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Introduction
Economist fiave, for t/ie mosf part,
/bund ffie w/io/e suö/ect o/faiow/edge too s/ippery too Ziand/e
- Edith Penrose (1957)
A common theme in industrial organization Q/O) economics is the notion
that external forces shape the profit potentials of individual firms. Profits, or
the lack thereof, are industry driven, and are largely seen to be determined
by market power and industry structure. Early neo-classical perfect
competition theory concluded that whatever short-run profit an individual
firm is able to reap is eventually eroded by the entrance of more firms,
driving prices down and yielding market equilibrium of zero economic
profits (Stigler 1957). Conceding that the presence of alternative market
structures within which individual firms have the power to influence the
price of their products and services, the first wave of I/O theorists, led by
Mason (1957, 1966) and Bain (1951, 1954), argued that profits were only
possible if oligopolistic and monopolistic firms created entry barriers for the
whole industry. Seen through Porter's theory of competitive forces (1979a,
1979b, 1980), a firm's ability to capture economic rents is largely
determined strategic group memberships, which involves the erection of
different mobility barriers that insulate the strategic group from entry byrivals.
These outward-oriented theories turned out to be very fruitful for
economic exploration, but they also have drawbacks. In the first place, they
have dominated research thinking for so long that it is tempting to suggest
that firms could only improve their performance by finding an attractive
industry and/or by harnessing or suppressing competition. In Porter's
words: "Strategy can be viewed as building defenses against the competitive
forces or finding positions in the industry where the forces are weakest"
(1979a: 140).' As this statement suggests, a "superior" firm E essentially a
firm that operates in an industry with high barriers to entry, and/or
formulates a strategy that prevents outsiders from occupying a similar
strategic position. In the second place, the I/O paradigm fails to explain, or
even acknowledge, the phenomenon of interfirm differences in efficiency
within industry and strategic group. The critical issue as to why, for
instance, ArQule had revenues per employee totaling $US 152,000 in 2001
while Cortech went out of business remains unanswered. Same industrial
group, same barriers to entry, same market (e.g. chemical-based services and
products), different performance. Why? In this context, a firm seeking to
outperform its rivals will only find limited guidance in the essentially static
I/O literature.
To accommodate the problems arising from the I/O perspective, the
knowledge-based analysis of superior performance developed in this thesis
will combine contributions from the resource-based theory of the firm, the
emerging knowledge-based theory of the firm, evolutionary economics,
economics of innovation, organizational learning and the industry life cycle
literature. In particular, the theory subscribes to the resource-based view of
the firm that is closely associated with the firm's rare, valuable, non-imitable
and non-substitutable bundle of resources and competences. This
knowledge-based model, however, posits the need to integrate dynamic
considerations and reframes the central principles of the resource-based
theory of the firm to highlight knowledge as the single most important
resource of the firm. The idea that superior performance depends mainly on
this intangible asset is based on the fundamental premise that a firm must
repeatedly innovate in order to survive and grow in an environment where
customers demand changes rapidly, competition intensifies and technological
change is characterized by high complexity, high uncertainty and high
velocity. More importantly, it is assumed that knowledge is by no means
static, implying that its creation can only reinforce a firm's competences and
hence competitive standing in such environment. Learning, therefore, is of
1. Porter (1980) identifies three generic strategies: (1) overall cost leadership (i.e. to
produce the same or better quality product at less cost than rivals); (2) differentiation
(i.e. to produce a different or better product/service from rivals); and (3) market
niche/segmentation (i.e. to service a narrow target more effectively than rivals).crucial importance to reach and sustain a high performance position.
This theory also considers the impact of technological discontinuities on
market structures. Thus, the thesis examines two kinds of technological
discontinuities: (1) competence-destroying discontinuities and (2)
competence-enhancing discontinuities. The implication drawn from this
distinction is that competence-destroying discontinuities can shift the
competitive emphasis in favor of new entrants, whereas competence-
enhancing discontinuities give a long-term advantage to large incumbents.
ÄnoiWedge-öased t/ieo/y o/£he firm and comij/jatoria/ c/ie/nitfry
From a theoretical point of view, combinatorial chemistry (or
combichem) provides an interesting background for presenting a knowledge-
based theory of the firm. As will later be shown, firms using combinatorial
chemistry operate in a turbulent environment, where technology, demand
and competition rapidly evolve. Innovations, obviously, occupy center
stage. In addition, combinatorial chemistry, which is here defined as "the
systematic and repetitive, covalent connection of a set of different "building
blocks" of varying structures to each other to yield a large array of diverse
molecular entities" (Gallop et al. 1994:1233), presents all the attributes of a
competence-enhancing process discontinuity. On the one hand,
combinatorial synthesis and combinatorial drug discovery largely rest on a
knowledge base that has been around for decades, already known and shared
by a large network of universities, public research institutions, large
established firms, etc. On the other hand, the days of laborious, expensive
and slow organic synthesis are long gone. Where a team of chemists would
previously produce one molecule a week at a cost of $US 7-8000, scientists
have now the possibility to synthesize, hundreds, if not thousands of
molecules a week at a cost of $US 8-12 per unit.
This latter point cannot be overstressed, given that the main bottleneck
in the therapeutic drug market is no longer biological, but chemical. Almost
every drug works through a structural interaction with a target protein that
plays key roles in the disease process. Typically, a drug binds to a target, like
a key in a lock, and either induces or inhibits the protein's normal function.
While all drug discovery programs traditionally aimed at about 500
molecular targets (Drews 1997), the explosion of new targets stemming
from the Human Genome Project now puts the burden of innovations on the
shoulders of organic chemists. "We're in a very target-rich but lead-poor
post-genomics era for drug discovery", explains Raymond Stevens,
researcher at the Scripps Research Institute and co-founder of Syrrx (Henry
2001a:69). In summary, chemistry is once again the main driver of
technological change in the pharmaceutical industry.
No wonder, then, that 7}ie Economist put combinatorial chemistry on itslist of technologies "to watch" in 1996. Two years later, the scientific journal
Science (1998) brought further attention to this technology, recognizing it as
one of nine discoveries that transform our ideas about the natural world. In
2000, 77me magazine named Peter Schultz, a pioneer scientist-entrepreneur
in the field, one of the most important innovators of the century. No study
to date, however, has documented what is one of the most important
technological achievements to happen in the pharmaceutical industry since
the first gene splicing experiment by Cohen and Boyer in 1973. In 1995, the
technology has even entered the arena of new materials, polymers,
phosphors, catalysts and agrochemicals. Although the ensuing generic
technological developments have been unnoticed by students of
technological change, they have led to the establishment of new companies
and substantial research endeavors by large (agro)chemical firms, some of
which being the very same companies that have pulled out, or reduced, their
investment in agricultural biotechnology.
What is surprising, therefore, is that combinatorial chemistry is almost
entirely missed by economists. If combinatorial chemistry is discussed, it is
almost always discussed in terms of a simple technology used by dedicated
biotechnology firms (DBFs). The view adopted in this thesis is that, although
dozens of DBFs have invested in the radical innovation (i.e. innovations that
result in order-of-magnitude improvement in the performance/price ratio),
the new breed of new entrants, often founded by scientists from
departments of chemistry at universities, made it increasingly difficult to
distinguish between pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals.
Although these new entrants share the spotlight with large incumbents
and scientific organizations, they will be the main characters of this thesis, for
two reasons. The first reason is that new chemical-based entrants, most
notably Coselco Mimotopes in Australia and Affymax in the United States,
initiated technological change in the field, bringing out the first innovations
in the pharmaceutical drug market. By shattering an important barrier to
entry -the cost of chemical synthesis, these firms, which now total 393, have
entered a technological field that has been the province of large
pharmaceutical companies since the industry emerged in the 1880s. Market
structures, consequently, have been significantly altered by the technological
discontinuity. The second reason is that higher labour absorption can be
achieved through small firmst According to Audretsch (2001), the net
2. According to a study commissioned by the California Healthcare Institute, jobs
generated by the emergence of combinatorial chemistry offer good stipends too; thus,
employees working in California for the combinatorial synthesis sector earn an average of
$67,000 per year, as much as in the biotechnology industry but considerably more than
those employed in the medical laboratories sector, which make about $36,900 annually
(Gallagher 1998).employment gain during 1990-1995 is greater among small firms than larger
firms and while the latter yields a larger number of patents, the former
exhibits higher patenting rates when measured on a per employee basis.
Hence, it is clear that combinatorial chemistry is a new promising
technological area for economic growth and thereby will necessarily
command greater attention as far as policy-makers are concerned.
Diesis ou£/ine
This thesis is divided into four parts and seven chapters. In the first part,
chapter 2 establishes the foundation of a knowledge-based theory of higher
performance. In the resource-based tradition, superior performance is
ascribed to the firm's bundle of rare, valuable, non-imitable and non-
substitutable resources and competences. As these conditions may not be
enough to sustain a high performance position in a turbulent environment,
the theory presented in this chapter focuses on knowledge and the need to
bring new innovations on a continuous basis. More specifically, the theory
recognizes that three different features of the firm must be taken into
account if one is to shed light on the determinants of superior performance.
These three features are: (1) fechno/ogica/ /earning; (2) tnesfod o/'accumu/ated
AnovWedge; and (3) paf/i dependence. Borrowing from Tushman and Anderson
(1986), the chapter also argues that technological discontinuities can affect
industry structures by increasing, or decreasing, the entry-exit ratio.
The second part essentially deals with technological change. Chapter 3
provides technical background on the combinatorial synthesis methods, its
origins and expanding knowledge base. As will be demonstrated, the
technology is best described in terms of a competence-enhancing process
innovation leading to a period of incremental improvements representing
progress along four trajectories: (1) chemical synthesis, (2) lead discovery
and lead optimization, (3) knowledge-based combinatorial chemistry and (4)
new materials. Another central lesson that can be drawn from this chapter is
that rapid advances in genomic sciences have the effect of fragmenting the
demand of chemical-based services and products.
The third part and chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to the three main
players in the innovation network. Chapter 4 reviews the build up of new
entrants. The chapter also demonstrates how these new entrants have been
able to cope with the turbulent environment by /earning, both internally and
externally, about the innovations carried out along the four trajectories. A
focus on the process of external learning with smaller firms (i.e. firms with
less than 1,000 employees), most notably genomic firms, will also clarify
how suppliers of combinatorial libraries have been able to metamorphose
into suppliers of pharmaceutical services and products, most importantly
small molecule drugs (i.e. pills). For the purpose of this thesis, new entrantsrefer to companies that use the combinatorial techniques and have less than
1,000 employees.
Chapter 5 takes a closer look at the corporate response of large
established pharmaceutical and (agro)chemical companies: (1) in-house
development, (2) acquisition of new entrants, (3) learning through alliances
with new entrants and (4) scientific organizations. Following Rothwell
(1989, 1992) and Rothwell and Dodgson (1994), it is argued there that these
large incumbents have a material advantage (i.e. they can achieve economies
of scale and scope in R&D, they possess the necessary assets to produce and
distribute their innovations, etc.). In particular, a larger sfodr o/accumu/afed
AnoiWedgeallowed them to catch up with, and even establish their dominance
over, their smaller counterparts. However, a perspective is beginning to
emerge that challenges the Tushman-Anderson model: new chemical-based
entrants might be here to stay. As shown in the chapter, the introduction of
combinatorial chemistry appears to stimulate a new division of labour
between new entrants and large incumbents in the pharmaceutical industry,
the former providing chemical-based innovations while the latter provide
funding, complementary technologies and expertise in marketing,
distribution and regulatory affairs. More generally, combinatorial chemistry
and the firms that have embraced it further change market structures by
fostering new inter-organizational relationships on the basis of chemical-
based services and products, especially joint R&D and licensing of small
molecule drugs.
Chapter 6 focuses on scientific organizations. A scientific organization is
a term broadly used in this thesis to describe, indiscriminately, universities,
public research organization and private, non-profit research organizations.
The chapter is oriented towards the contribution of these scientific
organizations to industrial innovations and goes on to assess the transfer of
technology to new entrants. It also examines the competitive position of US-
based firms with respect to new entrants from the European Union and the
rest of world, suggesting that United States have a competitive advantage
over other countries thanks to a greater dissemination of knowledge into the
American economy.
The last part and chapter 7 return to the theory presented in chapter 2
and pick up many of the themes from chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. The final
chapter, therefore, is essentially concerned with one theoretical question,
namely, the conditions that separate the winning firms from the losers in a
turbulent environment. A correlation and regression analysis is introduced
as a means to test whether higher performance is related to the following
factors: (1) levels of internal learning, (2) levels of external learning with
other organizations, (3) learning through acquisitions, (4) research
"openness", (5) localization, (6) size and (7) diversification. The results
reveal the importance of (1) external learning with scientific organizations,(2) localization in California, (3) number of employees, (4) a competence in
combinatorial material and (5) previous experience in drug discovery. The
chapter and the thesis will conclude by drawing the following normative
prescriptions: firms can increase their revenues by building a multiple
technology platform, by increasing levels of internal learning, by fostering
"openness" of their research and by establishing close Inks with scientific
organizations.PART I: THE THEORYCHAPTER 2
Technological Learning
and Superior Performance
Man educated at t/?e expense of/nucn /a/wur and (ime
may te compa/ied to one o/" f/jase expensive macnines
Adam Smith (1776)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The resource-based view of the firm, which is rooted in the pioneering work
of Penrose (1959), Chandler (1962), Learned a al. (1965) and Andrews
(1971), may be given credit for shifting the axis of intellectual discussion
about the source of superior performance towards the Firm's resources and
competences. Hence it offers a natural and useful starting point in
formulating the foundations of a knowledge-based theory (section 2.2).
Besides discussing what is meant by "knowledge" and why it matters (section
2.3), the chapter also stipulates that three features of the firm have an
important bearing on its performance: (1) technological learning, (2) the
stock of accumulated knowledge, and (3) path dependence (section 2.4).
The basic purpose of section 2.5 is to examine the impact of technological
discontinuities on the long-term performance of new entrants and large12
incumbents. Some brief concluding comments are provided in the final
section.
2.2. PRELIMINARY TENETS FROM THE RESOURCE-BASED THEORY OF THE FIRM
Resource-based theorists have generated an impressive -and rather
heterogeneous- amount of theoretical and empirical work, and the following
account can do no more than bring forward and define the main concepts
and tenets that are germane to this knowledge-based model. Resources will
therefore be defined and categorized as tangible assets such as machines,
land, plants, etc., and intangible assets such as knowledge, patents, brand
name, entrepreneurial culture, etc. (Penrose 1959; Wemerfelt 1984).
Competences will refer to the combination of resources that are held by the
firm and help fulfill a particular task or activity (Collis 1991; Grant 1991,
1998). In this thesis, superior performance will describe the extent to which
resources and competences provide a firm with the ability to survive and
outperform its rivals. Armed with these three basic concepts, it is now
possible to examine the four tenets that run through most contributions, as
encapsulated in the following fundamental proposition: (1) Superior
per/brmance may be ac/i/eved and suifa/ned by a/iy g/ven firm (2) j/if can /everage its
bund/e o/" rare and va/uab/e resources and competences, (3) more speci7!ca//y, t/iose fnat
are simu/faneous/y di/ficu/r to imitare (4) and to substitute. Each one of these four
tenets will be considered in turn.
Superior per/brmance may be acnieved and sustained by any given /irm ...
Underlying the first tenet of the resource-based theory is an idea that is
very much questioned by early neo-classical economics theory: a firm,
regardless of its industrial or even strategic position, can create, capture
and, most importantly, sustain superior performance. Many attempts have
nevertheless been made to detect any differences (or consistency) in
efficiency and profitability levels among firms. Collectively, these studies
concluded that firms within an industry have very different features in terms
of job creation and destruction (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992), innovative
and imitative capabilities (Dosi 1984; Patel and Pavitt 1997), growth rates
(Dunne et al. 1996), productivity levels (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992;
Jensen and McGuckin 1997) and profitability (Jacobsen 1988; Gerowski and
Jacquemin 1988). Crucially, they have also concluded that such differences
can persist over long stretches of time. Sustainability, however, should not
be taken to mean that a high performance position is "eternal". For example,
Jacobsen (1988), who examined the time-series behavior of return to
investment of 2,000 business units over a 20-year period, points to the
persistence of within-industry asymmetries in profits rates, though at some13
point also finds that profits appear to move slowly towards competitive
levels.
...i/"if can /everage its öu/jc/ie o/"rare and va/uaWe resources and competences...
The resource-based curriculum is best known for explaining the
phenomenon of inter-firm differences in performance in terms of
heterogeneity of resources and competences. The tenet largely rests on the
Ricardian assumption that valuable resources and competences, by definition
yielding greater than average productivity gains, are in short supply, in turn
implying that inferior resources/competences are also brought into
production (Peteraf 1993). In this resource-based view, firms endowed with
rare and valuable resources/competences will be able to capture above-
normal profits while firms endowed with resources and competences that are
shared with large numbers of competitors should only expect to break even
(Barney 1991, 1997; Peteraf 1993; Dollinger 1999). Now, the important
question to ask is: What evidence is there that profitability has its source in
the firm's internal characteristics rather than in the firm's external
environment?
To begin, it is important to recognize that intra-industry variation in
profits, as demonstrated in a series of econometric studies, is far greater than
inter-industry variation in profits (Schmalensee 1985; Wernerfelt and
Montgomery 1988; Rumelt 1982, 1991). For example, Rumeit (1982), in a
study examining 1,292 US corporations over a 20-year period, reveals that
inter-firm differences in profitability within industry are three to five times
bigger than differences in profit rates across industries. But this too raises a
question: What causes this variation in profits? Hansen and Wernerfelt's
study (1989) suggests that firm characteristics (i.e. communication flow,
emphasis on human resources, decision-making practices, etc.) are largely
responsible, accounting for far more profitability variance as industry
characteristics (i.e. average industry profits, market share, firm size, etc.).
Perhaps more importantly, the simple procedure of assuming that
profitability derives from strategic group memberships, as set forth in
Porter's theory of competitive forces, has also been forcefully criticized. For
instance, Cool and Schendel (1988) demonstrated, using longitudinal data
from the US pharmaceutical industry between 1963-1982, that firms
pursuing similar strategies can nevertheless display significant asymmetries in
performance levels.
In line with the econometric studies, an impressive number of case
studies covering a wide range of industries underline the significance of
idiosyncratic resources cum competences, associating those which are
valuable and unique to the superior performance of individual firms. The
point is best made with two practical examples. In the bearing industry,14
Collis (1991) convincingly demonstrates that Minebea's success in the market
of precision miniature bearing and 256 K DRAMS owes much to its low cost
strategy that exploits its intangible assets and competence in "high quality
volume production". In the retailing industry, Stalk et al. (1992) show that
Wall Mart's unique inventory-replenishment system, combined with its
highly effective human resource system, had transformed the American
company from a small niche retailer to the world's largest and most
profitable retailing company. Miller and Shamsie (1996) indicate that long-
term contracts for movie stars help to explain the superior performance of
Hollywood film studios in the period 1936-1950.
...more specificaiVy, those tfiaf aresimu/faneousiy di/ficuif fo imitate...
Resource-based theorists share a common point in advocating that rare
and valuable resources cum competences must equally be imperfectly
imitable, namely, hard to copy, if they were to create and sustain higher
performance. The resource-based argument goes, if resources and
competences were to be easily and cheaply duplicated by rivals, the
condition of heterogeneity will be violated, driving profits back to
competitive rates. In this respect, Rumelt brought forward the concept of
the isolating mechanism, described as "the phenomena that limit the ex posf
equilibration of rents among individual firms" (1984:567). Isolating
mechanisms can therefore be compared with the concepts of entry barrier
and mobility barrier which, to recycle Rumelt's formula, refer to the
phenomena that limit the ex posf equilibration of rents among individual
industries and strategic groups.
At first sight isolating mechanisms seem to have the attributes of a
"catchall" concept. To see this most vividly, consider the fact that Mahoney
and Pandian (1992) have identified 37 different isolating mechanisms in the
literature, ranging from time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool
1989) and unique combinations of business experience (Prahalad and Bettis
1986) to causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt 1982) and patents (Alchian
1984). Impressive though their list may be, the authors pointedly remarked
that most isolating mechanisms exist as a result of causal ambiguity. In other
words, isolating mechanisms implicitly underscore the fact that the causality
of events leading to superior performance, being very hard to untangle,
often hinder the imitative efforts of competing firms (Lippman and Rumelt
1982). Demsetz expresses it this way: "It may be difficult for these firms to
understand the reasons for this difference in performance or to know which
inputs to attribute the performance of successful firms" (1973:7). This is
essentially why the possession of tangible assets, being inherently mobile,
easy to purchase and/or "reverse-engineer", seldom represents a source of
superior performance (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Peteraf 1993).15
... and to suteüftite.
Every theorists of the resource-based perspective have rightly stressed the
threat (or opportunity) of imitable resources. Fewer, however, have
pondered the substitution of resources (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Barney
1991, 1992, 1997). The apprehension over substitutable resources,
embodied by Porter in his "diamond" of competitive forces (1980), is
nevertheless a serious matter, the "seriousness" largely depending on the
form taken by the substitutability; that is to say, on whether substitutable
resources are: (1) equivalent and equally costly; (2) equivalent and cheaper;
or (3) superior and equally costly. First, if equivalent and equally costly
resources were to be owned by competitors, prices might have to go down
and profits shared among sellers. Second, if equivalent and cheaper resources
were to be employed, a firm's competitive advantage could be wiped out
altogether. Third, if superior and equally expensive resources were to be
used by rivals, the ability to capture super-normal returns and experience
higher performance would be moved away from the pioneering firm towards
the challengers (Barney 1991, 1992, 1997). An example of his form of
substitutability is to be found in the anti-ulcer drug sub-market. Introduced
by SmithKline in 1977, the H2-antagonist Tagamet, the first of its kind, was a
blockbuster, capturing the whole sub-market, commanding a premium price
and providing an important source of super normal returns to the company.
However, the UK-based company Glaxo responded 6 years later with
Zantac, a slightly modified version of Tagamet that had fewer side effects. As
a result, Glaxo, despite charging slightly more than its US counterpart for its
ulcer drug, had captured 25 percent of the sub-market within one year and
55 percent by the end of May 1993, whereas SmithKline's market share had
decreased from total market to 21 percent in 1993 (Berndt et al. 1994).
2.3 KNOWLEDGE AS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE OF THE FIRM
Such as it is, the discussion about the resource-based theory of the firm has
expressly moved the source of superior performance away from industry-
wide and strategic group characteristics and memberships towards the firm's
resource endowments and competences. Another fundamental lesson that
the resource-based perspective allows one to extract is that a sustained
superior performance demands that resources and competences comply with
the conditions of (1) heterogeneity; (2) non-imitability; and (3) non-
substitutability. The key to profitability, here, is not only a matter of being
dj/Terenf but also, perhaps as crucially, a matter of protecting this uniqueness
(Wemerfelt 1989; Aharoni 1993; Grant 1998). Accordingly, the way
forward can only be the formulation of strategies that enable the firm to align
the intangible assets that meet the above conditions with the marketplace.16
Following this insight, Teece (1980, 1982), Schoemaker and Amit (1994)
and Grant (1991, 1998), setting out the first claims on behalf of the
resource-based approach to strategy formulation, have devised useful
guidelines and procedures for top management to follow and observe. Grant
(1991), for instance, suggested that profit seeking firms ought to: (1) identify
their unique, non-imitable and non-substitutable resources; (2) identify their
unique, non-imitable and non-substitutable competences, otherwise known
as core competences; (3) appraise the rent-generating potential of their
resources and core competences; (4) select a strategy which best exploits
their resources and core competences; and (5) identify the resources gaps
that need to be filled. It is useful to note that steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 are
essentially "static" in nature, involving the management and coordination of
the firm's current resources and competences, in contrast to step 5, which
involves the "dynamic" replenishment of resources. Admittedly, a one-sided,
static emphasis on existing intangible assets would be shortsighted in a
turbulent environment, where customers' demand for products and services
changes rapidly, competition intensifies and the pace of technological change
accelerates. If one accepts the fundamental premise that profit-seeking firms
must adapt by moving their competences along such environment, then the
presumption that knowledge is the single most important resource of the
firm naturally follows. A number of authors have drawn attention in different
ways to this dynamic aspect of competition. For example, Aaker (1989), in a
survey of 248 businesses, asked 68 managers from high-tech businesses about
the source of their competitive advantage. The majority cited technological
superiority as the most important factor, much more than managers from
services and manufacturing businesses. Another example is a study situated
within the pharmaceutical industry by Roberts (1999), which shows that a
firm can only maintain a high performance position if it repeatedly
introduces innovations that service previously unmet consumer demands.
However, a knowledge-based theory of superior performance should be
regarded as more than just a resource-based theory of the firm with special
emphasis on knowledge as the ultimate resource. At least in today's world,
knowledge sets apart from other tangibles in being dynamic and difficult, if
not impossible, to monopolize. As a result, a shift towards a knowledge-
based theory of the firm, which seems natural for the study of a high-tech
industry, demands a treatment of knowledge to be realistic and useful.
Because of the inherent complexity of such model, the arguments will be
built piece-by-piece, beginning with a thorough examination of what is
meant by the term "knowledge" and why it matters. A classification of
knowledge and some comments about its attributes will therefore be
proposed in the next few pages, followed by theoretical propositions that are
broadly consistent with the discussion on knowledge.17
2.3J Tavonomy of/cnoiW
The idea that knowledge has important economic value perhaps dates
back to the eighteen century when Adam Smith (1776:8) brought attention
to the power of specialization and division of labor. Henceforward,
contemporary economists have pondered in many different ways its
economic significance, glimpses of which may be caught by reading the
history of economic thought. Preceding the national systems of innovation
literature by hundred years, List's appreciation (1841) of England's industrial
leadership was one that relates the wealth of that nation to its larger stock of
accumulated knowledge assets. Breaking fresh theoretical ground, Marx
suggested in the late eighteen century that inventions and innovations were
the outcome of interactions between social classes and institutions. More
recently, Marshall (1952:115) boldly stated that "knowledge is our most
powerful engine of production; it enables us to subdue Nature and forces
her to satisfy our wants." Finally, Schumpeter (1942:1954) introduces the
notion that innovation as an engine of growth is the driving force of the
evolution of capitalist societies.
In spite of all this, the very idea of formalizing these arguments into
practical models had largely been overlooked, if not completely ignored by
mainstream economics. By all accounts, conceptualizing and
operationalizing knowledge has always been a difficult task. To see this, one
only has to note that "neo-classical production functions" had traditionally
emphasized the relationships between the maximum output that can be
produced by every possible combination of labor, capital, material and
energy. The issue of knowledge and technologies had conveniently been
subsumed into the production function. Economists would simply assume
that these two intangible assets were in the public domain, suggesting that
many parties could benefit from their production by virtue of the fact that
they are considered to be inexpensive to teach and learn compared with the
cost of invention or innovation (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962a).
Nevertheless, this simple, materialist conception of knowledge and
technologies is not unassailable. Since Machlup (1962), a score of academics
have criticized this conception on epistemological grounds; thus, they
pointedly remarked that knowledge has multiple dimensions and attributes,
suggesting that focus on an isolated aspect would only represent a fraction of
what is necessary to capture its true nature. Winter, for instance, decries
"the paucity of language useful for discussing the subject" (1987:180). In this
context, scholars of technological change have argued that taxonomies of
knowledge highlighting its multifaceted nature would actually be more
helpful than attempts to conceptualize it.' Although several classifications of
3. Other critics and/or taxonomies can be found in Winter (1987), Nelson (1989),18
knowledge have been proposed, the typology of Lundvall aid Johnson
(1994) offers the advantage of stressing the properties of knowledge in terms
of transferability across time, space and people. Subsequently adopted by the
OECD (1996, 2000), this typology draws a clear and useful distinction
between: (1) faxw-wAat; (2) toow-w/iy," (3) taw-how; and (4) Jknow-w/io.
denotes knowledge about facts and is, quite simply, related to
information that can be transmitted in the form of data and messages to
decision agents. Examples of know-what includes the facts that Edwin
Merrifield synthesized the first enzyme, that Zeneca was awarded the patent
EP 0820591-A1 for an affinity Chromatographie method for screening
combinatorial libraries, that a radio-ligand experiment gives a certain
percent inhibition, etc. This form of know-what is commonly traded by
independent companies specialized in law and medicine.
most commonly known as scientific knowledge of the principles
and laws of nature, in the human mind and in society. The discovery that 2'
substituted phenethylamines bind with a receptors, thus activating the
production of proteins, is one instance. Another one is the discovery that the
deficits caused by Parkinson's disease are associated with nicotinic
acetylcholine receptor subtypes, which regulate the release of dopamine and
acetylcholine. Know-why offers great opportunities for industrial
innovations, though its contribution varies widely across industries and
technologies (Godin 1996). The creation of know-why is mainly organized in
universities, government laboratories, private, non-for profit research
institutes and firms in high-technology sectors like genetics, Pharmaceuticals
and chemistry are also known to invest in its production.
oiv is to the individual what competences are to the firm: the
accumulated skills and abilities that allow him/her to achieve something
smoothly and efficiently (von Hippel 1988; Lundvall and Johnson 1994). As
economists have come to appreciate, this form of disembodied knowledge as
a strategic resource is paramount: technological success, akin to sports and
music, cannot simply be achieved by understanding physical laws or by
reading books. Manuals may provide great insights and guidance as to how to
perform well, but success without painstaking and repeated practice would
elude even the most well red scientist.
AO refers to a combination of social skills and information about who
knows what, why and how. Know-who is built on trust and is gained through
Nonaka (1991), Spender (1993), Kwavnicki (1994), Gibbons et al. (1994), DenHertog
and Huizenga (2000), Garud (1997) and OECD (1996, 2000).19
day-to-day dealings with costumers, sub-contractors, universities, rivals, etc.
As will be shown, know-who is particularly important for technological
systems, since the know-how necessary to devise complex innovation is
usually widely dispersed in a network of innovators.
More than just mere semantics, this taxonomy of knowledge allows one
to draw an overview of the four attributes that affect the process of
knowledge creation, accumulation and diffusion. The first attribute is that
know-what and know-why have many of the characteristics that are otherwise
associated with non-rival, durable public goods. They may be absorbed and
used jointly by many players without losing their value in the course of
repeated use (Dasgupta and David 1994). The second attribute is that know-
what and know-why are generally easy to codify, their main vehicles ranging
from manuals, textbooks, scientific and technical journals to computer
programs and operating manuals for commercial process plant and research
equipment. The third attribute is that know-how and know-who are typically
more "tacit" than know-what and know-why. The concept of tacit
knowledge, first described by Polanyi in his book Persona/ Know/edge: Towards
a Ajst-Critfcay P/iiiosop/iy (1958), refers to the idea that people know much
more than they are able to describe. Paraphrasing Polanyi's classical
illustration of bicycle riding or swimming, these activities might be practiced
successfully, but full awareness of how they are done -the elementary facts
that constitute them- can never really be achieved. The fourth and final
attribute is that know-why may possess generic attributes that allow it to be
used as a shared input in the search for closely related products and services.
For instance, know-why that has been used to discover pharmaceutical
products has proven to be applicable to the development of new pesticides,
but not the design of motor cars (Pavitt 1992).
2.3.2 AnovWedge as a semi'-puWic, se/nj-priva<e good
Thus described, it is obvious that knowledge represents a resource that
has little resemblance to other assets, its particularity resting on the fact that
knowledge is neither completely public nor completely private. On the one
hand, there is a public aspect attached to codified know-what and know-why
because educated people may simply learned them by reading manuals,
textbooks, etc. (Nonaka 1991; Dasgupta and David 1994; Lundvall and
Johnson 1994). This possibility, of course, is influenced by the amount of
knowledge being codified, which varies greatly depending on how costly it is
to do and the extent to which rewards can be captured from the extra effort
involved (David 1993). In this respect, information and communication
technologies (ICT) in general and the Internet in particular have reduced
substantially the transmission costs of know-what and know-why among20
economic agents, thus altering radically the knowledge production and
distribution chain. The fact that codified know-why and know-what have
non-rival and durable public features is also noteworthy, since the ease with
which it can be reduced, transmitted, stored and reproduced raises a
problem of appropriability -the classical "free rider" problem. While the
buyer of knowledge has no idea about the value of the know-why and know-
what she or he wants to acquire, the seller has little incentives to reveal her
or his knowledge for evaluation for fear of losing it. Such knowledge is also
typically generic and widely used by professionals in the field, which
generally means that other specialists can ferret out the generic aspects of a
rival's technology (Nelson 1989).
Unless, of course, its access is restricted through expensive measures such
as patent laws and "codes" or "languages" designed to ensure secrecy (i.e. not
known to external agents) (Cowan and Foray 1997). The essence of patent
protection is that an invention cannot be commercially made, used,
distributed or sold without the patent owner's consent. In theory, the patent
owner has the monopoly right to decide who may use the patented invention
for a 20 year-period. In practice, the legal system through which know-what
and know-why is shielded from competition needs careful consideration.
This is due to the fact that patents have different protective value across
industries, their effectiveness varying greatly according to the type of
innovation the firm is trying to safeguard and the industry it operates. Thus,
the survey questionnaires conducted by Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al.
(2000) on appropriability conditions strongly suggest that patents are
generally better suited to products than processes. The surveys also show
that patents are highly effective for a small number of industries, most
notably in the pharmaceutical sector, but ineffective for most innovations in
other sectors. So ineffective, in fact, that firms often choose not to patent,
especially processes, the ease of inventing around and information disclosure
being adduced as the main reason for keeping the innovation as trade secret.
Also, it needs to be insisted that know-why is never "free" as major
investments in learning must be made before know-what and know-why have
any meaning (OECD 2000).''
On the other hand, knowledge may be seen as a private good in that
know-who and know-how have tacit and specific elements preventing them
from being easily traded in the market (Lundvall and Johnson 1994). In fact,
markets as a governance structure are only efficient when know-how is
4. Sociologist of science Michel Callon presents the case clearly: "You might print
thousands of copies of an article or a book and air-drop copies in Lapland or in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. You might similarly send well-trained students or well-calibrated
instruments to the far corners of the earth. However, if all these elements do not come
together in a single place at the same time, the dissemination will have been a waste of
time" (1989:402).21
embodied in a product and the product efficiently used without having to
grasp the nuts and bolts of its production (Demsetz 1988; Grant 1996a).
Scientists do not need to know how a piece of automated instrumentation
has been constructed in order to use it; they may simply purchase the item
from a supplier. In contrast, know-who is socially embedded knowledge that
cannot be communicated through formal channels of information, and it
cannot be bought: "you cannot buy trust and, if you could, it would have no
value whatsoever", writes Arrows (1971).^ Likewise, know-how possesses
distinguishing features that impinge on its transferability across boundaries.
That is, its difficult-to-verbalize property makes it difficult to transmit from
individual to individual (Polanyi 1958, 1966), from firm to firm (Nelson and
Winter 1982; Spender 1996) and from country to country (Teece 1981;
Westphal et al. 1985).
There should therefore be no mistake in casting tacit know-how and tacit
know-who in terms of causal ambiguity and, consequently, isolating
mechanisms. Inherently hard to articulate, tacit knowledge generates, in the
words of Reed and DeFillipi: "ambiguity through the skilled operator's own
level of unawareness of the actions that he or she undertakes. Consequently,
the causal relationships between action and results remains less than apparent
or is not understandable to rivals" (1990:91). Because of this property,
duplicative efforts can be a costly enterprise. Mansfield et al. (1981), for
instance, estimated that the imitation costs of innovations remain close to 70
percent of innovation costs. One must also reckon with the fact that know-
how is seldom completely used efficiently outside the firm that has generated
it. The explanation is that that much learning is "localized", specific to
particular contexts, to the experience of the user, the producer or both
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969; Dosi 1988). Nonetheless, the proprietary nature
of know-how and know-who is not watertight. For one thing, tacit know-
how can be learned if demonstrations, personal instruction and the provision
of expert services by those who possess it are involved (David 1993). For
another thing, technologies tend to display lower levels of tacitness in the
course of their life cycle, since the degree of codification often increases as
innovations mature (Saviotti 1998). Consequently, the potency of causal
ambiguity regarding tacit knowledge eventually declines over time, and the
cost and difficulties associated with the transfer of know-how is reduced in
due course. Take the example of genetic engineering. Born in 1973, the
radical innovation caught the scientific community by storm, and yet, the
basic principles became widely accessible to scientists and students alike in
1982, when Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory published Mo/ecu/ar C7o/u7>g: /4
laboratory Manual (Fujimura 1988). Yet another thing is that firms seeking to
gain access to tacit know-how and know-who can hire a top scientist or top
5. As quoted in OECD (2000:17).22
manager away from a competing firm, though firms have particular
institutional arrangements that may help protect these intangible assets. For
example, employment contacts containing a restriction clause and a non-
compete clause could help reduce the mobility of the know-how and know-
who employees possess (Liebeskind 1996) .^
2.4 TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING AS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT PROCESS OF THE
FIRM
A key element in this knowledge-based theory, as reflected in the previous
section, is that public and private knowledge cannot be easily dichotomized,
suggesting that knowledge remains a very difficult resource to protect against
imitation, let alone substitution. Hence, if the goal is to assess the conditions
which separate the technological leaders from the technological laggards in a
turbulent environment, a knowledge-based analysis of superior performance
must accept the notion that, because knowledge eventually leaks out to
industry, firms must maintain -and even speed up- their innovative
momentum to keep abreast of the technological race. Thus, resource-based
theorists, by simply assuming that the firm's valuable resources are those that
cannot be imitated or substituted by rivals, have often neglected the
disequilibrium process, and even sympathizers like Foss, Knudsen and
Montgomery (1995) recognize that issues such as technology and
entrepreneurship should be getting more attention.
By contrast, the evolutionary framework, being largely concerned with
the survival and growth of industries, has largely eschewed the firm as a unit
of analysis, but incorporates more realistic assumptions with respect to
innovations and technological change. In an evolutionary setting, the
knowledge-based economy leaps in and out of equilibrium, and
Schumpeterian competition occupies center stage: "The fundamental
impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the
new consumer's goods, the new methods of production and transportation,
the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist
creates..." (Schumpeter 1942:82).
Assuredly, evolutionary economics and resource-based theory have much
to gain from borrowing concepts and assumptions from each other. After all,
they both take an efficiency approach to firm performance, and both depend
on the claim that resource/knowledge asymmetry is the essence of
performance differences among firms since, without this claim, superior
performance would not be possible (Foss and Foss 1998). Mindful of this
6. In a restriction clause, an employee must exclusively work for the employee in
question, whereas in non-compete clause employees are forbidden from working for a
competitor for some time after quitting the Job (Liebeskind 1996).23
potential, authors such as Dierickkx and Cool (1989), Collis (1991, Conner
(1991), Lado et al. (1992), Grant (1996a, 1996b), Teece et al. (1997) and
Mathews (2002) have gone some way towards meeting theoretical
integration.
One of the most interesting and well-known examples of "cross-
fertilization" is to be found in the dynamic capability theory of Teece, Pisano
and Shuen (1997). Combining elements from the theories of Penrose (1959)
and Barney (1986) on the one hand, and Schumpeter (1934) and Nelson and
Winter (1982) on the other, the dynamic capability framework predicts that
accumulating valuable technology assets will not be enough for wealth
creation in a turbulent setting. Rather, the dynamic capability theory made
an important point stipulating that "the competitive advantage of firms lies
with its managerial and organizational processes, shaped by its (specific) asset
position, and the paths available to it" (Teece et al. 1997:518). This latter
argument concerning the three dimensions of the firm as a determinant of
superior performance provides a great opportunity for the development of a
model that will focus more closely on the attributes of knowledge, its
creation and accumulation. Specifically, the theory states that the firm's
fortunes: (1) are Mimateiy tied fo tfie process o/fedino/ogjca/ iearn/ng, (2) ivnich is
condifioned by its stodc of accumu/afed taw/edge, a/id (3) determined öy pafft
dependence.
2.4.7 Techno/ogica/ yearning
To sustain a superior performance, a firm is compelled to generate
knowledge in an endless race with its rivals. To accomplish this, the firm
must develop and upgrade its competences to match with the turbulent
environment: volatile customers demand, increasing competition and
rapidly changing technologies. According to this view therefore, a firm must
pursue a strategy requiring technological learning, which is here defined as
the process tnat aiiows firais fo create and accumu/afe Know/edge and purpose/u//y
ennance, expand and renew ttar competences as a response to cnanges in fecnnoiogy,
demand and competition/To comprehend the ramification of this definition, it
is useful to think about technological learning as a dual, yet overlapping set
of learning mechanisms and consider the following discussion on internal
learning, which focus on the creation and accumulation of knowledge within
the firm, and external learning, which concerns on the absorption of
knowledge from upstream and downstream sources such as universities,
suppliers, subsidiaries, rivals, customers, etc.
7. This definition of technological learning is largely consistent with the definitions
proposed by Dodgson (1991), Carayannis (1999) and Figueirido (2002).24
Zrtferna/ ieam/ng
Following Huber (1991), the firm can learn by grafting new employees,
that is, it can reinforce and develop its competences by hiring new members
who possess know-how not previously available within the firm. This is surely
why the movement of skilled graduates to industry is often regarded as the
single most important technology transfer mechanism of universities
(Gibbons and Johnston 1974; Abramson et al. 1997). While science and
engineering graduates must be taught about the lessons of "history" through
formal and informal training (Levitt and March 1988), this new personnel
brings into industry new knowledge and an ability to solve complex
problems, perform research and develop new ideas (Salter and Martin
2001).
However, if a firm is to increase its chances of survival in a turbulent
environment, it must also commit significant resources to in-house R&D.
This is because strong commitment to R&D is one of the surest ways to
produce innovations (Cohen 1995), generate firm profits, especially in
complex resource contexts (McEvily and Chakravarthy 1999), create
shareholder value (Keim et al. 1995) and raise capital in an initial public
offering (Deeds et al. 1997). The firm must also think strategically about
long-term outcome and hence promote changes or explore new alternatives,
especially in science-based industries which, by definition, rely heavily on
know-why (March 1991; Lei et al. 1996).* Although the outputs of know-
why creation deemed economically valuable remain the exception, "they are
critically important inputs to other investment processes that yield further
research findings, and sometimes yield innovation..." (David et al. 1992:68).
Thus, the process of know-why creation may not yield new products and
processes per se, but the interaction between this process and applied
research can play an important role in increasing the productivity of both
activities. This process does not come free of cost, however. As Klevorick
and colleagues (1995) have shown empirically, R&D intensity in an industry
is strongly related to the industry's connection with know-why created, and
opportunities generated, by scientific organizations.
Yet it would be a serious mistake to think of R&D as involving know-why
for the sole purpose of disrupting the status quo. This is due to the fact that
R&D generally aims at solving a broad range of technological problems in the
near term. According to the National Science Foundation (1998), more than
$US 160 billion were allocated was spent by the US industry on
development and applied research in 1998, but only $US 12 billion to basic
8. This is amply confirmed by scientometric studies, where patents in
Industries/technologies such as pharmaceutical, genetics and chemistry cite journals
dedicated to basic research more than those of applied research (Collins and Wyatt 1988;
Narin and Olivastro (1992).25
research (i.e. know-why creation).^ Emphasizing the *D" of R&D, Rosenberg
wrote that:
Even where technological change does clearly depend upon
previously existing science, it often turns out that the purely
scientific part of the research is the easy part: the real difficulty is
converting that newly acquired scientific knowledge into useful
products and services. We commonly attach very high status and
prestige to scientific accomplishments. But, if our primary
concern is with business activity and productivity improvements,
it is the technological achievements and their translation that
really counts (1992:65).
Relatedly, it would be mistaken to underestimate the importance of
learning by doing and incremental innovations. The concept of learning by
doing captures the essence of the fact that workers improve the efficiency of
production through the accumulation of know-how over time.'" Thus,
learning by doing creates changes in the way the product is manufactured
without alterations in physical capital, which have the effect of increasing
productivity levels. It also creates opportunities for communicating know-
how and know-what between workers/technicians and scientists, which may
be conducive to yet more innovations (David 1975; Rosenberg 1976). In
fact, taken together, the tacit know-how born of experience and small,
gradual improvements of innovations generate productivity gains greater
than those generated by the introduction of major technological innovations
(Enos 1962; Hollander 1963; Lieberman 1984; Rosenberg 1982, 1994). An
oft-cited example is Enos's long-term study on the petroleum refining
industry, which shows that cost reductions taking place during the
production stage were three times as significant as those associated with the
initial implementation of several radical innovations (Enos 1962).
Notice that incremental innovations often occur, not so much as the
result of any deliberate R&D activity but as the outcome of inventions and
improvements suggested by users or other persons engaged in the innovation
process. Take, for instance, oral contraceptive pills. Epidemiological studies
revealed that estrogen could increase the risk of thromboembolic disorders,
9. In the pharmaceutical industry, estimates for financial year 2000 show that
companies spent only 36 percent of R&D expenditures to pre-clinical functions, the rest
being allocated to human clinical trials (40.8 percent), development and quality-control
functions (11.7 percent), etc. (PHRMA 2001).
10. Wright (1936), an American engineer working for the aircraft industry, was the
first to make the observation that a firm's efficiency depends positively on the extent of its
previous productive activity, and the idea was taken up by economists such as Arrow
(1962b), Hollander (1965) and Lieberman (1984).26
some patients even voicing concerns over weight gain and symptoms of
nausea. In that event, feedback loops motivated the search for a better pill,
leading to the discovery oral contraceptives with lower concentrations of
estrogen and fewer side effects (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1994). Anyone
familiar with the economics of innovation literature would see a connection
between this latter example and the process learning by using. As pointed by
Rosenberg (1982), von Hippel (1988) and Lundvall (1992), a great deal of
disembodied knowledge may be accumulated in the course of using a new
scientific instrument, software product, piece of equipment and so on,
namely, through learning by using. Undergirding this view is the assumption
that users may gain know-how while using the innovation, since the
cumulative experience enables them to improve the execution of particular
tasks and thereby lower costs and increase efficiency. There is, of course,
more to this story. Another noteworthy feature of learning by using is that
feedback loops from users to producers can motivate the search for minor
and even major improvements. Thus, users can inform scientific actors
about the innovation's shortcomings or strengths, and the resulting
information used as basis for further research."
The reason why the process of internal learning is paramount for success
is simple: first, consider that knowledge is the single most important output
(innovation) and input (competence) in the innovative process. Thus the
innovative process contributes to 6ot/) the genesis of innovations and the
enhancement, expansion and renewal of competences, the impact of which
being felt long after a research program has been brought to fruition.
Second, consider that the creation of knowledge and strong competences
remain crucial to evaluate, absorb and assimilate external knowledge
produced outside the firm (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990). Arora and
Gambardella (1990) stress this point most of all; thus, they observed that
large pharmaceutical firms pursuing higher levels of R&D in biotechnology
were also those that exploit the most the opportunities of external learning
with new biotechnology firms and scientific organizations.
£f terna/ teaming
There are at least six reasons why firms may wish to collaborate with
other organizations: improving market power (Hagedoorn 1993), sharing
risks (Hamel 1989 et al.) and costs through scale and scope economies
(Kogut 1988; Ebers 1993), obtaining external legitimation (Baum and
11. For instance, the first generation of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) machines
had been impaired by the use of a DNA polymerase that tended to break down at high
temperature, compelling the addition of polymerase after each cycle of the reaction.
Noticing this glitch, an inspired technician suggested using a polymerase extracted from
the hotspring bacterium 77iermus aquatticus, which copes better with heat (Mullis 1990).27
Oliver 1991), and speeding up products to market (Rothwell 1992). Gaining
access to complementary assets can also be an important motive, especially
for smaller companies lacking the necessary manufacturing, distribution and
marketing skills to commercialize their products. This is especially true for
the field of biotechnology, where dynamic complementarities between new
entrants and large incumbents benefit both players (Pisano et al. 1988;
Rothwell and Dodgson 1994; Barbanti et al. 1999). More often than not,
biotechnology firms have products but not the funds to bring them beyond
the first stage of clinical trials, large Pharmaceuticals need new drugs to fill
their innovation gap but have the money to carry out all the complementary
tasks.
However, an alternative explanation for collaboration could be the
following. In consonance with Hamel et al. (1989), Dodgson (1991), Mody
(1993), Hagedoorn (1993), Inkpen (1996) and many others, the decision of
a firm to collaborate may also stem from the motivation to access knowledge
from other organizations and learn, that is, to purposefully enhance, expand
and renew its competences as a response to changes in the external
environment. This explanation cannot be underestimated. According to
innovation studies, knowledge contributing to the development of
innovations is often obtained from suppliers, customers, subsidiaries,
competing firms, universities and public research organizations (Jewkes et al.
1969; Langrish et al. 1972; Gibbons and Johnston 1974; Rothwell et al.
1974; Mansfield 1991, 1995; Arundel et al. 1995).'*
In this latter explanation, interorganizational collaboration is often
regarded as involving bilateral arrangements or clusters of autonomous, yet
interdependent organizations connected by bilateral arrangements. If more
than two organizations are connected through such arrangements, including
those across industries and countries, they form a network of innovators
(Grant and Baden-Fuller 1996; Ebers 1997; Gulati et al. 2000; Kogut
2000). By and large, these network members engage in relationships
characterized by recurring exchange of knowledge over a longer period of
time and trust (Freeman 1991). One explanation is that tacit know-how
cannot be transferred efficiently in the absence of repeated face-to-face
interactions (Teece 1992; Grant and Baden-Fuller 1996; Ebers 1997).
Another explanation is that codified know-why is best transferred if
opportunism is reduced by repeated and durable relationships between
people who share norms of trustworthy behavior (Powell 1990; Liebeskind
etal. 1996; Lutz 1997).
These network relationships can take the form of either formal or
12. Mansfield (1991), for instance, estimated that 11 percent of new product
innovations and 9 percent of process innovations could not have been developed had
academic research not been performed within 15 years of the first introduction of an
innovation.28
informal arrangements. Whereas formal arrangements support the exchange
of knowledge by using legal contracts (i.e. licensing, equity participation,
etc.), informal arrangements circumvent the need to use the legal system.
This is largely because partners in these informal network not only share
norms of reciprocity (i.e. mutual exchange of knowledge, resources, favors,
etc.), honesty and respect for other's people intellectual property rights but
also a mutual interest in each other's success (Saxenian 1991; Liebeskind et
al. 1996). In fact, most members of the informal network admit that they
consider most of their transfer partners to be good acquaintances or even
friends (Schrader 1991). Yet even if trust is not completely funded -
meaning that codified know-why and know-what spill over to other players-
the knowledge is likely to enlarge the informal and formal network's
knowledge pool, further stimulating the synergistic creation of innovations
through joint learning. As argued by DeBresson and Amesse: "Networks
involve a positive sum game, where some members may be losers some of
the time, but most members are winners, to some extent, most of the time"
(1991: 364).
Following the insights of Marshall (1920), a number of authors have
documented the notion that proximity facilitates the transmission of tacit
know-how among network members (e.g. Audretsch and Feldman 1996;
Lawson and Lorenz 1999; Desrochers 2001). Others have also argued that
trust and the exchange of know-why necessitate repeated interaction that is
easier to achieve over short distance (e.g. Saxenian 1991). Going one step
further, Jaffe (1986, 1989), Jaffe et al. (1993), Mansfield (1995), Prevezer
(1995) and Audretsch and Feldman (1996) argue that the ability to capture
knowledge spillovers is one of the major reasons behind the decision of firms
to cluster nearby universities and other publicly funded research bodies.
Jaffe's work is particularly interesting in this regard. Using state-level R&D,
patent and patent citations data, Jaffe (1989) demonstrated in one particular
study that firms, especially in the drug sector, located nearby universities had
more chances of capturing external knowledge spillovers through informal
conversations than those located far away.
These arguments are an important part of the jigsaw, provided they are
seen in the context of a turbulent environment. Distinct from innovation
studies, but consistent with their main Indings, the management literature
shows that firms are choosing to place less emphasis on total integration of
activities in technological fields such as biotechnology, new material,
telecommunication, semiconductor and computer (Hegert and Morris
1988; Pisano et al. 1988; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1990; Duysters
1996). The complexity, velocity and uncertainty of technological change in
these fields may shed light as to why firms choose a strategy focusing external
learning, rather than solely relying on internal learning:29
Compferify: As demonstrated by Bertrand Gille (1978) in his seminal book,
//isfoi're des Techniques, technologies, to various degrees, are interrelated to
one another, constituting what he refers to as a technological system.' The
relationships between technologies, noted Gille, also grow over time, so the
nature of a technological system becomes more complex during the course
of its life cycle.'* Because the success of complex innovations requires a wide
range of knowledge, and because there are limits to the range of things a firm
can do well, few firms have a perfect match between its knowledge base and
the evolving knowledge base of technological systems. Firms can therefore
benefit from a strategy focused on external learning, given that collaboration
provides a means with which firms can access knowledge components or
competences that would otherwise be too prohibitive to develop
independently.
Veforify: In high-velocity environments, there is a general agreement that the
advantage goes to those that act quickly (Stalk 1988; Smith et al. 1992). The
ability to outpace competition may therefore offer a good explanation for
prefering external learning, especially with scientific organizations, over
internal learning. Partnering with an organization that already possess the
necessary knowledge and competences can, in effect, reduce the interval
between know-why creation and commercialization and thereby provide a
first mover's advantage, given that firms often target the same market
segment. Doz and Hamel would agree with this proposition by stating that:
"companies often turn to alliances to win the learning race. These are often
faster and more effective than alternative approaches to learning. Internal
development, for instance, is often slow and uncertain" (1998: 52).
[/ncertai/ity: The very business of developing new products and processes
internally is indeed fraught with uncertainty, with the majority of innovative
attempts floundering for both technical and economic reasons (Freeman and
Soete 1997). '^ Consequently, no one can predict if any particular R&D
13. Interestingly, Kodama (1986), in a survey of 3.803 Japanese companies, found
that firms allocate a significant percentage of their resources outside their principal
product field (i.e. chemical products, electronic equipment, etc.) and that the trend
gained momentum between 1970 and 1982. suggesting that companies are increasingly
fusing technologies in their research portfolio.
14. For Wang and von Tunzelmann (2000), the concept of complexity can be
assessed along two dimensions: "breath" (i.e. range of areas that has to be investigated to
develop a particular subject) and "depth" (i.e. analytical sophistication of the subject).
This thesis is essentially concerned with the breath of technologies.
15. This is, however, only the most obvious source of uncertainty. One must also
take into consideration the ex an/e uncertainty associated with predicting the future uses
of successful technologies and the impact of improvements that take place In
complementary inventions (Rosenberg 1998).30
project, especially when know-why creation is involved, will translate into
viable and profitable products. The nagging doubt that firms might not do so
may therefore provide powerful reasons to collaborate. Three reasons are
apparent. One is that the cost sharing and risk pooling afforded by external
learning can buffer potential technological and commercial downturns. A
second reason is that collaboration may provide a window on promising, yet
unproven technologies. A third reason is that external learning with an
expert in the field can provide the necessary flexibility with which to access
knowledge assets without dealing with the irreversible sunk costs of internal
learning (Mody 1993). If the outcome of an alliance is poor, which happens
in 30 to 70 percent of the time (Kogut 1989; Bleeke and Ernst 1995), the
firm can just terminate the relationships with its partner on short notice.
If the outcome of collaboration is good, the firm may decide to put more
money into it or merge with its partner (Roberts and Mizouchi 1986; Mody
1993; Doz and Hamel 1998). Or so most people assume. Hagedoorn and
Sadowski (1999) argue that alliances and M&As are not part of a smooth
continuum where the former strategy leads to the latter.^ This is not to
suggest that alliances and M&As have nothing in common; both modes of
governance can be used as a vehicle enabling firms to broaden their
knowledge base and competences. Following Vermeulen and Barkema
(2001), learning through acquisitions can break the rigidities of acquiring
firms and foster their long-term survival. Other related advantages usually
considered in discussing M&As are the synergies created by bringing
different competences together (e.g. the exploitation of economies of scale
and scope) and the financial rewards (e.g. higher stock price; cost of capital)
associated with being a larger and more diversified company.
Paradoxically, past empirical and theoretical contributions found M&A
activity to be a mixed blessing. A peculiar lacuna found in the resource-
based literature is that the bidder faces many difficulties in investigating: (1)
what intangible assets the targeted firm possesses; (2) which of those the firm
can actually benefit from; (3) what the costs of doing so will be; and (4) what
the firm could pay (Wernerfelt 1984). As a result, the acquirer must either
have better information or be lucky to capture a competitive advantage
(Barney 1986). The most obvious downturn, however, is that this form of
learning is the most costly of all, not least because the acquiring company
would not automatically assimilate and adapt the acquired resources.
Integration of new technical staff, consequently, is an important
organizational issue (Keil aid Laamanen 1995). Therefore, the acquiring
firm wishing to transfer knowledge and technologies from its subsidiary is
16. In examining 6,425 strategic technology alliances, Hagedoorn and Sadowski
(1999) only find 168 cases (2.6 percent of total) where an alliance preceded a merger or
acquisition (M&As).31
often obliged to stimulate interactions between the two entities if it wants
the acquisition/merger to bear fruit. In addition, there is always the risk,
especially if the entrepreneurial culture is replaced by a bureaucratic
organization, that key personnel leaves as a result of the take-over. The
impact can be damaging to the acquiring firm. According to Grandstrand
and Sjölander (1990), based on empirical studies of Swedish industry, in all
cases where a large firm could not retain R&D key personnel, and in 60
percent of the cases where the general manager left the firm, the take-over
led to a failure.
24.2 Sfoc* o/accumu/afed fo?oiW«/ge
An important proposition circulating in the emerging knowledge-based
literature has it that the creation of knowledge requires that individuals
specialized in specific knowledge domains, while the application of
knowledge demands that several knowledge specialists be integrated within
the organization (Demsetz 1988; Spender 1993; Grant 1996a, 1996b;
Hodgson 1998). Two additional assumptions must therefore be introduced
in this section. First, it must be assumed that an individual is limited by
"bounded rationality", namely, his or her behavior is constrained in principal
by the limits of the human mind, and hence, he or she is likely to specialize in
a particular area of know-why, know-how and so on (Simon 1955). A firm
equipped with a larger stock of human capital may therefore be better
positioned to exploit economies of scale, given that a larger firm can benefit
from increased specialization (Scherer 1980). Additionally, a larger stock of
accumulated knowledge enables firms to assess, transfer and learn more
efficiently and more cheaply knowledge outside its boundaries (Teece 1977,
1981; Cohen and Levinthal 1989)." Furthermore, although levels of
spending on technological learning can be adjusted instantaneously,
knowledge stocks cannot. To the extent that setting a given rate of R&D
expenditures over, say, 10 years, yields a larger increment to the stock of
accumulated knowledge than setting twice this rate over 5 years, a firm
endowed with a larger stock of accumulated knowledge can erect an
isolating mechanism through time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and
Cool 1989). Time, and thus the age of the firm, can be a double-edge sword,
however. On the one hand, older firms can learn from experience and
innovate more frequently than younger firms. On the other hand, older
firms tend to build on their previous innovative activity and generate less
17. These costs can be substantial, as demonstrated by Teece (1977) who estimated
that the non-codified part of costs of transferring and absorbing technology between
plants range from 2 percent to 59 percent of the total projects costs. As a rule, the larger
the stock of knowledge a firm accumulates, the smaller the anticipated costs of
transferring tacit knowledge.32
influential innovations than those of their younger counterparts (Sorensen
and Stuart 2000).
The second assumption is that, since technological problems often defy
easy analysis, individuals have much to gain from pooling their specialized
knowledge together under the same organization. This is precisely the point
Adam Smith was trying to convey in his famous story of the "pin factory",
though the nineteenth century economist was mainly concerned with
productivity gains stemming from specialization rather than those arising
from the coordination of different skills (Demsetz 1988). Yet firms are, to
put it succinctly, integrators of specialized knowledge (Grant and Baden-
Fuller 1996). One powerful reason is that a broad knowledge base creates
synergies from scope economies, which exist when the productivity of
conducting two or more activities together are higher than if they are
conducted separately (Grant 1996a). Another reason is that a firm can also
increase flexibility with a broad knowledge base, enabling it to reconfigure
related technologies into technological systems (Bierly and Chakrabarty
1996a, 1996b; Henderson and Cockburn 1994). In turn, the
reconfiguration of different knowledge assets and their integration into
organizational routines may shield firms from duplication, providing a source
of enduring superior performance (Reed and DeFillipi 1990). Yet another
reason is that additional knowledge in marketing, manufacturing and after
sales support, also known as complementary assets, provides a basis upon
which learning by doing and learning by using and helps safeguard knowledge
spillovers that might otherwise benefit competing companies (Teece 1987).
This is not taken to mean, however, that the integration of specialized
knowledge is a rfeus or mac/ii/ia. To integrate specialized knowledge, top
management must implement direction and built routines (Demsetz 1988;
Grant 1996a, 1996b; Grant and Baden-Fuller 1996; Hi« et al. 2000).
Direction implies the codification of tacit knowledge and encompasses a
wide variety rules, directives and guidelines for organizational members.
Their main advantage is that they allow knowledge to be communicated at
low cost between specialists and non-specialists. Thus, American technicians
producing and testing drugs at a pharmaceutical company do not have to
know everything about quality control. Instead, they rely heavily on Good
Manufacturing Practice regulations of the Food and Drug Agency (FDA) and
the firm's own directives.
Routines, on the other hand, are "an executable capability for repeated
performance in some context that has been learned by an organization in
response to selective pressures" (Cohen et al. 1996:683). The firm's
repertoire of organizational routines is often regarded as the firm's
organizational memory (Levitt and March 1988) or repository of knowledge
(Nelson and Winter 1982). Despite the turnover of personal and the passage
of time, routines can be maintained through systems of socialization and33
control, as for example systems of formal and informal apprenticeships
(Levitt and March 1988). Routines are also highly tacit, and hence, do not
involve the communication of knowledge in explicit form. Nor do they
require each organizational member to acquire the specialized knowledge of
the others. For example, a screener knows what to do when a combinatorial
chemist brings in new compounds, but not a molecular biologist. Their main
advantage, therefore, is that they economize on communication and offer
wide variety of responses to a broad range of circumstances (Grant 1996a;
Hittetal. 2000).
On the other hand, direction and routines require the existence of a
common language. Indeed, a common language known to all members is
essential as "it permits individuals to share and integrate aspects which are
not common between them" (Grant 1996b: 115-116). The key point is that
a common language is necessary for organizational members to be able to
communicate with one-another and to orchestrate their tasks in view of
possible technological difficulties (Kogut and Zander 1992; Lawson and
Lorenz 1999).
2.4.3 PaA dependence
Devoid of historical considerations, a knowledge-based theory of the firm
would necessarily flounder in its attempt to explain how firms manage to
di/Terentj'ate themselves and protect their uniqueness from their rivals over long
period of time. To fill this void, and to pin down precisely what may cause
firms to diversify in one line of business and not another, it is necessary to
introduce a third dimension: path dependence. The evolutionary path the
firm has followed in the course of its existence is highly significant, for it
determines what it can do today and in the future (i.e. "history matters").
A defining moment in the life of a firm should therefore be its founding
year. Firms do not start their existence with clean states, but inherit the
congenital knowledge of the founding entrepreneurs (Boeker 1989; Huber
1991). This congenital knowledge has the technological implication of
circumscribing the creation of future knowledge and competences along a
narrow corridor of incremental innovations and learning domains. A major
reason why firms would "stick to their knitting" is that the switching costs
associated with implementing a new set of organizational routines are often
too high to justify against the backdrop of a successful performance. Another
reason is that uncertainty is extremely costly to reduce, imposing
restrictions on what is likely to be profitable (Rosenberg 1990). Thus,
success nurtures success; economically, it would seem unwarranted for a
firm to create knowledge far from the stock of specific knowledge it has
accumulated since its inception (Nelson and Winter 1982; Arthur 1989; Lei34
et al. 1996; Dosi et al. 1992).'* To the extent that for different firms that
narrow corridor differs, the knowledge created and accumulated by the firm
will be specific in nature. This property and the tacit lessons of experience
that are maintained within the firm's organizational routines combine in
various ways to dj/Terenfiafe firms and protect their uniqueness over a long
period of time. For example, Ely Lilly has been remarkably productive in
the field of diabetic therapy for over one hundred years, largely because
much of the knowledge created and accumulated about a particular disease
area is highly specific and tacit in nature, making it difficult for its rivals to
understand and duplicate (Henderson and Cockburn 1994).
To say that the firm's present knowledge constrains its future behavior,
obviously, is not the same as saying that firms never change. Following
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Dosi et al. (1992), the accumulation of
knowledge in one period allows further absorption of external, though
closely related, knowledge that may become available in the next period.
The point is noteworthy. Consistently, the technical and managerial
competence of the firm and the extent to which it understands the new
technology determine the ease with which it will absorb the technology
(Teece 1977). In this connection, the concept of path dependence may
provide some clues as to why firms decide to move in one line of business,
rather than another one (Teece 1980, 1982; Dosi et al. 1992). In the same
vein, the concept may shed light as to why firms following a diversification
strategy into related businesses exhibit higher levels of profitability than firms
diversifying into unrelated ones (Rumelt 1982; Montgomery and Wernerfelt
1988; Chatterjee and Wemerfelt 1991).
2.5 TECHNOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITIES AND MARKET STRUCTURES
The discussion to this point has been concerned with the firm as the main
unit of analysis; thus, issues proper to market structures were set aside. Yet
firms can be confronted with the emergence of technological discontinuities
at some time in the course of their life cycle. Characteristically, these
technological discontinuities may have an important effect on the
performance of these business organizations: they may either destroy or
enhance their knowledge base, competences and thereby competitive
position. This section draws this theoretical consideration together with
those already discussed.
18. This is particularity evident in the pharmaceutical industry, where the cost of
moving from a new disease area to another one that is unrelated can be too prohibitive to
consider. To see this, one only has to note that the most important determinant of
investment in any given disease area is the previous year's investment (Cockburn and
Henderson 1994).35
25.1 On Discontinuous fechnoicgica/ change
Insofar as firms turn to the existing knowledge base for clues as to what to
do next and how to achieve it, the stock of public and private knowledge
accumulates in the economy, building endlessly on prior achievements.
Therefore, the process of technological change is by no means random,
without references to knowledge and competences already in use. Just like
learning, technological change has irreversible, path-dependent features. It
would be inclined to follow a relatively ordered and distinctive pattern of
continuous incremental improvements, proceeding along what Nelson and
Winter (1977, 1982) referred to as fechno/og/cai fra/ecforiej. However,
technological progress is sometimes punctuated by a technological
discontinuity. That is, the economic and technological potentials of a single
product (i.e. electric calculators, compact disks, etc.) or process (i.e.
genetic engineering, catalytic cracking, etc.) are such that this innovation
alone displaces an old one, triggering a wave of incremental innovations
along one or several new trajectories in the process. Indeed, a new
technology is initially crude and expensive: only when improvements are
carried out and thereby the technical feasibility and economic viability of the
innovation demonstrated would its diffusion actually take off throughout the
economy (Rosenberg 1976, 1982).'"
This technological shift often brings about a change in the set of
knowledge and competences necessary for designing and producing a given
product. Yet, as pointed out by Ehrnberg (1995), technological change can
be assessed in different ways, often leading to confusion. In addition to
changes in knowledge and competences, a technological discontinuity can
also be used to describe physical change in the product itself and changes in
price and technical performance. This latter dimension of change comes
from Tushman and Anderson, who also make a clear distinction between
competence-destroying innovations, those entailing the use of "new skills,
abilities and knowledge in both the development and production of the
product", and competence-enhancing innovations, which "built on existing
know-how within a product class" (1986:441-442). The distinction is an
important one, since it may help forecast the long-term performance of new
entrants and large incumbents in a new industry or new line of business. It is
19. Hence sales or uses of the old product/process may continue for years and even
decades. For example, steamships began replacing sailing ships only when technological
change lowered substantially the costs of transportation by steam as compared to the
relative cost of transportation by sail. The process took nearly 40 years, spanning from
1850 until 1890 (Harley 1971).
20. Inevitably, the terminology used in the literature varies greatly. Concepts such as
radical, drastic, basic, replacement, major and revolutionary innovations are thus usually
taken to counter the concepts of minor, improvement, routine, add-on, evolutionary and
incremental innovations.36
treated more extensively below.
Z5.2 5tructura/ implications
As a first cut to the issue of technological change and market structures,
one should conjecture that new entrants have a learning-based advantage.
Or, as Rothwell (1989, 1992) and Rothwell and Dodgson (1994) point out,
smaller firms have a 6e/iaviora/ advantage over large incumbents. These
entrepreneurial firms, among other things, are more willing to accept risks,
have less organizational rigidity, react more quickly to change in the external
environment and have better informal communication networks than their
large counterparts. For all these reasons, it does seem likely that
entrepreneurial firms frequently serve as a powerful catalyst for
competence-destroying innovations, in line with the predictions of the early
Schumpeter of The Dieory of Economic Deve/opmenf (1934). ' For instance, in
the emergence of radical innovations such as diesel engines, the float-glass
process in glass manufacturing or mechanical ice-making new industries were
created or old industries were reformulated by new entrants (Tushman and
Anderson 1986).
Conversely, the literature identifies a set of explanation as to why large
established firms are often loath or slow to venture into radical innovations.
For Hannan and Freeman (1984), large firms are less inclined to invest in
radical innovations because potential members, investors and clients value
reliability more than efficiency; thus, the fact that large firms are more
accountable for their actions becomes a source of structural inertia. The
study of Henderson (1993) on photolithographic alignment equipment
pointed to both underinvestment and incompetence as responses to radical
innovation. Rosenbloom and Christensen's (1994) results on the computer
disk drive industry suggest that the incumbent's disadvantage rests on their
inability to change strategies, not technologies. Katz and Allen (1982)
propose that R&D professionals of large corporate companies suffer from the
"Not-Invented-Here syndrome"; thus, they tend to think that they possess a
monopoly of knowledge in their field, leading them to underestimate
innovations from their competitors. Bet it implicit or explicit, a recurrent
theme across these explanations is that large established organizations tend to
be constrained by the evolutionary path they have followed in the course of
their history. Thus in each explanation, large firms, unwilling or unable to
alter their organizational routines, are often victims of their own past
success. In the tradition of Schumpeter (1934), a competence-destroying
discontinuity breaks the grip of large established companies, since they are
21. See Mansfield (1981), Pavitt et al. (1987), Scherer (1990), Henderson and Clark
(1990), Henderson (1993) and Christensen (1997) for a discussion of this in different
industrial settings.37
locked-in with the wrong type of knowledge and competences. Thus, the
innovation blows path dependence asunder, providing the best opportunity
for smaller firms and outsiders to gain market share at the expense of large
incumbents.
On the other hand, large established companies already possess the
necessary knowledge and competences to initiate a competence-enhancing
discontinuity, as put forward by Schumpeter in Capjfa/wm, Sociatan and
Democracy (1942). Large incumbents have introduced important
competence-enhancing innovations into industry, as for example the
turbofan, the electric typewriter, the Edison kiln and catalytic reforming. As
Tushman and Anderson (1986) tell the story, a competence-enhancing
discontinuity ushers in an era of ferment: uncertainty and munificence (i.e.
the extent to which an environment can sustain growth) prevail as many
different versions of the product or process innovation compete in the
marketplace and annual sales grow significantly. Only when a standard
version (or dominant design) emerges and is no more questioned by users
would an era of incremental technological change begin. To the extent that
the quantity of products being manufactured increases, large firms can enjoy
the benefits of scale economies, which rise barriers to entry and propel the
exit of smaller players. Summing up the discussion Tushman and Anderson
argue: "The rich are likely to get richer" (1986:443). The intuition here is
that large incumbents have a maferiai advantage (Rothwell 1989, 1992;
Rothwell and Dodgson 1994) and can use their greater financial and
technological resources to consolidate their leaderships in a product class.
Besides scale economies, large established companies can benefit from scope
economies, can spread risks over larger portfolios and are better positioned
to deal with distribution, marketing and manufacturing.
The Tushman and Anderson model, however, does not seem to hold in
the cases of several technological discontinuities.^ Examples can be found in
the markets for organic chemical products, Pharmaceuticals, medical devices
(Nelson 1996), cameras, road vehicle amplification ystems and personal
computers (Windrum and Birchenshall 1998). There are, of course, many
different explanations for this, which are beyond the scope of this
knowledge-based theory of the firm. Hence this thesis will confine itself to
two central, closely knitted, reservations.
The first reservation flows directly from the observation that technology
life cycle theories largely emphasize "supply-side" over "demand-side"
dynamics (Adner and Levinthal 2001). In many cases, customer needs can be
so heterogeneous that an industry differentiates into a number of distinct
market niches (Windrum and Birchenshall 1998). In this event, economies of
22. See, for instance, Rosenbloom and Christensen 1994; McKelvey 1996; Tripsas
1996; Nelson 1996.38
scale play a lesser role in affecting market structures, in large part because
large incumbents lose their cost spreading advantage. Moreover, the
relationships between technological activities and customers demand can
open opportunities to firms of all size, thus weakening concentration ratios
in a given industry.^
The second reservation lies within the focus of this chapter in that firms
can confront a technological discontinuity by implementing knowledge-
based strategies involving internal and external learning. This plausible
argument has already been made by Carayannis and Stokes (1997), who
showed that continued good performance at the German
chemical/pharmaceutical firm BASF may be traced back to its capacity to
maintain a corporate culture fostering technological learning, enabling the
firm to adapt and thrive despite encountering watershed events such as two
major wars, a worldwide depression and the conversion from coal to oil-
based feedstock. Another example is provided by McKelvey (1996), who
demonstrated that Kabi (now Pharmacia) and Eli Lilly, far from being
displaced by new biotechnology companies, have been able to "jump" over
to the new technological trajectory by linking their absorptive capabilities
with access to external agents with complementary knowledge.
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Insofar as the first wave of resource-based theorists have often paid lip service
to dynamic considerations, the contributions of these scholars could only be
viewed as a staging step towards the development of a knowledge-based
model of superior performance. The resulting model treats knowledge as a
dynamic asset and, because of its semi-private, semi-public good
characteristics, difficult to monopolize. The problem of firms is
compounded by the fact that they often operate in a turbulent environment,
compelling them to innovate in a ceaseless technological race with their
competitors. Accordingly, the crucial objective to pursue is less the
development of innovations as the matching of knowledge and competences
with the ever-changing technology, demand and competition. Technological
learning, therefore, becomes paramount. Yet, firms differ from one another
in terms of learning-based strategies, knowledge assets and historical paths,
so one should expect these heterogeneous organizations to perform
differently.
The Tushman-Anderson model presented in this chapter also showed that
23. In a way this reservation is consistent with that of Edith Penrose: "The productive
opportunities of small firms are composed of those interstices left open by the large
firms which the small firms see and believe they can take advantage of. The nature of the
interstices Is determined by the kind of activity in which the larger firms specialize,
leaving other opportunities open" (1959:222-223).39
for large firms, little would come easily as far as competence-destroying
discontinuities are concerned. On the other hand, the emergence of
competence-enhancing discontinuities would reinforce their competitive
position at the expense of smaller firms. Yet another possibility that cannot
be dismissed is that firms can confront both types of technological
discontinuities through technological learning. More specifically, the
implementation of strategies involving internal and external learning and the
fragmentation of an industry into different submarkets could be conducive
to a division of innovative labor. Given the be/jaWora/ advantage of new
entrants and materiai advantage of large incumbents, dynamic
complementarities could be established between these organizations
(Rothwell 1989, 1992).PART II: THE TECHNOLOGYCHAPTER 3
On the Emergence and Expanding
Knowledge Base of
Combinatorial Chemistry
Comtonaforia./ c/iem/sf/y is notjusf a numiers garnet
- Mario Geysen, co-inventor of a parallel synthesis method
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with technological change and the ways in which
combinatorial chemistry introduced a technological discontinuity and
provided a foundation for a large number of subsequent incremental
innovations along four technological trajectories. Its principal methodology
is historical, with emphasis placed on the dynamic pattern of knowledge
creation in combinatorial drug and, to a lesser extent, new material
discovery. Only four questions will be addressed:
• What are the origins of combinatorial chemistry?
• What is the underlying (and expanding) knowledge base of
24. As quoted in Thayer (1996).44
combinatorial synthesis methods?
• Is combinatorial chemistry a competence-enhancing discontinuity, as
opposed to competence-destroying discontinuity?
• Is the demand for combinatorial-based services and products
heterogeneous, as opposed to homogenous?
The chapter is set as follows. Section 3.2 takes up the challenge of
identifying the origins, methods and underlying principles of combinatorial
chemistry. Section 3.3 is in three parts, each highlighting the dynamics of
technological change in the field. Section 3.3.1 breaks down the
combinatorial approach to drug discovery into 5 pre-clinical steps as an
attempt to assess the first two technological trajectories: incremental
innovations concerning: (1) the synthesis of combinatorial libraries and (2)
the discovery and optimization of leads. Section 3.3.2 focuses on a summary
of research carried out under the umbrella of knowledge based
combinatorial chemistry as a means to highlight the third technological
trajectory and further integration with the rational drug design approach.
Section 3.3.3 describes the fourth trajectory, that is, the recent changes that
combinatorial chemistry, together with recent developments in software and
hardware technologies brought about in new materials, catalysts, pesticides,
etc. Section 3.4 concludes with some remarks about the characteristics of
technological change.
3.2 COMBINATORIAL CHEMISTRY: ORIGINS, METHODS AND
PRINCIPLES
Chronicling the history of combinatorial chemistry is bound to be a difficult,
subjective task. This is largely because the pharmaceutical industry actually
exploits dozens of combinatorial synthesis methods, the diversity of which
reflects a broad choice of methodologies, building blocks, synthesis and
screening strategies, software packages, targets, instrumentation levels and
so on. Such is its complexity that an historical account is likely to
overestimate the contributions of a handful of inventors and innovators while
underestimating the inputs of hundreds, if not thousands of known and
unknown chemists of all backgrounds, mechanical engineers, molecular
biologists, x-crystallographers and so on. Bearing these caveats firmly in
mind, one may nevertheless introduce combinatorial chemistry and trace
back its origins if one establishes a simple dichotomy between the methods
and nomenclatures of "simultaneous parallel synthesis" and "simultaneous
multiple synthesis".
Ronald Frank (1983) at the German National Research Center for
Biotechnology (GBF) may be credited with laying the first principles of
simultaneous parallel synthesis, having invented a method with which45
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Nomenclatures of Combinatorial Synthesis Methods
Souire: Ronald Frank (1993)
thousands of different oligonucleotides (i.e. short strand of DNA or RNA)
could be rapidly synthesized for systematic functional screening through
simple fragment exchange. While Frank's method was a radical departure
from previous work in the field, contributing to construct thousands of
"synthetic genes", it was soon being overtaken by polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) machines as well as better and faster automated DNA synthesizers. "
Hence it is probably Mario Geysen, Rob Meloen and Simon Barteling at the
Central Veterinary Institute (now called ID-Lelystad) in the Netherlands who
presented the most influential parallel synthesis method. Published in the
journal ?roceed/ngx in A/afiona/ j4carfemy of Science £/5J4 in 1984, this method was
initially used to synthesize peptides simultaneously by assembling different
building blocks (as represented by C, A, Y and D in figure 3.1a) in parallel
fashion. Parallel synthesis was first carried out on pin-shaped solid-support,
then on microtitre plates (i.e. a molded plastic sheet of wells filled with a few
millilitres of reagents) and compound arrays such as those invented by
Stephen Fodor (1991) at Affymetrix, Ronald Frank (1992) at the GBF and
25. Personal communication. Prof. Ronald Frank, German National Research Center
for Biotechnology (October 2000).46
Sheila DeWitt et al. (1993) at Parke-Davis. Had scientists used a 1,536-well
microplate, 1,536 compounds would have been synthesized, each exhibiting
different chemical properties.
The simultaneous multiple synthesis method was first demonstrated in 1982,
when Ärpäd Furka (1982) at Eötvös University in Hungary described his
portioning-mixing process in an unpublished -albeit notarized- theoretical
study.^ The method, however, seemed impossible to publish and patent at
the time, only reaching wider audience following a series of conferences in
1988 and a paper in the /nfematfona//ou/nai o/Pepfide and frofein ifoearc/i in
1991 (Furka et al. 1991). This was done pretty much at the same time as Kit
Lam et al. (1991) at the Arizona Cancer Center disclosed the split synthesis
method and Richard Houghten et ai. (1991) at the California-based Scripps
Research Institute the "divide, couple and recombine method" in the same
issue of iVafure. These three methods, which have all been the foundation for
a number of later variations, would be carried out on polymer beads, "tea-
bags" or filer disks in movable combined synthesis compartments containing
mixtures of building blocks (i.e. A-C-D in figure 3.1b). Had a combinatorial
project used 20 building blocks and involved a four-fold reproduction, 20*
different chemical combinations, or 160,000 new compounds, would have
been synthesized, each exhibiting different chemical properties.
3.3 THE EXPANDING KNOWLEDGE BASE OF COMBINATORIAL
CHEMISTRY
Insofar as combinatorial chemistry is akin to major innovations in being
introduced in a crude form, it became clear that the impact of simultaneous
parallel synthesis and simultaneous multiple synthesis upon drug discovery
would have been minimal had several clusters of incremental innovations not
followed its appearance in Hungarian, Dutch, American and German
laboratories. This is not unheard of in the history of technology literature.
Important inventions and innovations hardly ever work in isolation, and
productivity gains can often only be achieved by drawing on small gradual
refinements and improvements (Enos 1962; Hollander 1963; Lieberman
1984; Rosenberg 1982, 1994). In this respect, the emergence of combichem
methods should not be regarded as a cu/minafing point in the history of drug
discovery processes. This should not be taken to trivialize the work of Furka,
Geysen, Houghten, Frank and two or three dozen more pioneers. On the
contrary, the reality is far more interesting: the emergence of combinatorial
chemistry signaled a technological discontinuity, triggering a period of
numerous incremental, improvement innovations along four distinct
technological trajectories: (1) chemical synthesis; (2) lead discovery and lead
26. Personal communication, Prof. Ärpäd Furka, Eötvös University (October 2000).47
optimization;(3) knowledge-based combinatorial chemistry; and (4) new
materials (see figure 3.2).
In the first trajectory, synthetic organic chemists would progressively shift
their efforts and imagination away from "traditional synthesis methods"
towards the production of large collections of molecular compounds, also
known as combinatorial libraries. The preparation of these libraries did not
come without strings attached: automation devices for synthesis had to be
developed; chemical synthesis had to be performed in smaller volumes;
software for data handling improved; etc. Yet, judged from the vantage
point of about 20 years, it is apparent that much of the research performed
along this first technological trajectory contributed to the success of multiple
and parallel synthesis as a provider of fresh and low costs compounds, once
an important bottleneck and a high barrier to entry in the pharmaceutical
industry. As will be shown in the following chapter, this first technological
trajectory led to the development of a first phase of industrial development:













A View of Technological Trajectories in Combinatorial Chemistry
The next three technological trajectories have been critical to the
establishment of a new phase of industrial development: the firm as a supplier
of chemical-based services and products, most notably small molecule drugs.
In the second trajectory, technological progress headed upstream towards
lead identification techniques, high-throughput screening equipment48
purification tools, quantitative structure-activity relationships and ADME-
toxicology software." The intent was to improve the process of lead
discovery (i.e. the process of generating and identifying an active
compound) and lead optimization (i.e. the process of modifying an active
compound to fulfill all stereophonic, physicochemical, pharmacokinetic and
toxicological tests required for clinical usefulness).
In the third trajectory, technological change is rapidly moving
downstream towards the experimental design of focused libraries (i.e.
"libraries using a limited number of building blocks chosen on the basis of
pre-existing knowledge or hypothesis which defines the type of
functionalities deemed important to obtain a particular activity") (MaClean
et al. 1999: 2352-53). The rationale behind this move is that the initial
combinatorial libraries often yielded disappointing results, leading to a
marriage of convenience between combinatorial chemistry and rational drug
design. In the fourth trajectory, the achievements of combichem in drug
discovery set the stage for exploration into new market segments; thus,
knowledge initially created for pharmaceuticals is now being increasingly
used to create phosphors, catalysts, zeolites, pesticides and other products.
Diversification into new materials, however, has given rise to yet other
challenging problems and hence a focal point of further scientific and
technological developments.
3.3. / 7)je combinaforia/ approac/i fo drug discovery
The following description segregates a combinatorial drug discovery
project into five pre-clinical steps: (7,) fne s/ecfi'on a/id design o/a discovery or
fa/gefed /iörary; 0 fne synt/iesis of a discovery or targeted /iörarv; ß/ d»
esfab/is/iment o/"germane screening tests for /ead va/idafion; (4J tne actua/ screening o/"
/ibraries and ra/idation o/" /ead compounds; and (5j t/ie optimization o/" /ead
compounds. Admittedly, this technical account is not exhaustive, and one
should keep in mind that each pre-clinical step necessitates a complex set of
scientific and technical interactions (Augen 2002). Nonetheless, the section
should provide a basis for understanding how the emergence of
combinatorial chemistry formed the basis upon which two technological
trajectories were initiated: (1) chemical synthesis, and (2) lead discovery and
27. The exact wording of research leader Andrew Merritt at Glaxo Wellcome is
instructive: "Once the realization that the combinatorial and parallel route was an
opportunity to obtain, for example. SAR data far more rapidly than previously possible,
and that the handle-turning aspects were mostly taken care of by either the machineiy
itself or support mechanisms, the avenues for project advancement using the new
approaches were wide open. Moreover, newer technical and scientific challenges
became the driving forces to enthuse and interest the chemist -such as how to select a
good set of compounds or how to optimize a piece of chemistry for genetic reactants"
(1998:507).49
lead optimization.
first step: seiect and cfesign discovery or fargefed library
During the late eighties and the first half of the nineties, combinatorial
libraries could be conveniently divided into two categories: discovery
libraries, which are prepared with building blocks and scaffold chosen wit/iouf
bias toward a particular target; and targeted libraries, which are geared
towards a particular protein class such as a kinase, an ion channel, etc.
(MacLean et al. 1999). For the former, the reasoning is that with large
random libraries containing thousands and thousands of compounds,
medicinal chemists will be able to cover more chemical space in the search
for new classes of compounds. For the latter, the reasoning is that with
smaller libraries containing building blocks that are known to interact with
target receptors, medicinal chemists will be able to cover more diversity
(i.e. the "unrelatedness" of a set of, for example, building blocks or members
of a combinatorial library, as measured by their properties such as atom
connectivity, physical properties, computational measurements, or
bioactivity) (MacLean et al. 1999:2352) within a given conformational
space, thereby prioritizing compounds for screening and accelerate the lead
discovery process. Yet both libraries attempt to maximize diversity in their
own way, since it is axiomatic for all combichem projects that the more
diverse the compounds, the better the odds of finding "hits" (Fauchere et al.
1998).^
Anxious to maximize their chance of success and minimize uncertainty,
for-profit firms would carefully plan these libraries by exploiting the
potential of information technologies in general and the burgeoning field of
chemoinformatics in particular. Chemoinformatics has been recently defined
as the "mixing of [information technology and management) resources to
transform data into information and information into knowledge for the
intended purpose of making better decisions faster in the arena of drug
identification and optimization" (Brown 1998:375). In an all-encompassing
fashion, the latest buzzword in the combichem field embraces "compound
registration into databases, including library enumeration; access to primary
and secondary scientific literature; QSAR (quantitative structure-activity
relationships) and similar tools for relating activity to structure; physical and
chemical property calculations; chemical structure and property databases,
chemical library design and analysis; structured-based design, and statistical
methods" (Hann and Green 1999:379). Stated differently, chemoinformatics
28. Robert Pearlman at University of Texas expresses the concept of diversity this
way: "It is like shooting a shotgun in the dark. You want to shoot in as many places as you
can to maximize your chance of hitting something. Once you hit something, you can train
the gun in that one area to see if you hit more" (Wilson 1998).50
takes in most of the information resources the combinatorial chemist needs
to perform his or her job before and wifton the process of lead discovery and
optimization (Brown 1998).
Responding to this pressing demand, software companies and database
suppliers have developed text-based information systems, software programs
and databases aimed at evaluating proactively existing data, know-what and
know-why on the inventory and commercially available building blocks (Can
starting materials be obtained at reasonable price?), the related chemical
reaction literature (How can the optimal synthetic route be achieved?), the
existing drugs (Are there any potentials for patent infringement?), the
company's own libraries (How much of this library overlaps with previous
ones?) and the availability of bioassays (Can the newly synthesized compounds
be efficiently tested?) (Krieger 1996; Pavia 1996; Polinsky 1999; Grethe
1999; Calvert et al. 1999). Hundreds of new websites have also been created
to provide not only the now familiar access to the organization's home pages
but also an effective channel through which the above knowledge is freely
disseminated, licensed or sold to a widespread group of users (Krieger 1997;
SuJJjvan J997; Güwrand Caster J£»£»P>.
Second step: synthesize discovery or targeted /ibraiy
Prior to 1992, discovery and targeted libraries exclusively contained
small stretches of proteins called peptides and oligonucleotides. Such
libraries, however, began to lose some of their appeal when Barry Bunin and
Jonathan Ellman (1992) at University of Berkeley in California, preceding
Sheila DeWitt et al. (1993) at Parke-Davis by a few months, set up a library
made of small chemical molecules (i.e. compounds weighing about 500
daltons). The idea clearly caught fire (Borman 1996). Roland Dolle s surveys
of combinatorial libraries best captured its diffusion (Dolle 1998a, 1998b,
2000; Dolle and Nelson 1999). Of the 154 biological active libraries
identified by Dolle during 1998-1999, 31 (20 percent) compound
collections were peptide-based and 123 (80 percent) had low-molecular
weight diversity elements, a reversal of fortune considering that peptide
libraries represented 50 percent of total combinatorial libraries synthesized
during 1992-1997.
Technological change in the discipline of organic chemistry must be
understood in the light of delivery problems arising from using DNA and
29. One reason for this early preference is that peptides and oligonucleotides were
well suited to the medium of solid phase chemistry, a synthesis method invented by
Nobel Laureate Edwin Merrtfield (1965). Another reason is that automated
DNA/peptide/proteln synthesizers and sequencers widely available, making routine the
task of producing and identifying newly assembled peptides and oligonucleotides (Thayer
1996).51
amino acid as building blocks. Proteins and peptldes, which become
seriously vulnerable to digestive enzymes when taken orally, often have to be
administered through intravenous injections. Small molecular weight
compounds, by contrast, can often -but not always- be delivered without
needles. These orally active medications cause less discomfort and less
inconvenience, increase patient compliance and thus wider use, a human
reflex that may lead to larger markets and larger profits (Damms and Bains
1995). In other words, Ellman's breakthrough discovery and the strong
demand for pills had been pushing and pulling combinatorial synthesis into
the field of organic chemistry.
However, the opportunity to commercialize small molecule drugs had
been restricted by the limited number of solid phase reactions that have been
optimized since Merrifield invented the method in 1963. An important
advantage of solid phase chemistry is that the medium allows more complex
reactions to be completed by use of excess of reagents, which reduces the
risk of losing compounds during the extraction procedures. On the other
hand, solution phase chemistry (i.e. without the use of beads or solid
support) had been used by synthetic chemists since the end of the 19'*"
century, permitting the use of a greater variety of reagents and reactions,
but had disadvantages with respect to purification (Coe and Storer 1999). To
redress many of these shortcomings, substantial efforts have been made to
develop compatible organic reactions for both solution phase and solid phase
synthesis in conjunction with new supports, methods, etc. (Sucholeiki 1999;
Van Hijte et al. 1999). However, Dolle's surveys are proof of higher activity
with regard to solid phase chemistry. Of the 284 biological active and non-
active libraries reported in the scientific literature in 2000, 82 percent were
generated on solid support (Dolle 2001).
At first, these libraries were synthesized manually. Combinatorial
chemists using parallel synthesis employed pins that were mounted onto a
plate, and synthesis had to be carried out on the tip of each pin by dipping
them into a machine tray with reagents. Similarly, the initial emphasis for
producing complex mixtures of compounds focused on manual synthesis. It
was carried out in 20 independent flasks, which were then empty into a
separate mixing container from which they were redistributed. Proposed
by Arne Holm and Morten Meldal (1989) at the Carlsberg Laboratory (DK),
the first multiple-column synthesizer for simultaneous parallel synthesis was
patented and presented at a conference in Tübingen, Germany, in 1988.
The potential for automating the multiple synthesis method was also
recognized, and Zuckerman et al. (1992) at the US-based biotech firm
Chiron built the first equimolar mixture synthesizer in 1990.
30. Personal communication, Dr. Morten Meldal, Carlsberg Laboratory (June
2001).52
This was followed by the commercialization of dozens of automated
devices by manufacturers of scientific instrumentations. In addition to
increased efficiency, which can be measured by increased throughput, a
broader range of chemistry, increased in the product quality, reliability and
reproducibility of the process, these suppliers have given careful
considerations to make synthesizers accessible to most chemists, rather than
expert programmers (Hird 1999; Coates et al. 2000). While the price of
these fully automated synthesizers can be steep, manufacturers have also
brought to market semi-automated or manual synthesizers, making the
technology affordable to every chemist.'"
One thing is sure, however; the emergence of combinatorial synthesis
methods marked a technological discontinuity, providing the framework
upon which a swarming of incremental innovations would allow the scope of
synthesis to be extended and a reduction in the price of individual
compounds. One needs only to look at the changes in price and performance
of chemical synthesis to appreciate the importance of this technology. It
previously took, on average, one month for a medicinal chemist to generate
four compounds directed towards a given target -at a cost of approximately
$US 30,000, or $US 7,500 per compound. By 1996, a chemist could
generate 3,300 compounds for $US 40,000, or approximately $US 12 per
compound. Calculated differently, combinatorial chemistry allows 1,000
times more compounds to be synthesized than the conventional methods for
at least 600 times less cost per compound (Persidis 1998).^
77iirt/ step: esfaWis/? screen on assay /or /ead va/idation
A goal that all drug discovery programs have in common is the need to
determine whether any of the newly formed compounds elicit a particular
physiological activity. While yesterday's drug hunters would have met this
requirement by injecting the novel compounds into animals, today's
scientists are more likely to perform their primary screens on a bioassay that
is germane to a specific disease. This is not surprising considering that in vitro
and in vivo assays are unmistakably less cumbersome, ethically much less
controversial, clearly much faster to implement, much cheaper (i.e. $US
0.10 to $US 1.00 per unit) and more effective than animal models (Beese
1996). In addition, large investments in basic research in biotechnology have
31. In fact, some chemists even prefer working with these semi-automated and even
manual synthesizers due to the complex nature of conducting many types of chemistry
on a single robot Personal communication, Dr. Morten Meldal, Carlsberg Laboratory
(February 2001).
32. These estimates were taken from the Booz, Allen & Hamilton 1996 Survey. It is
safe to say that today's methods permit greater reduction in costs because they are
ceaselessly being improved, evolving towards more sophisticated forms.53
made possible the identification and cloning of drug targets, which then can
be grown into cultured cells and deposited in a screening assay. Besides cell-
based lines, other molecular drug targets have been developed, including
factors and hormones, enzymes, ion channels, nuclear receptors and DNA.
In 1996, compounds could be screened against about 500 targets own
genetic diseases (Drews 1997).
Nonetheless, firms face difficulties producing in a cost effective manner
the quantities of molecular targets needed for current screening capabilities.
Therefore, large number of compounds may also demand that assays have to
be adapted to run in smaller volume, prompting a shift of detection mode
away from radioactive methods towards methods based on fluorescence
(Oldenburg 1998).^ Moreover, the distribution of these targets is heavily
skewed, reflecting the opportunism stemming from past medical research
experience. For example, almost 30 percent of total targets aim at drugs
affecting synaptic, neuroeffector junction sites and the central nervous
system (Drews and Ryser 1997). Despite these limitations, the years to come
should bring a growth in the number of drug therapy targets -estimated
about 5,000-10,000- as a result of the Human Genome Project (Drews
1997). As a consequence, wrote Jürgen Drews: "the potential of drugs to
interfere with physiological or pathophysiological processes would increase
by at least one order of magnitude as compared with the present situation"
(1997:77).
This potential should demand a rising number of newly synthesized
compounds, thereby unleashing synergetic forces resulting in a stream of
new innovations and the creation of new sub-markets for firms of all size to
occupy. In the words of Riccardo Pigliucci, chief executive officer at
Discovery Partners International: "It is hard to imagine two drug discovery
technologies that could be more reinforcing and complimentary. Genomics
will provide a wealth of new targets. Combinatorial chemistry is providing a
wealth of new chemical diversity, and high throughput screening is providing
the machinery to test this chemical diversity against these targets" (Parle
1999).
Fourt/i sfep: screen Wfcraiy and validate /ead canAdafes
If the innovations listed above were to have a truly significant impact on
the pharmaceutical industry, another major issue had to be addressed: how
can the most active compounds be rapidly singled out and identified from
the new-found ability to create small quantities of many compounds cheaply
and rapidly? Finding the needle in the haystack required innovations to be
33. Suppliers have striven to do achieve these goals, and fluorescence-based assays for
parallel synthesis methods are now becoming prevalent (Burbaum 1998; Hetzberg and
Pope 2000).54
developed, but again the parallel synthesis and multiple synthesis methods
posed different sets of problems to which there were many viable technical
solutions.^
Consider first parallel synthesis methods. Parallel synthesis on solid
support (or in solution) allows molecules to be tested individually in a
spatially differentiated manner. This basically means that investigators, having
kept track of the building blocks used for each reaction in each well of a
microtitre plate, may use specially designed software to locally derive the
structure of compounds that appear to be reacting against the set target.
Parallel synthesis also lends itself well to high-throughput screening methods
(HTS), which refers to the techniques by which vast populations of
compounds are screened simultaneously via automated instrumentation.
However, no typical HTS strategy actually exists, and levels of automation
and robotization vary greatly from firm to firm. In some companies, the
purchase of a complex robotic system capable of screening large collections
of compounds without requiring shift work is the solution of choice
(Houston and Banks 1997). In some others, HTS are limited to simple
automated dilution devices. Yet other firms would prefer buying off-the-
shelf components and cobble them into an integrated screening system
(Dove 1999).
However, most firms are prone to purchase HTS instrumentation that is
becoming increasingly automated and miniaturized. On the one hand, the
automation of repetitive tasks like pipetting, assay reading and sample storage
pushes screening rates to higher levels as well as being less labor intensive
and more reproducible. The recent introduction of ultra high-throughput
screening (UHTS), which can handle 100,000 samples or more a day, fits this
mould (Hertzberg and Pope 2000). These robotic systems are "walk-away"
devices in the sense that the operator can walk away until the screening is
completed (Oldenburg 1998). On the other hand, miniaturization allows
scientists to pack more compounds/vessels into a microtitre plate, which
increases the number of compounds being screened in a given time and
keeps reagents, compound and target quantities -and cost- to a minimum.
For this reason, technological endeavors got underway to develop smaller
microtitre plates, as shown in table 3.1. Economies of scale can be
substantial. For instance, the new entrant Selectide recently synthesized
300,000 compounds in 1,536-well plates. Whereas the price of the required
reagents amounted to $US 12,867, the same test carried out in a 96-well
plate would have cost the firm $US 321,610 (Hadlington 1999).
34. For further references to the extensive literature, one should see, for instance,
Gallop (1994), Wilson and Czarnik (1997). Venton and Woodbury (1999) and Barnes
and Balasbramanian (2000).55
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Sou/res: Houston and Banks 1997; Oldenburg 1998; Dove 1999; Sundberg 2000.
In light of these benefits, the infant microfluidic technologies should only
be attracting more attention in the future. These miniaturized devices are
designed to control the flow, reactions and measurements of tiny amounts of
chemicals and biochemicals on a chip made of glass, plastic and/or silicon
(Kricka 1998; Freemantle 1999).^ Many microfluidic technologies are not
directly connected to combichem, but the start-up company Orchid
Biocomputers continues to experiment with the concept of synthesizing
more than 10,000 molecules on a credit-card sized glass chip^ while Caliper
Technologies broke fresh technological grounds by introducing the first
microfabricated devices for high-throughput drug screening in 1999. The
Caliper 100, 110 and 220 are capable of performing thousands of screening
experiments per day on a single chip while reducing reagent consumption
up to 100,000-folds. These lab-on-chips compete directly with microtitre
plates and HTS instrumentations. But the dynamics of substitution may be
hampered by the fact that the Calipers are only sold through a technology
access program involving license fees and subscriptions fees, and these
command premium price. In addition, screeners typically work in a
manufacturing mode, and they have less time than other industry scientists to
allocate to technology exploration. '
Multiple synthesis methods produce much larger libraries in complex
mixtures of compounds, most of which do not work well with HTS methods
and do not allow for direct identification (Venton and Woodbury 1999).'*
35. The term microfluidic technology is used quite loosely and may include a variety
of products and thereby applications such as DNA sequencing for genomic projects,
diagnostics/prognostics, forensics, analytical systems for use in defense against biological
and chemical warfare, high-throughput screening and even synthetic chemistry
(Pharmaceutical Business News 1997).
36. It is estimated that a library of 10,000 compounds would cost less than $US 100
with a Orchid microchip, as opposed to $US 200.000 (Borman 1998).
37. Personal communication, Dr. Mike Knapp, Caliper Technologies (April 2001).
38. The exception is the portioning-mixing synthesis method, wherein one bead
contains one compound. This characteristic allows researchers to elucidate the
compound's structure by mass spectrometry (Venton and Woodbury 1999).56
Nevertheless, solutions to the screening bottleneck were eventually brought
forward: (1) deconvolution methods and (2) tag-encoding technologies.
Pioneered by Richard Houghten et al. (1991) at the Scripps Research
Institute, the iterative deconvolution procedures involve the creation and
screening of sub-libraries in which the building blocks at one position are
identified. If a strong pharmacological activity were observed in a particular
sub-library, medicinal chemists would resynthesize the whole mixture,
divide it into even smaller sub-libraries, and retest each one separately. The
iterative process is then repeated until the active compound ends up
isolated. Various deconvolution methods since 1993, which provide direct
validation without iterative resynthesis, have since been developed,
including the positional scanning method by Colette Dooley and Richard
Houghten (1993) at the Torrey Pines Institute for Molecular Studies in
California and the "orthogonal" library approach by Benoit Deprez et al.
(1995) at CEREP, France's largest new entrant in the field.
A second solution involves developing tag-encoding technologies in
which compounds are screened still tethered to polymer beads and identified
by "chemical markers". While there is no single best tagging method, most
innovations have in common the synthesis of a second compound on the
bead, each one representing a readable tag that defines the synthetic history
of the compound. The first of these, invented by Steven Brenner and
Richard Lemer (1992) at the Scripps Research Institute used biochemical
tags made of small stretches of nucleotides, which act a bit like bar codes on
products in supermarkets. Other scientists followed suit, and other tag-
making technologies have been successfully tested. Recently, K.C.
Nicolaou at the Scripps Research Institute and Xiao-Yi Xiao and colleagues at
the new entrant Irori also proposed radiofrequency encoding (Nicolaou et
al. 1995). This encoding strategy involves tethering beads with microchips
containing detailed information about the compound's specific synthetic
pathway, namely, its structure, the reagents used and the reaction conditions
such as temperature and pH. As these chips emit radio waves, researchers
would retrieve the required information with the help of a receiver Wa
radiofrequency transmission.
Innovative though deconvolution and encoding technologies may be,
their laborious and time-consuming nature, combined with the lack of
analytical control, the lack of accurate structure elucidation and a tendency
to yield reveal "ghost" activity, can play down multiple synthesis methods as
far as computing methods are concerned (Plunkett and Ellman 1997; Antel
1999; Van Hijte et al. 1999). * Yet, if the demise of multiple synthesis has
39. Examples include tags made of peptides (Kerr et al. 1993), halogenated aromatic
compounds (Ohlmeyer et al. 1993), fluorescent labeled enzymes (Lowe and Quarell
1994) and chromatographically resolvable organic (Still 1996).
40. "Ghost" activity may arise when a combination of many low-affinity compounds57
sometimes been heralded, it is by no means sure that firms using this process
have become "locked-in" to an inferior technology, since deconvolution
methods and encoding technologies are constantly being upgraded (Barnes
and Balasubramanian 2000), lead compounds are still regularly found in
mixture-based libraries (Golebiowski et al. 2001) and new materials have
just begun being synthesized along this trajectory (Borchardt 1998). In
addition, because some properties may be impossible to predict with smaller
libraries, several organizations still believe that large mixture-based libraries
will be more successful in disclosing entire new classes of compounds,
especially when no knowledge about the target is available (Karet 1999).
Fi/i/j step: optimize iead compounds
It is important to bear in mind that drug candidates do not come out
directly from combinatorial libraries and screening activities. In fact,
combinatorial chemistry does not produce higher quality compounds; only
more compounds -and data. The quality of compounds will never depend on
a specific synthesis method, screening strategy, software product or
automated piece of equipment, however sophisticated or miniaturized the
technological platform may be. Rather, the quality of compounds -and
ultimately drugs- will always depend on the intuition and care which the
medicinal chemist has put into their design.'" Nevertheless, taking a lead
compound through the lead optimization process may take 24 to 36 month,
the longest and most unpredictable pre-clinical step to drug discovery
(Andersen 1998), and increasing pressures to speed up and enhance the
whole combinatorial drug discovery process pointed to more innovations
along the second technological trajectory.
Before considering the bottlenecks tackled by scientists in greater detail,
it needs to be insisted that a lead compound is not a ligand and a ligand is not
a drug candidate! To qualify as a ligand a lead compound must fulfill the
requirement of potency (i.e. the molecule must interact with a receptor
protein and bring about a physiological change), and to qualify as a drug
candidate a ligand must be optimized with respect to its absorption,
distribution, metabolism and excretion (ADME) properties (i.e. the
molecule must be absorbed efficiently by the body, accumulated in sensible
quantities and persist for a sensible period of time), toxicity (i.e. the
molecule must have a minimum of negative side effects), freedom to
operate, acceptable cost of synthesis, accessibility, stability (chemical and
metabolic), color, odor, formulability, etc. (Kubinyi 1997a, 1998a; Feciket
sometimes reveals as much activity as a few high-affinity compounds, producing complex
mixtures of molecules with equivocal and even false screening results (Gordon et ai.
1994).
41. Personal communication. Prof. Dr. Hugo Kubinyi, BASF (DE) (April 2001).58
al. 1998).
From this standpoint, the enhanced role of combinatorial chemistry finds
its expression in the ability to generate large quantities of low cost analogues
and data for quantitative structure-activity relationships studies, or QSAR for
short; thus, a medicinal or computational chemist who wishes to anticipate
the binding affinities of ligands may harness the power of numbers far more
rapidly and effectively than previously achieved. First demonstrated by
Gorwin Hansch and Toshio Fujita (1964) at Pomona College, QSAR models
are chemoinformatics methods that enable chemists to predict the likely
potency of analogues not yet synthesized, all from kiowledge of chemical
structures and properties. The central assumption is the similarity-property
principle: structurally si/n//ar compounds tend to exhibit si/m/ar biological
activities (Kubinyi 1997a; 1998b). The main challenge is to quantify the
structures or physical property (i.e. hydrophobicity, electronic properties,
steric effects, topology, etc.) of a set of compounds into a number and
compared them to the numerical value of a biological activity (i.e. the yes or
no answers of bioassays). The principal task is to craft mathematical models
and use correlation techniques to convert data into know-what and know-
what into know-why of which interactions are important to biological
activity (Brown 1998). And, finally, the crucial objective is to provide
working hypotheses for the synthesis of simi7ar but more potent compounds,
which will be validated by screening these analogues in an assay and the best
ones refined in a follow-up process until the medicinal chemist is satisfied
with the characteristics of a particular ligand (Kubinyi 1997b).
However, it is apparent that the economies of scale created by
combinatorial chemistry came at a price: the more compounds being
synthesized, the more difficult it became for analytical chemists to guarantee
the purity of compounds -and thereby the validity of QSAR calculations.^
The recognition that combinatorial chemistry is not always up to the task led
instrumentation companies to develop high-throughput purification
instruments. These manufacturers and many others have constructed reliable
and sensitive devices for infrared and gel-phase nuclear magnetic resonance
spectroscopies and liquid and gas chromatography mass spectrometries. The
success of these purification tools, reflected in their ability to rapidly,
reliably and effectively purify and assess the quality of multiple and parallel
synthesis libraries, suggests that quality assurance and quality control is fast
becoming a reality (Fitch 1999; Weiler 1999; Coatesetal. 2000; Papacand
42. As pointed out by Sheila H. Dewitt, inventor of the Diversomer method and
senior director of business development at Orchid Biocomputer: "As the bottleneck
moves from lead generation to lead optimization, the need for quality compounds
becomes critical. The current capabilities of analytical instrumentation cannot address the
emerging needs for quality assurance and quality control or large numbers of
compounds" (Kane 1999).59
Shahrokh2001)."
Medicinal and computational chemists also felt the burden of numbers. In
the early nineties, synthesis and screening efforts were commonly designed
for 10 to 20 assays and 10,000 compounds per assay, per year, yielding
100,000 to 200,000 data points. By the mid-nineties, the number of assays
had increased on average to 25 to 50, with 200,000 compounds being tested
in each assay, resulting in 2.5 million to 10 million data points per year. By
the late nineties, scientists tested 500,000 compounds annually in 100
different assays, resulting in roughly 50 million data points per year (Kane
1999). While the flood of new compounds and data made it more difficult
with traditional property descriptors to characterize adequately what
distinguishes an active compound from ai inactive one (Connolly Martin
1996), software programs encompassing a wider range of property
descriptors have been and continue to be developed in-house and
commercialized by suppliers of chemoinformatic tools. A prime example is
the introduction and improvement of CoMFA, or Comparative Molecular
Field Analysis, by Richard Cramer et al. (1988) at Tripos. Much of the early
work focused on 2D descriptors, but CoMFA made it possible to consider
the 3D representation of molecular structures, enabling correlations to be
established between properties of molecules and their shapes (Connolly
Martin 1998). Another prime example is QuaSAR-Binary, a new technology
for HTS and UHTS data analysis. Developed by Paul Labute (2000) at
Chemical Computing Group (CA), the software incorporates new
mathematical principles and error-prone binary measurements as input and
is capable of predicting the biological activity of untested compounds even
when large numbers of compounds and data are considered.
Another important bottleneck arising from rapid synthesis comes from
the realization that medicinal chemists and pharmacologists could not keep
up with the number of compounds being supplied for pharmacokinetics and
toxicity studies, propelling the development of in sWico testing as a way to
reduce to a minimum the use of animal models and/or standard metabolic
screens (Sanson 1999). Examples include software products that have been
marketed the solubility prediction software by Advanced Chemical
Development and the toxicity software package by Accelrys. Simple rules of
thumbs have also been developed to reduce the uncertainty of the innovative
process and help identify compounds with ADME and toxicological
problems (Lipinski et al. 1997; Fecik et al. 1998; Ekins et al. 2000; Watt
and Morrison 2000). Lipinski's rule of five, in spite of its simplicity, is
assuredly the most well known of combinatorial filters. By studying the
physiochemical properties of over 2000 drugs that are on the market,
43. Purification tools, however, are not costless: sophisticated instruments may reach
the six digits number, raising the sunk costs associated with the lead optimization
process.60
Christopher Lipinski and colleagues at Pfizer suggested that easy-to-calculate
parameters could be of assistance in the prediction of a compound's poor
absorption.^ Lipinsky may well have a point: only 4 out of the 100 best
selling drugs in 1998 fell outside the rule of 5 (Blake 1998). Although
software for QSAR and ADME and simple rules of thumbs may boost the
chance that the selected drug candidate does not end up being rejected, or
withdrawn, by regulatory authorities for unforeseen negative side effects,
they only produce working hypothesis which, albeit supported by statistical
parameters, need to be proved (or disproved) by iterative feedback cycles of
synthesis and testing of analogues (Kubinyi 1997b). The lead optimization
process is therefore evolutionary, as opposed to "finding a needle in a
haystack"."
3.3.2 ÄnoiWedge-based comftinaforiaJ c/ie/nistry: wta comftinaforia/ chemistry meets
rafiona/ drug design
The core of this section is to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of
discovery and targeted libraries and systematize what has been done along
the third technological trajectory: knowledge-based combinatorial
chemistry, also known as mechanism-based or structure-based library design.
Such trajectory contrasts with the first and even second trajectory in that,
like biotechnology and the rational drug design approach (Gambardella
1995), it generated greater incentives to invest in frontier scientific
research. Consequently, the underlying methodology of combinatorial
chemistry has swung from a semi-empirical approach towards a knowledge-
based approach to drug discovery.
From discovery iibra/y fo focused //örary
The best thing that can be said about the innovations mentioned in the
previous section is that they have combined together to improve chemical
synthesis, lead discovery and lead optimization. An illuminating illustration
of these benefits have been presented by Stefan Thomke, Eric von Hippel
and Ronald Frank (1998) in a case study involving the construction of a
targeted library (see table 3.2). Using data by New Jersey-based
Pharmacopeia, a leader in the industry, the authors weighed the
development cost and time of synthesizing and screening compounds in the
hope of finding one that can act against an eye disease (glaucoma). In all
respects, the combinatorial approach wins hands down, allowing the firm to
44. Thus, if a compound has more than 5 hydrogen-bond donors, 10 hydrogen-bond
acceptors, a calculated log of octonol/water partition coefficient greater than 5 and a
molecular mass over 500 daltons, the medicinal chemist would simply not synthesize it.
45. Personal communication. Prof. Dr. Hugo Kubinyi. BASF (April 2001).61
move to clinical trials much faster and cheaper than the traditional approach.
The scholars have also conducted a series of interviews with experts in the
field, who estimated that combinatorial chemistry projects reduce the cost
and time devoted to lead optimization by a range of 10 percent to 80
percent.
The worst thing that can be said about combinatorial chemistry is that
large random discovery libraries and therefore pure chance discoveries are
passe. By the mid-nineties, evidence began trickling out of laboratories that
these libraries did not necessarily deliver pharmacologically active
compounds (Lahana 1998; Dolle 2000; Leach and Hann 2000). While large
libraries using diversity-driven sample screening have a share in the discovery
of lead compounds (Golebiowski et al. 2001), these leads are much more
likely to be derived from corporate collections of compounds, reflecting
more the history of each incumbent than actual chemical diversity. This
underscores the fact that discovery libraries are usually constructed around a
single or few scaffolds (i.e. core portion of a molecule common to all
members of a library) -if the theme is biologically irrelevant, no leads can be
found.^ In this respect, skeptical medicinal chemists have wasted no time
remarking that 10* molecules or so would have to be screened if every
conceivable drug-like molecule were to be synthesized. To put this into
perspective, the number of seconds since the Big Bang is 10". Therefore,
even if a company were to synthesize and screen 100 million compounds,
the sampling would still be hopelessly inadequate (Valler and Green 2000).
Table 3.2
Comparing the parallel synthesis approach with traditional chemistry in the
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Source: Thomke et al. (1998)
To address this huge bottleneck, scientists from both public and private
sectors have turned to rational drug design for solutions. In a few words, the
46. Personal communication. Dr. Roland Dolle, Adolor Corporation (June 2001).62
ultimate objective of the rational drug design method was to construct a
drug, atom by atom, on a basis of knowledge about the target (Blundell
1996). Yet, as is often the case with new drug discovery methods, the impact
of rational drug design had been less than envisioned (Gambardella 1995;
Bailey and Brown 2001).^ One reason is that protein structures are dynamic,
making it difficult for nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and x-
crystallography to predict how a protein might change shape to conform to a
not yet synthesized ligand. Another reason is that even supercomputer level
calculations of enzyme-ligand complexes have difficulties coping with force
field inaccuracies, poor modelling of solvation and counter-ion effects, bond-
making/breaking processes, dynamics of binding/reaction, etc. Peter L.
Myers, chief scientific officer at the new entrant CombiChem, explains that:
... the problem with [rational drug design] was that it had to be a
hole in one. You took the combination of features that looked
perhaps the most relevant and then you tried to express them all
in one molecule. Then you'd go make that molecule, and if it was
a lemon, you kind of were no wiser. We use libraries, so we're
automatically looking at larger numbers of compounds and we're
not expecting to get an exact match. We're just expecting to see
some marginal improvement in activity of some of those
compounds as the focused libraries are synthesized, screened,
and analyzed in an iterative manner (Borman 1999:38).
Since the combinatorial chemistry could be criticized for relying to
excess on numbers rather than design and rational drug design disparaged for
the opposite reason, the two technologies were set for a marriage of
convenience (Bailey and Brown 2001). Spurred on by the hope of
revitalizing both technologies, scientists of all backgrounds took to improve
and merge both research methods with a wave of incremental innovations.
As charted in figure 3.3, this close intermeshing of process innovations
triggered a conceptual division of combinatorial libraries from discovery to
focused library and focused library into pharmacophore based and structured
based library, each exhibiting less diversity and more knowledge about the
receptor target than the last (Hann and Green 1999). To add complexion to
an already intricate situation, pharmacophore based, targeted and
optimization libraries can be designed based on 3D information of the target,
blurring all distinctions between libraries. In this context, any typology of
47. Only a handful of "rationally designed drugs" exist, including Dorzolamid by
Merck, AG85 by Agouron as well as Saquinavir and Ro466240 by Roche (Bailey and
Brown 2001).
48. Personal communication. Dr. Peter Grund, Pharmacopeia, June (2001).63






















Diversity needed to find a hit
Figure 3.3
The knowledge plot
*Focused sets and **Primary screening libraries in authors' terminology
5oura: Hann and Green (1999:380)
Confronted with a huge chemical universe, scientists have learned that the
similarity-property principle could prove useful in situation in which the list
of compounds to be synthesized needs to be pared down, libraries need to
be compared one another and/or libraries need to be purchased, h the
course of time, this recognition became the catalyst that fuelled the in-house
and/or commercial development of software for diversity analysis and the
basis upon which focused libraries will be synthesized. *° In concrete terms,
diversity analysis involves the construction of a virtual combinatorial library
containing, in electronic form, all the compound structures that would be
possible to make given the constraints of specific problems, the chemistry
being involved and the reagents that are commercially available or
synthetically accessible (Brown et al. 2000; Leach and Hann 2000).
Hereafter, the limiting step involves making difficult decisions, since
computational chemists must choose among hundreds of descriptors (i.e.
molecular properties, 2-D fingerprints, BCUT descriptors, 3-D structural
49. Personal communication, Dr. Adam Golebiowski, Procter & Gamble (June
2001).
50. Examples of diversity software include DiverseSolution by Tripos, C2Diversity
by Accelrys and Fingerprint Toolkit by Daylight Chemical Information Systems.64
descriptors, etc.), each capable of converting the physical property of the
whole molecule or pieces of the structure into data. They must also choose a
selection method, as for example cluster-based selection (Down and Willett
1995), genetic algorithm (Sheridan and Kearlsey 1995), partioning
techniques-based (Pearlman 1996), stochastic algorithm (Agrafiotis 1997)
and dissimilarity-based selection (Lajiness 1997). Each method is capable of
converting data into know-what and know-what building blocks or members
of a combinatorial library are the most "unrelated".
While every chemist agrees on the need to select a representative
sampling of compounds, no one seems to agree as how best to define, let
alone to measure, diversity (Agrafiotis et al. 1999; Gorse and Lahana 2000;
Connolly Martin 2000). Nor does a consensus exist as to the best selection
method (Willett 2000). This uncertainty stems from the fact that diversity
largely depends on multiple factors that are beyond the scope of isolated
molecular descriptors, compelling scientists to take decisions on the basis of
imprecise and vague feedback (Ramesha 2000; Villar and Koehler 2000).*'
While diversity software can avoid the necessity for a large library, it can do
little to ensure that libraries contain molecules that have drug-like properties
(Oprea et al. 2000). Filtering procedures such as Lipinsky's rule of five are
therefore added to computer programs, which enable computational and
medicinal chemists avoid molecules from undesirable groups (i.e. alkyl
halides, acid chlorides, etc.) or classes of compounds known to cause ADME
or toxicological problems (Lipinski et al. 1997; Walters et al. 1998; Leach
and Hann 2000; Ekins et al. 2000; Watt et al. 2000).
However, diversity analysis may not be enough to uncover lead
compounds. To paraphrase a scientist, diversity is only serendipity in
disguise (Agrafiotis et al. 1999:22). To add value to their synthesis efforts,
computational chemists would often design a pharmacophore based library,
countering the false notion that "rational design" is all about protein
structures. A pharmacophore is a binding hypothesis as to the minimum
functionality a molecule requires to exhibit biological activity, which is
described in terms of a 3D geometric pattern recognized by a target
macromolecule: only molecules that act at the same receptor site in the same
way will share a pharmacophore (Davies and Upton 1995; Ghose and
Wendoloski 1998, Drewry and Young 1999). Specifically, scientists may use
information provided by a ligand known to interact with a target to
construct a pharmacophore, which can be used for 3D pharmacophore
searching (Valler and Green 2000). This operation allows them to use the
pharmacophore profile to screen a database, as for example the public
database of the National Cancer Institute, to check whether the
51. The "old" debate as to whether 2D descriptors outperform 3D descriptors
exemplifies this uncertainty (Brown and Martin 1996; Patterson et al. 1996).65
pharmacophore embedded in the compounds of their virtual library meet the
geometric constraints specified in the query definition. Only then will they
synthesize by combinatorial means the compounds that meet the
pharmacophore requirements.
Alternatively, scientists may focus combinatorial libraries by
incorporating 3D structure information of the protein target into the virtual
library design process (Salemme et al. 1997; Li et al. 1998; Kubinyi 1998c;
Antel 1999; Böhm and Stahl 2000). In the few years since the first public
presentations of structured based libraries were made rira 1993-1994,
several methods using combinatorial chemistry in tandem with rational drug
design have appeared in the literature, all of which involves selecting
compounds which fit the cavity of the target receptor by /n S/7;'CO screening
(i.e. computer simulation). The steps of the structured based procedures
generally entail choosing one or a few scaffolds based on their
complementarity to the macromolecular target. Then computational
chemists would attach synthetically accessible side chains (or branch) on the
scaffold to form a virtual library and "dock" the compounds into the 3D
structure of the target by means of a computational algorithm (Drewry and
Young 1999; Böhm and Stahl 2000)." Given that only virtual compounds
that match specific geometrical criteria will be kept for actual synthesis, a
macromolecular target may act as a powerful combinatorial filter in the
design process, providing the means to weed out molecules with unsuitable
structures and speed out the innovative process.
Missing in this account is the fact that today's chemistry and computer
scientists can freely navigate the websites of the Brookhaven's Protein Data
Bank (PDB) database, the HIV protease Database, the Cambridge Structural
Database or many other sources in the hope of finding some useful, yet
public knowledge (Berman 1999; Berman et al. 2000). This strategy is likely
to gain in acceptance, since important advances in NMR and x-
crystallography technologies, themselves triggered by important advances in
hardware and software technologies, have radically streamlined the supply of
3D structures of proteins (Gambardella 1995). At Cambridge University in
the UK, Max Perutz and his colleagues took 22 years to complete the 3D
structures of hemoglobin in the late 1950s, which could be now
accomplished in a matter of days (Augen 2002). The pace of development is
well illustrated by the escalating number of biological macromolecular
crystal structures being archived by the Brookhaven's Protein Data Bank, as
figure 3.3 shows." By July 2002, the number of available structures had
52. "Docking" refers "to the physical fit between a macromolecular target and a
pharmaceutical compound, whether it is a substrate, Inhibitor, or activator" (Smith
2002).
53. However impressive the pace of development may seem, it is important to
remark that any knowledge that helps reduce the chemical space to be explored needs to66
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Figure 3.4
Growth in the number of structures in the PDB (1972-2001)
Source: PDB's Website (www.rcsb.org/pcib/).
If large random libraries are characterized by sheer unrestricted diversity,
focused libraries designed to incorporate knowledge about the target reduce
the amount of diversity to be tapped and thereby redundancy of information
and sample, reagents and handling costs (Valler and Green 2000). If
discovery libraries were not up to expectations, yielding hit rates of only
about 0.01 percent, focused libraries often provide rates of about 10
percent (Augen 2002). It is therefore telling that Dolle's results regarding
240 biological active libraries show that 49 (57 percent) discovery libraries,
26 (30 percent) targeted and focused libraries and 11 (13 percent)
optimization libraries had been designed during 1992-1997, whereas the
period 1997-1999 saw the construction of 42 (27 percent) discovery
libraries, 76 (49 percent) targeted-focused libraries and 36 (23 percent)
optimization libraries (Dolle 2000).^ Besides Web-based 3D-databases,
be taken into account, irrespective of its origins: patents, diversity analysis, structure-
activity relationships studies, target receptors, chemical structures of known drugs, etc.
Scientists at Vertex Pharmaceuticals, in a recent review of virtual screening, nicely
encapsulate this notion: "There is no dichotomy between HTS and [virtual screening].
Information drives drug discovery -the more of it, the sooner, the better" (Walters et al.
1998:181).
54. Data for 2000 are not available.67
scientists can now use software for pharmacophore-based and structure-
based design, which have been developed in-house and licensed on a yearly
basis by specialized, chemoinformatic firms. ^ Both types of software
products take aim at converting data into know-what and know-what into
know-why of which geometric relationships are important to biological
activity.
Despite the appeal of knowledge-based combinatorial chemistry, a
number of problems still need to be solved if the full benefits of previous
innovations were to be fully achieved. Examples of bottlenecks facing
today's pharmaceutical companies include poor scoring functions, imprecise
understanding of the properties of drug-like molecules, inability to map 3D
properties onto 2D structures, incorrect assessment of existing SAR data,
poor docking strategies, poorly selected targets and incorrect synthetic
assessment (Walters et al. 1998). No doubt further innovations in the field
of chemoinformatics will circumvent many of these bottlenecks, but these
tools remain expensive.^ Moreover, computing tools are rooted in
different scientific domains, implying that incompatible computers systems,
standards and terminology may hinder the interface between medicinal
chemists and scientists from other disciplines (Hann and Green 1999). In
doing so, the implementation of drug discovery services increases the
likelihood that different "codes" impaired effective communication across
scientists. "This is probably the single most challenging problem that
chemoinformatics must solve", argued Hann and Green (1999:379). While
commercial information management systems (IMS) have been touted as tool
for bringing together interdisciplinary teams, these systems often fail to
address some of the tasks that are intrinsic to the firm, compelling drug
makers to purchase software programs and write in-house programs to
complement commercial ones (Brown 1998; Hann and Green 1999).
3.3.3 7jf?e comtonatoriaf approach fo new materials, cafafyrts, pesficides, efc.
Earlier in this chapter the idea of discovering new materials by
combinatorial means was dismissed in a few lines. Nonetheless, the fourth
technological trajectory deserves a little more attention because the general-
purpose technology will continue to grow steadily as a result of significant
technology-push and market-pull factors. The following review, however, can
do no more than briefly cover the infant applications of combinatorial
55. Like PRO_SELECT (Proteus Molecular Design; GB) and DREAM++ (UBSF;
US) for the former and the CHEM-X (Chemical Design; GB) and Catalyst (Accelrys;
US) for the latter.
56. If you want good tools to derive and use knowledge" wrote Hann and Green,
"you must be prepared to commit significant resources to this area, in terms of hardware,
software and people-ware (i.e. effective creators and users of software" (1999:382).68
chemistry into new market segments.
from pfta/maceutfca/s to new materia/s, cafafysts, pesWddes, etc.
If Furka, Geysen and colleagues could see their ideas unfolding into the
knowledge-based economy before their eyes, Joseph Hanak (1970) at RCA
Laboratories had to wait 25 years before witnessing a revival of his "multiple-
sample concept", a combinatorial-like approach that yielded a variety of new
materials, a series of publications and even patents (Dagani 1999). Hanak's
ideas lay dormant due to the inefficiencies of computers of the time, but the
synthesis of new high-temperature superconductors and magnetoresistive
materials on cobalt oxide by Xiang et al. (1995) at Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory (LBNL) and Briceno et al. (1995) at LBNL and UBC led
to a revival of his ideas. Unfortunately, a major difficulty in discussing state of
the art combinatorial research in new materials emanates "from the highly
confidential aspects of the progress accomplished by industrial research"
(Holzwartetal. 2001:310).
On the other hand, examples of successful experiments are not too difficult
to find. Danielson et a). (1997) at Symyx discovered a red light-emitting
phosphor in a library of 25,000 different phosphors, which could be used in
the fabrication of computer and TV screens. Brocchini et al. (1997) at Rutgers
University synthesized by combinatorial means a small library of 114
structurally related copolymers, which are biodegradable and potentially
useful as medical implant materials. New classes of dielectric materials have
also been created, like thin-film materials by van Dover et al. (1998) at Lucent
Technologies, which hold promises in the fabrication of dynamic random-
access memory (DRAM) computer chips. The work of Akporiaye et al. (1998)
at Sintef Applied Chemistry in Norway opens the gate for the combinatorial
synthesis of zeolites, which can end up as catalysts in oil refineries or as
ingredients in the making of laundry detergents, absorbents, etc. It is also
instinctive that knowledge originally created to discover new drug candidates
is being used by scientists to discover new pesticides, herbidices, etc. The
generic nature of chemical knowledge knows no border: "A compound is a
compound. Once it's synthesized it doesn't know whether it's supposed to be
a pesticide or a drug", says pointedly Russell Bellina, DuPont
director/agricultural chemical synthesis (Chemical Week 2000a).
Echoing the story of combinatorial chemistry in pharmaceuticals, the first
impact of material R&D most certainly came from productivity gains achieved
through the generation of large quantities of low costs molecules. Yet,
according to John D. Hewes, program manager at the chemistry and life
science office at the US Commerce Department's Advanced Technology
57. Forareview of literature, see Jandeleit et al. (1999).69
Program, the probability of success in the discovery phase of new materials has
already increased from 20 percent to more than 50 percent (Wood 2001).
One can get a glimpse of these overall potentials by examining the estimates of
table 3.3. This table, taken from the website of the start-up Symyx, shows
some of changes in the price-performance ratio that combinatorial chemistry
brought about in the area of new materials, catalysts, etc.
Table 3.3
Comparing the Symyx combinatorial approach with traditional chemistry in
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That data handling should prove difficult is not surprising since
combinatorial methods applied to new materials feature the same ability to
generate thousands of molecules than those applied to pharmaceuticals (Dagani
1999). However, their main bottleneck is of a different nature because new
materials require per/brmance-toed c/iaracferizations that are app//ca(/on-specific,
and this can only be done by adapting "old" or developing "new" analytical
techniques (Hewes 2000). A good example of new high-throughput screening
tools is the technique of infrared thermography. Initially employed by police
departments and the military for surveillance purposes, infrared thermography
technology has been successfully used by Moates et al. (1996) at University of
Houston and Holzwarth et al. (1998) at the University of North Carolina to
measure heat coming out of catalytic reactions and thus assess catalyst activity.
Another good example is the development of resonance-enhanced
multiphoton ionization (REMPI) by Senkan (1998) at University of California
in Los Angeles. REMPI is a laser-based method that enables the detection of
the product molecule in the gas stream containing the starting material that
flows through the catalyst sites (Dagani 1999). Other scientists have taken the
challenge of devising yet more screening methods, and the new scanning mass
spectrometer device (Cong et al. 1998) by Symyx, the x-ray microprobe
technique (Isaacs et al. 1998) by LBML and the scanning evanescent
microwave microscope (Wei et al. 1996) by NEC Research Institute may be
added to the list of practical high-throughput screening tools.70
3.4 Concluding remarks
Seen through the lens of economic history, the introduction of combinatorial
chemistry by Furka, Geysen, Houghten, Ellman and others signaled
fundamental changes in the price and technical performance of chemical
synthesis, and laid the foundation upon which a whole series of incremental
innovations were made by scientific organizations, new entrants and large
(agro) pharmaceutical firms along four technological trajectories. In the first
technological trajectory, new knowledge was, and continues to be, created
in the fields of solid and solution phase chemistry, chemoinformatics and
automated synthesis instrumentation. In the second trajectory, R&D targets
identification methods, 2D and 3D QSAR software, "bioware", HTS
workstations and purification tools as a mean to improve the process of lead
optimization. In the third trajectory, the necessity to sample a much smaller
portion of chemical space and improve the process of lead discovery has
been adduced as a reason to develop diversity analysis tools and to
incorporate elements from the rational drug design approach, giving the
powerful, yet faulty technology a second lease of life. In the last trajectory,
one that pushes and pulls combinatorial chemistry into new material
territory, the future points to the development of sophisticated high-
throughput screening tools as a mean to overcome very specific testing
problems.
As technological change goes, it is apparent that the emergence of
combinatorial chemistry was not the most disruptive innovation as far as
knowledge and competences are concerned. Furka, Geysen and other
pioneers largely stood on the shoulders of Edwin Merrified (1965) by virtue
of their dependence on solid phase chemistry. Chemoinformatics covers
applications that can be traced back to Justus Liebig's y4nna7e/j der /Via/mane
(1832) and the creation of the C/iem/ca/ Mtefracß in 1907 (Smith 2002),
prompting two scientists to call it "a new name for an old problem" (Hann
and Green 1999: 379). More recently, Cramer's CoMFA grew from
traditional QSAR methods, structural chemistry and quantum chemistry; 3-
D pharmacophore searching in database had been proposed by Peter Grund
as early as 1977; Kier's work on pharmacophores was inspired by Paul Elrich
(1909); etc. Even Xiang's work on combinatorial material built on the
achievements made by Hanak in the early seventies. What's most important,
the profession of medicinal chemistry had not become obsolete as a result of
combinatorial chemistry, and good old-fashioned synthesis know-how
remains one, if not the most important competence of the firm.
In this sense, although combinatorial chemistry is either spoken of as a
simple problem-solving process fThomke et al. 1998), a technological
platform (Persidis 1998; Poste 2000), a general-purpose technology
(Pammoli and Riccaboni 2000) or a mass-production technology71
(Nightinghale 2000), it is also a competence-enhancing process discontinuity
as defined by Tushman and Anderson (1986). This finding implies that large
pharmaceutical companies should rapidly learn the new synthesis methods
and even dominate the field of combinatorial synthesis. This is the hypothesis
that will be tested in chapter 5. Yet, as the following chapter will
demonstrate, new entrants reacted quickly to enhance, expand and/or
renew their competences along the evolving environment through internal
and external learning. More specifically, the implementation of learning-
based strategies by new entrants and the increasing fragmentation of the
pharmaceutical industry resulting from the genomic revolution contributed
to their success in terms of firm formation, growth, revenues and research
output.PART III: THE ACTORSCHAPTER 4
Combinatorial Chemistry
and New Entrants
J&jovWedge is power, buf p///s are pro/ft
Stephan Herrera, industry analyst (2001)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
From chapter 3, it emerged that combinatorial chemistry has all the
attributes of a competence-enhancing process discontinuity as described by
Tushman and Anderson (1986), implying that large pharmaceutical and
(agro) chemical companies should initiate innovations in the field and later on
gain competitive advantage over smaller or newer firms. This chapter,
however, questions these predictions on both empirical and theoretical
grounds. The first companies using combinatorial chemistry were
overwhelmingly new entrants, not large incumbents. In addition, although
large pharmaceutical corporations have rapidly absorbed the new synthesis
methods, new entrants continue to demonstrate their success in terms of
firm formation, growth, revenues and research output. The key to unlocking
this mystery is to be found in the 6e/?aWora/ advantage of new entrants. Rather
than exiting the industry, these firms have been able to adapt by moving their76
knowledge base and competences along the second, third and/or fourth
technological trajectories through technological learning, with many if not
the majority becoming fully integrated drug discovery firms.
The chapter has four sections. Section 4.2 is mainly designed to illustrate
how the conditions of entry in the pharmaceutical and (agro) chemical
industries had been altered by the emergence of combinatorial chemistry,
propelling de now entry, entry by diversification and entry following merger
and acquisition of about 393 companies. Section 4.3 focuses on two
liindamental phases of industrial development: (1) the firm as a provider of
compound libraries; (2) the firm as a provider of chemical-based services and
products, most notably small molecule drugs. It goes on to assess the special
relationships between these new chemical-based entrants and other smaller
companies, especially genomic firms. Section 4.4 maintains that the recent
upsurge of mergers and acquisitions, rather than signaling the beginning of a
"shake-out", could be interpreted as the logical outcome of the realization
that rigidities can be broken and economies of scale and scope achieved if
knowledge specialists with complementary skills were brought together
under the same organization. Section 4.5 closes the discussion by suggesting
that the survival of new entrants remains possible in the backdrop of a
competence-enhancing discontinuity.
4.2 THE RISE OF NEW ENTRANTS
On the face of it, the younger Schumpeter of 7he 77ieory of Economic
Deve/opmenf (1934) better depicts the infant combichem subsector than
Schumpeter's later work Cap/fa/mn, 5oc/a//im and Democracy (1942). While
the former stressed the role of small firms in initiating technological
discontinuities, the latter postulated that large established firms would
preempt the role of small firms in innovations. In this respect, the Tushman-
Anderson hypothesis stipulating that existing firms initiate competence-
enhancing changes appears to fail the test of empirical validation: the firms
that introduced combinatorial chemistry into industry were new
entrepreneurial start-ups, rather than large pharmaceutical companies.
Indeed, the concept of synthesizing dozens, if not hundreds or thousands
of molecular compounds simultaneously had been first imported in industrial
setting in 1988, when entrepreneur Dr. Alejandro Zaffaroni launched
California-based Affymax and Coselco Mimotopes spun out of
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, Australia's largest investor in
pharmaceutical research and development, to exploit the potentials of
combinatorial chemistry. From then on, a significant number of early-
adopters began populating the pharmaceutical industry.^ The founding
58. These include Houghten Pharmaceuticals, Selectide, Gilead Sciences, NeXstar,77
scientists of these new entrants were from the chemistry discipline, unlike
biopharmaceutical companies where biologists often acted as entrepreneurs.
To quote Barry Toyonaga, president of Ontogen: "This is the first wave of
chemistry-based companies that hopefully will become places where chemists
can take their talents and really create something both professionally and
personally" (Thayer 1996:64).
Also, the striking intersection of chemistry, automated instrumentation,
biology and information technology provided dozens of (usually older) small
and medium sized companies from different, yet related lines of business
with an opportunity to diversify their technology portfolios into
combinatorial chemistry. In the early and mid-nineties, manufacturers of
scientific instrumentation, dedicated biotechnology firms, rational drug
design companies and suppliers of chemoinformatic tools, far from being
restrained by their previous investments and repertoire of organizational
routines, begun using existing knowledge to "jump" on the bandwagon of
combinatorial chemistry.
Take the examples of Advanced ChemTech, Oxford Glycosciences,
Vertex Pharmaceuticals and Tripos. Born in 1985, privately owned
Advanced ChemTech established a solid reputation selling an extensive range
of fine chemicals (i.e. amino acids, resin supports) and instruments for
peptide libraries and small organic compounds, but resolved to offer
synthesis services to biotechnology and large pharmaceutical companies.
Citing Mark Peterson, manager of commercial operations: "Adding
combinatorial chemistry as a service is a certainly something that you have to
be able to do" (Kreeger 1996:19). Oxford Glycosciences was established in
1988 to develop and commercialize products that would support research in
the areas of protein analysis and glycobiology. However, the firm decided to
become a fully integrated drug discovery company in 1995. To achieve its
goal, the Oxford University spin-off undertook to internally build a
competence in combinatorial chemistry, enabling the firm to screen its own
compounds against target proteins discovered v/a its genomics and
proteomics platforms. Vertex Pharmaceuticals was founded in 1989 to
become a rational drug design company, though the firm pointedly
concluded in the mid-nineties that combinatorial chemistry complemented,
rather than supplemented, its structure-based design platform. Tripos, set
up in 1979, was a supplier of discovery research software to pharmaceutical
and life sciences companies. In early 1995, the chemoinformatics firm began
an aggressive effort to expand its range of products and services, including
screening libraries and contract discovery research.
What's more, a second, much larger wave of new chemical-based
Isis Pharmaceuticals, Pharmacopeia, Ontogen and Sphinx Pharmaceuticals in the United
States, ComGenex in Hungary, Oxford Asymmetry and Cambridge Combinatorial in
Great Britain as well as Auda Pharmaceuticals in Denmark.78
entrants has been sweeping the therapeutic drug market since the mid-
nineties, and de novo entrants, often bypassing the bottlenecks of the first and
second technological trajectories, have been formed on the basis of
competences together forming a fully-integrated drug discovery platform.^
While these entrants exclusively pursued applications in the human health-
care sector h the early years of the technology life cycle, the technological
and economic landscape characterizing this line of business changed with the
foundation of Symyx in 1995. Symyx became the first entrepreneurial start-
up to focus on new materials, catalysts and polymers agrochemicals, a




De novo entry, entry by diversification entry following merger and
acquisition in combinatorial chemistry in combinatorial chemistry -by year
of foundation
Source: Compiled by author
To date, at least 393 companies, de noro entrants, entrants by
diversification and entrants following merger and acquisition, have
integrated combinatorial chemistry into their technology portfolios (see
figure 4.1). That the market of combinatorial-based products and services is
still in its infancy can be seen by noting that 285 (72.5 percent of total) have
59. Examples of <fe now) entrants include BioFocus, CombinatoRx, Combio A/S,
Libreria, Mixture Sciences, Neokimia, Personal Chemistry and Synt:em.79
been formed in 1992 onwards. Therefore, it seems certain that the
emergence of combinatorial chemistry in general and Ellman's 1992
breakthrough discovery (i.e. the first library made of small chemical
molecules) in particular triggered the largest influx of de now entrants in the
pharmaceutical industry since genetic engineering became a spawning
ground for biological-based entrants in 1976 -the year Genentech was
founded to exploit the technology.
While the swarming of new entrants is an international phenomenon, the
rise of combinatorial chemistry is most clearly pronounced in the United
States, where 256 new entrants have adopted the technology. With 82 and
55 firms, EU-15 and the rest of the world place a distant second and third,
respectively. For the former, efforts to use combinatorial chemistry in
industrial settings are especially strong in Great Britain (36 new entrants),
Germany (21), Sweden (8), France (4) and the Netherlands (4). For the
former, competition is most likely to be mounted by new entrants in Canada
(20), Israel (9), Australia (7), Russia (5), Switzerland (4) and China (3).
This burst of new entrants and the diffusion of combinatorial chemistry
must be understood from a number of perspectives. First, and closest to
what Winter (1984), Audretsch (1991), Malerba and Orsenigo (1996)
describe as an entrepreneurial regime, are the conditions of high
opportunity and "tight" appropriability. The tread of the argument is that the
potential of generating innovations for any given investment, combined with
the ability to appropriate the returns of this investment, can provide
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists with a powerful incentive for setting
up new companies. The condition of high opportunity is clearly met, given
that the chemical space yet to be explored is enormous. Specifically, the
chemical space offers an almost infinite set of possibilities for the synthesis of
combinatorial libraries not only in Pharmaceuticals but also in the fields of
new materials, catalysts, polymers and pesticides. These possibilities should
also be enriched by the introduction of better scientific instrumentation and,
most importantly, the likely generation of thousands of new target diseases
for actual and virtual screening, which open up ample technological and
economic opportunities for occupying and exploiting new market niches.
The condition of "tight" appropriability might seem more questionable. It
stands to reason that combinatorial synthesis methods, unlike genetic
engineering and PCR technology, are characterized by a diffuse lineage of
intellectual property, shared by several individuals and companies (Persidis
2001). Even so, firms involved in combinatorial chemistry can patent
libraries, lead compounds, scaffolds and structures for diversification
thereof, mechanisms and machines (i.e. synthesizers, purification tolls, etc.),
specialized chemistry directed to combinatorials (i.e. reaction protocols,
etc.) and so on (Caldwell 1998). Survey questionnaires also lend support to
the view that patent protection is strong for product innovations, especially80
drugs, in the pharmaceutical industry (Mansfield et al. 1981; Levin et al.
1987; Cohen et al. 2000).
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assert that entrepreneurs and holders of
capital are not being deterred by current appropriability conditions while
being encouraged by the opportunities presented by the technology. The
confidence shown by the financial community in combinatorial chemistry
and the new entrants that have embraced it is best put into evidence in a
recent study by the consulting firm BioVista.^" If their estimates are correct,
the market capitalization of the 10 principal combinatorial chemistry firms in
the United States was $US 1.7 billion in 2001. BioVista also estimated that
firms using combinatorial chemistry succeeded in raising about 23 percent of
the total public offerings and private placements raised by new entrants in
the life sciences industry between 1996 and 2001 and that market
capitalization has grown by 28 percent per year since 1991.
Thanks to combinatorial chemistry, these companies have also been free
to enter an industry that had long been protected by the big, expensive costs
of organic chemical synthesis. As combinatorial synthesis methods have
become available to anyone for a modest capital investment, largely because
automated instrumentation can be purchased at relatively low price, the
large collection of compounds that had been assembled by large
pharmaceutical companies were no longer preventing the entry of new
companies. "That's no longer a huge advantage when you can make and
purchased diversity libraries for screening", says Nicholas B. Lydon, vice-
president for small-molecule discovery at Amgen (Henry 2001b:82).
"Combinatorial chemistry has been a godsend for the smaller companies
because it allows you to develop a sample bank competitive in numbers to
those of large pharmaceutical companies, which in »me cases have been
amassing their banks for decades" adds Theodore Jones, the lab head of the
lead discovery program at the same company (Timpane 1996:7).
It is, of course, clear that combinatorial procedures remained tacit in the
early days of industrial development, hindering their diffusion throughout
the economy. This knowledge barrier, however, had been somehow lowered
when "cookbooks" of combinatorial "recipes" began to surface in private and
public libraries across the world in 1995.^' The publication of these manuals
was followed by the appearance of scientific journals dedicated to the new
chemical discipline. Afo/ecu/ar .DiVers/fy (Kluwer Academic Publisher) opened
the fray in 1995, followed by Comöinaforiay Chemistry & Hig/? 7hroug/iput
Screening (Bentham Science Publishers) and ComWnaforiai Chemistry (John
Wiley & Sons) in 1998 and the ./ou/nai o/" Combinatorial Chemistry (American
60. See www.hiovista.com.
61. The first manuals were probably Giemicai Diversify: 77» 5ynt/?etic Techniques of
Cbmtonaror/ai Chemistry by Mario Geysen et al. and ComMnatoriai Libraries: 7he 7heorya/)d
Practice ofComtonaroriai Chemijfry by Richard Houghten.81
Chemical Society) in 1999. These scientific journals as well as articles in the
traditional organic and non-organic chemistry literature fe.g.
Zetters, retftraAedron, Proceed/ngs of fne Afationai Academy of Sciences,
Aoche/nistry, etc.) have been instrumental in the diffusion and transfer of
public knowledge to graduate students and scientists of new entrants and
large incumbents alike. In fact, the number of papers related to
combinatorial chemistry published each year has rapidly risen since the early
nineties, one estimate showing that such articles grew from less than one
hundred in 1990 to more than 2,300 in 2000 (Barnett 2002).
4.3 TECHNOtOGICAL LEARNING IN A TURBULENT ENVIRONMENT
The preceding section implied that combinatorial chemistry, for the most
part because it has disrupted the conditions of entry to the pharmaceutical
and (agro) chemical industries, has been conducive to the de novo entry,
entry by diversification and entry following merger and acquisition of about
393 new companies. This section examines how these new entrants adapted
in parallel to the external environment through internal and external
learning. These companies will be analysed in terms of two phases of
development: (1) the firm as a provider of compound libraries, and (2) the
firm as a provider of chemical-based services and products. The first and
second phases of development differ in at least three respects. In the first
phase of development, combinatorial chemistry firms (1) focus on
innovations made along the first technological trajectory, (2) face
competition from similar chemical-based companies and (3) target the
market of combinatorial libraries. In the second phase of development, new
entrants (1) are mainly concerned about innovations created along the
second, third and fourth trajectories, (2) confront competition from a
broader front, most notably scientific organizations, and (3) target the wider
markets of chemical-based services and products, which include small
molecule drugs.
4.3. i Phase J: fhe firm as a provider of compound //oraries fi 988-7995)
The first phase of industrial development roughly covers the period
between 1988 and 1995. Much of the early commercial impetus was aimed
at supplying large pharmaceutical companies and biopharmaceutical firms
with discovery and targeted libraries, with new entrants striving to improve
the methods and/or absorb some of the interlocking innovations made along
the first trajectory. Clearly, these early-adopters also struggled to find
and/or integrate scientific and technicians, since combinatorial chemistry
was such a novel technology that few, if any students graduated with a solid
expertise in the field. Hence they often resolved to convert synthetic organic82
chemists into combinatorial chemists, integrating them in the laboratory
through formal apprenticeships. "It's a really new field and there are very few
people who have done this sort of work. So the company by and large will
recruit Ph.D. chemists and teach them much the same way the
pharmaceutical companies have hired organic chemists and taught them the
medicinal chemistry they need", said John C. Chabala, President and chief
scientific officer at Pharmacopeia (Brennan 1995).
1990-1995 1996-2001
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Figure 4.2
Average size of alliances -in million 2001 dollars (1990-2001)
Sourre: Compiled by author
According to TechKnowledge Associates (1997), the pharmaceutical
industry spent $US 3 billion to synthesize, study and test combinatorial
libraries in 1995. In dynamic terms, this translated into combinatorial
chemistry firms competing about market share in the business of compound
libraries, giving rise to "platform technology deals". Specifically,
combinatorial chemistry firms have been busy developing innovative
collaborative strategies for granting non-exclusive licenses to multiple large
pharmaceutical companies simultaneously, thus giving various degrees of
access to their discovery libraries. ArQule and Pharmacopeia, for example,
have offered the same library to multiple corporate partners, each paying an
upfront fee (i.e. also known as an access fee) for screening the same
compounds. If the deal resulted into a "hit", a hit into a drug candidate and a
drug candidate into a drug, the firm would usually receive success fees such
as milestones payments and royalties (Lytton 1997). Nonetheless, the
viability of this business model was to be questioned in the mid- and late
nineties. Then, it became apparent that large pharmaceutical companies and83
smaller firms with different history developed their own competences in the
field. As chapter 6 will demonstrate, even universities and non-for-profit
research organizations began offering services in combinatorial library
synthesis, with a growing number of scientific organizations selling or
licensing targeted and focused libraries to large incumbents and life science
companies alike.
Competition not only intensified, but customer desire for products and
services rapidly evolved. Thus, it became clear that large discovery libraries,
seldom backed by biologically active compounds, were simple commodities
with little value added, hardly a source of competitive power.^ It also
became apparent (hat large pharmaceutical companies were less willing to
pay downstream royalties for non-exclusive compound libraries, with
contracts often going to the lowest bidder (Thiel 1999; Studt 1999; Boswell
2000). Consequently, combinatorial chemistry firms came to acknowledge
the obvious: a superior performance could not be sustained by only
supplying compounds to large pharmaceutical firms and other organizations.
This can be seen by noting that the price tag attached to "platform
technology deals" significantly dropped over the first and second phase of
industrial development. Although the figure, which is based upon 276
partnership deals for which financial data and technological information are
available, is likely to overestimate the value of alliances, the average size of
alliances involving the synthesis of combinatorial libraries dramatically
decreased. Such alliances amounted, on average, to $US 42 million between
1991 and 1995, but only $US 23 million during the period 1996-2001. At
the same time, the value of alliances involving other stages of the drug
discovery value-chain (i.e. lead optimization, etc.) rose from $US 23 million
to $US 35 million.
3.2 ftase //: 7))e firm as a provider of c/iemica/-6ased services and products (7996-
2007;
With the value of alliances related to "technology platform deals"
dimming the prospect for a big pay off and competition increasing from all
sides, combinatorial chemistry firms had no other choice but to adapt with
the external environment -or exit the industry. Using their competences in
62. "The days of the multimillion dollar combinatorial chemistry deals are done",
argued Michael Grey, CEO at Trega Biosciences (formerly Houghten Pharmaceuticals,
now part of Lion Biosciences). "Simply providing a large numbers of compounds is not
enough" (Thiel 1999:2).
63. A comment by Richard Brown, vice president of business development at
ChemRx, exemplifies this awareness: "There simply is no interest in royalty-based
chemistry deals. The pharmaceutical industry is not willing to mortgage its future"
(Chemical Week 1999).84
combinatorial synthesis as a natural starting point for developing downstream
competences in lead discovery and lead optimization and upstream
competences in the design of focused libraries, these new entrants
responded by offering a better, broader range of products and services for
improving and accelerating pharmaceutical research and development. These
products and services may include: (1) the development of equipment (i.e.
synthesizers, etc.) and consumables (i.e. solid supports, building blocks, etc)
for the creation of combinatorial libraries; (2) assay development; (3) the
computational design and analysis of targets; (4) the sourcing of targeted and
focused libraries; (5) the creation of new leads against specific targets; and
(6) the optimization of already identified leads for particular targets. In
addition, 28 new entrants began to diversify from only offering
pharmaceutical products and services in the late nineties, when they
subsequently outsource combinatorial libraries to agrochemical companies
for applications in pesticides, herbicides, etc.
Take the example of Discovery Partners International, which comprises 7
subsidiaries (Irori, ChemRx, Axys Advanced Technologies, Discovery
Technology, Stuctural Proteomics, SIDDCO, and Xenometix). The firm
offers a wide array of integrated drug discovery services focused from the
point immediately following identification of a drug target through when a
drug candidate is ready for clinical trials. A few examples, some of which
displayed in figure 4.3, may illustrate this business thinking. SIDDCO
created an 800,000-compound library for Aurora BioSciences and licensed
miniaturized screening technologies to NPS Pharmaceuticals; Irori installed
an ultra high throughput system allowing synthesis of up to one million new
compounds per year at Aventis and Bristol-Myers Squibb; Discovery
Partners International identified drug leads for the treatment of colon cancer
for the Genetics Company; Xenometrix licensed its gene expression
profiling technology to Rosetta Inpharmatics; Axys Advanced Technologies
provided Bristol Myers Squidd with screening compounds and related
technologies; etc. Together, these value-added services created a strong
business, growing at a 15 percent-20 percent annual clip (Saftlas 2001).
There is little doubt that a multiple technology platform has potential
problems. To begin, new entrants operate amid far more competition; thus,
if new entrants continue to penetrate the industry, markets could become
64. Recently, Discovery Partners reorganized into five operational centers: (1)
Discovery Instrumentation, which develops, manufactures, and markets equipment and
consumables for the generation of chemical libraries. (2) ChemRx; which offers drug
discovery chemistry services by providing chemical libraries and lead-optimization and
medicinal chemistry services. (3) Discovery Biology; which provides assay development
and ultra-high throughput screening services; (4) Computational Discovery; which offers
informatics services for drug discovery; and (5) Xenometrix; which provides gene
expression analysis.85
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saturated with their products and services. With more competition, large
firms could also negotiate price discounts or other terms for products and
services that are unfavorable to new entrants. In addition, the spate of
mergers and acquisitions among large pharmaceutical giants may have
reduced the number of potential customers to deal with. Another problem
relates to organizational change and the evolving nature of scientific and
technological work. In order to gain the critical mass necessary to serve
opportunities in the new markets and achieve economies of scope and scale,
these firms needed to graft and integrate the multidisciplinary personal
necessary to create and monitor innovations carried out along the second,
third and fourth technological trajectory. As stated by David Ecker, vice
president of Isis Pharmaceuticals: "Beyond chemists, companies need
combinatorial-minded molecular biologists and computational modelers. As
companies figure out ways to make more molecules, they'll need to explore
structural biology and computational chemistry to figure out what they've
made. It's a new challenge, and it calls for an integrated approach" (Brown
1996:1). The multidisciplinary endeavors involved in combinatorial drug
discovery is perhaps better reflected in the scientific management profile of
Syrrx, a fully integrated drug discovery start-up company launched in 1999.
Syrrx brought together directors of lead discovery, cellular pharmacology,
combinatorial chemistry, computational biology, molecular biology, protein
chemistry and crystallography. In the case of new materials, a successful
operation can require the intermeshing of chemical, electrical, software and
mechanical engineers, analytical chemists, physicists, materials and catalyst
scientists as well as modeling and database experts. In fact, about half of
Symyx's workforce doesn't come from the chemistry discipline (Henry
2000). However, recruiting these scientists is by no means easy, for their
demand has been exceeding their supply since the early nineties (Brennan
1997, 2000; Henry 2000, 2001b; Mooney 2001). Physical and analytical
chemists, in particular, have been in increasing demand for the past couple
of years, in large part because new chemical-based entrants are gearing up
for an increasing number of lead compounds entering clinical trials (Brennan
1997). Therefore, competition to attract the best professionals is intense,
often compelling new entrants to "steal" experienced scientists away from
big pharma R&D units by paying them princely salaries (Brennan 2000).
Not only learning by grafting calls for the integration of different types of
specialized knowledge through the creation of organizational routines and
direction, but also requires a common language with which these specialists
can interact and exchange ideas, information, etc. Bruce Eaton, vice
65. These include Pfizer (Pfizer + Warner Lambert + Parke-Davis),
GlaxoSmithKline (Glaxo + BurroughsWellcome + SmithKline Beecham). AstraZeneca
(Astra + Zeneca), Novartis (Sandoz + Clba-Geiby), Pharmacia (G.D. Searle + Pharmacia
& Upjohn), Aventis (Rhone-Poulenc Rorer + Hoechsts + Marion Merrel Dow).87
president of research chemistry at NeXstar Pharmaceuticals, expresses it this
way: "Written and spoken communication is the key, as being able to
communicate in the language of different disciplines. We have molecular
biologists here who can discuss reaction mechanisms and transition states and
care about it, and we have chemists who understand the interplay between
different biological targets" (Timpane 1996:9). Underscoring further the
importance of knowledge specialists and common language, Eaton adds: "If
you can't work in a team, you are going to fail. There is no way a lone
scientist can do it all" (Ibid 1996:9).
Despite these challenges, a multiple technology platform does have
advantages; first among them is that a broader knowledge base allows firms to
adopt a "one-stop shopping" model, enabling them to offer different services
simultaneously under the umbrella of a single company. A well-known
example of such high-value deal is the legendary $US 800 million agreement
between Vertex Pharmaceutical and Novartis in which the new entrant is
responsible for drug discovery and clinical-proof-of-concept testing of 8
drug candidates over a six-year period. The second advantage for a firm of
having a multiple technology platform is that firms can create synergies
through economies of scope. The third advantage is that the firm can re-
allocate cash from one business that has positive cash flow to one business
with negative cash flow (Amit and Livnat 1988; Teece 1996). The fourth
advantage is that while the provision of non-exclusive discovery libraries can
be characterized as a commodity business, a "me-too" service than can be
duplicated by rivals, the new business model is based on highly specialized,
hard-to-copy drug discovery services that may become "core competences".
Following Henderson and Cockburn (1994), this is because the necessary
competences to perform these tasks are deeply embedded in the
organizational routines of the firm, which may become the basis for
sustaining a superior performance taken into account the unique knowledge
or mode of working together that makes the team particularly effective.
The last advantage is that new entrants can use their multiple technology
platforms to develop their own small molecule drug pipeline. Motivated by
the expectation of a temporary monopoly, these new entrants would not
only use their bioassay-to-lead optimization platform to support
pharmaceutical companies in their research efforts but also often translate
these knowledge assets into in-house drug discovery programs. Therefore,
the end-users (i.e. physicians and patients), as opposed to large
pharmaceutical companies, become the actual costumers. Concerned about
long-range outcome, the most forward-looking firms even rethought their
business model with an eye on focused library design, which saves time and
money and offers, at least potentially, higher hit rates (Boswell 2000;
Flanagan 2001). More generally, an alternative business strategy combining
inter-organizational collaborations with internal product development has88
emerged to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the thousands of
new targets for drugs being revealed from the sequencing of the human
genome project and the knowledge created along the second and third
technological trajectories.
Attempting to look at it pragmatically one can say that many if not the
majority of new entrants have been looking beyond an R&D boutique
strategy and are focused on becoming fully integrated drug discovery
companies. In a sense this is surprising. Very few new entrants possess the
complementary assets necessary to bring a drug to market, implying that
large incumbents usually end up being responsible for marketing and sales of
any therapeutic products. However, new entrants become much less
dependent on the timing of milestone payments and get to keep a much
larger percentage of the revenues and profits if they build their own
portfolio of drug candidates and carry them out as late a stage of pre-clinical
and clinical development as possible. The later the stage, the more revenues
and profits these firms will capture from future sales. This is essentially
because the risk of a compound not being the right type of drug candidate
should be remarkably reduced as it passes through the pre-clinical and
clinical phases (Fitzgerlad 1992). Therefore, it is not uncommon for deals
involving later-stage drug candidates to provide royalties in the range of 10
to 15 percent, whereas arrangements involving molecules with early stage
clinical data give royalties in the range of 5 to 8 percent (Lytton 1997).
To be sure, product-oriented companies face a higher level of uncertainty
than service-oriented companies. On one recent estimate, the R&D costs of
bringing a new drug to market is $US 803 million (DiMasi et al. 2003). Yet
firms cannot expect any of their active compounds to be profitable for a
number of years, if at all. This is because the process of drug discovery and
development is long -up to 15 years- and prone to regulatory and economic
failure. Not only 75 percent of drug candidates typically fail the test of
clinical trials (Bienz-Tadmor 1993), but also 70 percent of marketed drugs
do not generate enough revenues to cover average R&D costs (Graboswki
and Vernon 1994).^ Still, earnings can be substantial. Consider the example
of Agouron Pharmaceuticals. The structured-based design company hit it big
in 1997 with the approval of the HFV drug Viracept, allowing the firm to
post profits in 1998 (Copeland 2001).
Unsurprisingly, these new entrants struggle to find the long-term
financing they need to support future operations and capital expenditures
for additional tangibles such as purification tools, chemoinformatics
software, etc. and intangibles such as highly skilled personnel. Information
about private firms is, obviously, almost impossible to obtain, but data on 70
66. Isis Pharmaceutical learned first-hand how much the business of drug discovery is
uncertain in 2003. After its experimental cancer drug failed the test of regulatory
approval, the company cut its work force by 9 percent (NYT 2003).89
public firms in the United States were collected from the website of the
Security and Exchange Currency (SEC) or their annual reports, showing that
only 8 companies turned a profit in 2001. Despite sales revenues increasing
from $US 2 million in 1996 to $US 13.5 million in 2001, and despite
service revenues stemming for collaborative agreements rising from $US 9.5
million in 1996 to about $US 15 million in 2001, the average net loss for a
public firm operation amounted to about $US 34 million in 2001,
considerably more than 1996 losses (i.e. $US 10 million) (see table 4.1)."
Because of and/or in spite of these losses, the firms tracked herein continue
to grow and accumulate innovations: they had, on average, 116 employees
in 1996, which rose to 250 in 2001, 130 of whom are engaged in research
development, including 66 scientists holding doctorate degrees, and the
number of their patents applications accumulated from 9 to 24.^
Table 4.1
Selected consolidated financial data (1996-2001)


























































































Source: Form lOKsand annual reports
Clearly reflecting a shift towards a product-oriented model, their
commitments to R&D have also increased, escalating from $US 14 million to
$US 40 million over 1996 and 2001. At the same time, combinatorial drug
discovery swung from a semi-empirical approach (i.e. discovery libraries)
towards a scientific approach (i.e. focused libraries), which exercised a
significant effect on research intensity. In 2001, new entrants spent, on
67. Taken together, these 70 firms earned $US 1.035.859.000 through their services
and $US 947.373,000 by selling pharmaceutical products in 2001, but their net lost
amounted to $US 2,408,251,000.
68. Patent data are from the European Patent Office.90
average, $US 159,000 per employee (implying a growth of 32 percent
compared to 1996), thus showing an upward trend in basic research funding.
Such trend did not arise automatically. Rather, it reflects the conscious and
deliberate pro-active decision of strategic leaders. 3-Dimensionnal
Pharmaceuticals is a prime example. Dr. F. Raymond Salemme, founder,
president and chief scientific officer of the Pennylvania-based company is
quoted as saying: "We recognized that specific knowledge of the target could
guide the power of combinatorial chemistry to rapidly make compounds
eight or nine years ago and built the entire architecture of our company
around that idea" (Henry 2001:71).
In addition to being among the most research intensive, the emerging
combinatorial drug market is one of the most "know-why intensive". Using
the classification of journals and methodology of CHI Research Inc., Geuna
and I have also examined the citations in 816 combinatorial patents to the
scientific literature to assess the scientific content of combinatorial
chemistry. Of the cited papers, 80.7 percent belong to basic research
literature (e.g. Wafure, /oumai o/" f/ie Chemical Society), 17.6 percent were in
the applied research literature (e.g. /ourna/ o/" Cnromafograpny) and the rest
(1.7 percent) in the engineering/technological sciences (e.g. Chemical &
Engineering A/iew^ and applied technology (e.g. /ournai o/" [/rotog)) literature.
Breaking down the patent data and the citations in scientific journals by type
of innovation and scientific discipline, the role played by science in the
creation of process innovations (86 percent) appear to be even more
predominant than product innovations (77.8 percent). Therefore, it is very
difficult to distinguish between basic and applied research in combinatorial
drug discovery, implying that know-why creation can rapidly lead to
industrial innovations (Malo and Geuna 2000).
While only 8 firms turned a profit in 2001, the number will certainly
increase, judging by the fact that 152 new entrants reported having 978
compounds in the pipeline. Of these, 261 were active compounds at the
discovery stage, 356 lead compounds at the lead optimization stage and 341
drug candidates at the clinical stage. Although it is difficult to determine
whether compounds moving along these stages of drug development come
out of a combinatorial chemistry program, one knows for sure that Isis
Pharmaceuticals identified by combinatorial mean a lead compound against
HIV infection and Selectide an anticoagulant agent (Hughes 1996); Corvas
International identified an orally active thrombin inhibitor and Trega
Biosciences a drug candidate for pain and asthma (Persidis 1998); Magainin
Pharmaceuticals has a novel antibacterial drug lead in the regulatory pipeline
(Borman 1998); Signal Pharmaceuticals, Acadia Pharmaceuticals, Ontogen
and Ariad Pharmaceuticals discovered lead compounds from focused
libraries (Golebiowski et al. 2001); etc.91
The discussion, however, misses an important point: it takes higher levels
of internal learning and accumulated know-why to be a member of the
innovation network. To illustrate this point, consider the synthesis of
focused libraries. The fact that macromolecular crystal structures and
pharmacophores can be downloaded, freely or not, from the Internet is
irrelevant: spending more in R&D in general and know-why creation in
particular is necessary to assess, collect, reduce, store and analyze gigabyte
data. Following de Valle and Gambardella (1993), the organizational
implication of shifting from a service platform to a product platform could
be that new entrants may be compelled to accept more openness of their
research and hire scientists who internalized some values of the scientific
community. More generally, an absorptive capacity is needed to monitor,
understand, evaluate and exploit external knowledge. The bottom line may
well be that the process of external learning could play its full part only if
underpinned by strong internal knowledge and competences in both
chemistry and biology.
4.3.3 The dynamics o/ßrterna/ /earning between new enfranfs and jma//er firms
Why would new entrants monitor, understand, evaluate and learn
external knowledge, with whom, when, what and how? To answer these
questions, a database for formal contractual, interorganizational agreements
was built from the web pages and press releases of new entrants with a
competence in combinatorial chemistry. The sample is composed of 273
firms and covers their subsidiaries and/or parent company if the latter had
less than 1,000 employees. The search unearthed 3,035 different
agreements, many of which involve multiple modes of collaboration. For
example, a typical agreement would include an initial equity investment,
research and development funding and licenses on certain products
developed through the collaboration. Hence the database, which covers the
period between 1984 and 2001, includes 4,390 alliances.
Whereas new entrants with a competence in combinatorial chemistry
signed 2,194 and 795 formal contractual, interorganizational agreements,
respectively, with large incumbents and scientific organizations, they
collaborated 1,401 times with other smaller firms (i.e. companies with less
than 1,000 employees) (see figure 4.4). On one estimate, these
interorganizational agreements are designed to last on average 3 years, with a
0.5-5 year range (Persidis 1998). If anything, they illustrate first and
foremost that the locus of chemical-based innovations is to be found in a
network of innovators. The root of this argument is, of course, a knowledge-
based division of labor between large incumbents, scientific organizations
and new entrants in the market of chemical-based innovations. Empirical
evidence about collaborative activities with large incumbents and scientific92
organizations, which deserves to be discussed at greater length, is deferred in
chapter 5 and 6. However, it seems expedient to mention in this chapter
that the share of alliances with large incumbents rose from 33 percent (722
alliances) to 67 percent (1472) and with scientific organizations from 45
percent (358 alliances) to 55 percent (437) over the first and second phase
of development. By comparison, the share of strategic alliances implemented
between new entrants and smaller firms grew from 18.3 percent (256
alliances) to 81.7 percent (1145) over the periods 1984-1995 and 1996-
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Figure 4.4
Increase in the number of formal interorganizational agreements by new
entrants with smaller firms, large incumbents and scientific organizations
(1982-2001)
re: Compiled by author
While formal interorganizational agreements with large incumbents
provide opportunities for access to complementary assets and financial
support and linkages with scientific organizations provide a means to explore
scientific and technological alternatives, the greater propensity to
collaborate with smaller firms largely reflects the desire of new entrants to
capture a share of the lucrative market of chemical-based services and
products, most notably orally acting pills. In parallel with their collaborative
activities with big pharma and scientific organizations, new entrants are93
counting on formal alliances with genomic firms, high-throughput screening
firms, suppliers of chemoinformatics tools, manufacturers of scientific
instrumentations and other smaller players to access the information,
knowledge and existing technologies necessary to enhance, develop and/or
renew one or several competences along the drug discovery value-chain.
Explanation for choosing this learning-based strategy over internal learning is
quite straightforward: three attributes of technological change stimulate
collaboration among heterogenous companies. These three attributes are:
Comp/eAfify. The knowledge base of combinatorial chemistry has been evolving
into a technological system wherein a myriad of scientific disciplines such as
structural biology, information technologies, engineering and many more
disciplines play a crucial part. Therefore, the combinatorial approach to
drug discovery is composed of knowledge components that are so tightly
intermeshed that the absence of any component would impair the
development of drug (new material) discovery projects. As observed by
Fred Fox at University of California in Los Angeles: "It is important to look
at the whole picture -the chemistry, the screen, the biology that drives the
screen, and the informatics that holds these things together. The parts aren't
worth much without the whole" (Borman 1999:34).
To the possibilities of clinical and commercial failures one must
add up the rising popularity of focused libraries, which suggests that know-
why creation will play a far more active role in impending combinatorial
drug discovery projects. Yet, despite the come back of scientific inquiry,
new entrants are still trying to skin the diversity cat to the best of their
knowledge. In fact, they are still struggling with a highly hazardous
environment; the bulk of R&D remains one of trial and error, involving the
use of "fuzzy" scientific principles and even simple rules of thumb as means to
minimize uncertainty.
Ve/otify. The knowledge frontier of combinatorial chemistry is moving very
rapidly, making it difficult for firms, large or small, to keep up.
"Combinatorial chemistry synthesis and screening technologies are
developing so fast that requirements for a library design a year ago compared
to what they are today are totally different" says Rob Brown at Molecular
Simulations, San Diego (Studt 1999:49). This is corroborated by a recent
scientometric study, wherein Geuna and I calculated that the peak time for
papers cited in combinatorial patents is 2 years prior to patent application
(Malo and Geuna 2000). This represents an extremely short time lag; in
comparison, Narin et al. (1997), using US patents, estimated that the peak
time of papers cited in drugs and medicine patents is 4-6 years prior to
patent grant. In addition, the number of new targets and protein structures94
is increasing rapidly, making it difficult for new entrants to keep up with
advances in genomic sciences.
It follows that few new entrants have the breadth of knowledge necessary
and the financial capacity to perform all the tasks along the pre-clinical steps
of a research program, given the complexity of the combinatorial drug
discovery process. This is largely why collaboration among smaller firms with
complementary skills is so appealing. By facilitating the transfer of tacit
know-how, and by facilitating economies of scale and scope, collaboration
with smaller firms can provide the means to access knowledge that would be
impossible to purchase in the market or too expensive to produce internally.
Table 4.2
Formal network
Increase in number of strategic alliances between new entrants and smaller


















































































Sou/re: Compiled by author
Formal contractual, interorganizational agreements with genomic firms
engaged in identifying genes and drug targets are particularly noteworthy
because these firms remain the most important source of technological
opportunities for chemical-based innovations. In times of rapid technological95
change, collaboration with these firms can also save valuable time. Thus for
those new chemical-based entrants seeking to occupy a niche position in
market of small molecule drugs, collaboration with genomic firms can offer a
way to pre-empt competition in the patent race, thus providing a first
mover's advantage. In fact, even when a patent expires, a pioneer product
often dominates a sub-market due to successful marketing and prescribers'
familiarity with the drug (Caves et al. 1991). Savings can also be significant,
since the full cost of bringing a drug to market not only include the cash
outlays spent to discover and develop the product but also the opportunity
cost of capital (OTA 1993).
There are also ample reasons to believe that formal contractual,
interorganizational agreements can preserve flexibility in the face of
uncertainty. Indeed, a product-oriented model, though generating much
more revenues if the drug under development ends up being a blockbuster,
is much more risky and costly than a single or even a multiple technology
platform model. Hence firms with complementary skills have good reasons
to share the risks of drug discovery and keep the collaboration as flexible as
possible. In the event of a "hit", they may choose to invest more capital and
perhaps even establish a joint venture to develop the lead compound into a
drug candidate. If, on the other hand, the joint research program fails to
delivers on its promises, it can be terminated at much lesser costs on short
notice. As mentioned earlier, the attrition rate between lead discovery and
commercialization remains unacceptably high, and far too many compounds
still fail relatively late in the development process at huge cost. Thus the
uncertainty pertaining to the process of combinatorial drug discovery has, in
the pharmaceutical industry, made the firm's performance something of a
lottery, making it impossible to predict the outcome of innovative activities.
Yet the process of external learning enables new entrants to minimize
uncertainty; and it thereby provides a basis upon which value is created and
effectiveness boosted.
This is not to imply that sweeping generalizations can be made about
external learning. To begin, the needs of start-up companies have evolved
along the changing environment in general and the life cycle of the
combinatorial approach to drug (and new material) discovery in particular.
The network is therefore subject to dynamic evolution. In addition, the level
at which knowledge and technology is actually absorbed depends on the
mode of cooperative arrangement (Hagedoorn 1990; Steensma 1996). Thus
the knowledge rooting of external learning increases as start-up companies
shift from R&D contracts, licensing agreements, equity participation,
manufacturing/distribution/marketing agreements, R&D consortium, joint
R&D contracts and joint ventures. An examination of these modes of
collaboration is presented below.96
contracts are agreements where, in exchange for capital, an organization
contracts another one to perform a particular task without losing its rights to
any development made ßteensma 1996). For most part, these agreements
are of a unilateral technology transfer type (Hagedoorn (1990). New
entrants increased the number of these R&D contracts from 45 to 137
between the periods 1984-1995 and 1996-2001. By and large, such
customer-supplier agreements bypass face-to-face interactions and thus limit
the transfer of tacit know-how, which is probably why their share decreased
from 17.6 percent to 11.9 percent over the first and second phase of
development. Yet R&D contracts are a relatively low risk strategy and may
help determine the potential of a new, uncertain technology (Steensma
1996). For example, Sugen participated in Calipers Value-Added Screening
Collaboration program, which serves as an in-house testing facility for the
path breaking microfluid high throughput technology. Under the agreement,
Sugen paid Caliper Technologies to screen its compound library and target
in exchange for data. While Caliper received screening fees on a data point
basis, Sugen retained all proprietary rights to develop drug leads that emerge
from screening. ^
licensing agreement is a contractual arrangement by which a company receive
the rights to use another organization's drug, lead compound, combinatorial
library, process innovation, software product or, most commonly, a
receptor target for a lump sum payment and future royalties. There is a body
of literature suggesting that licensing contributes little to knowledge
accumulation (Roberts and Mizouchi 1989; Hagedoorn 1990; Anand and
Khanna 2000), yet the new research climate promises to be different for two
reasons. One reason is that the combination of licensed targets and genomic
technologies with combinatorial synthesis methods enable firms to generate
more chemical and biological data than ever before. New entrants can
transform these data into information and information into knowledge,
which, in turn, can establish a foundation for generating and sustaining the
expertise required to occupy a niche market. Aurora Biosciences, for
example, obtained a non-exclusive license to Microeide Pharmaceuticals'
U.S. Patent Number 6,020,121, related to a specific non-traditional
bacterial target.™ The licensing deal does not directly enhance competences,
but will subsequently lead to the creation of knowledge about bacterial,
fungal and viral infections and further the development of new classes of
antibiotics, antifungal agents and antiviral drugs. Second, a licensing
agreement does not preclude firms from using another mode of
collaboration. In fact, if the number of licensing agreements reached 370 (32
69. Interestingly, Caliper moved away from a fee-based technology access program
model to a commercial product business in 2001.
70. Microeide Pharmaceuticals recently changed its name to Essential Therapeutics.97
percent of total) in the period 1996-2001, up from 95 (37 percent) in the
period 1984-1995, it is essentially because chemical-based firms and
biological-based firms signed an increasing number of joint R&D agreement
in tandem with licensing rights. :
£guify participation, or minority holding, takes place when a firm buys capital
stock into another firm. Minority investment alliances were taken 22 times
(8.6 percent of total) in the first phase of development, as compared to 88
times (7.7 percent) between 1996 and 2001. It its simplest form, equity
participation gives an exclusive right to buy resources in exchange for capital
(Lewis 1990). For instance, Ligand Pharmaceuticals acquired a minority
equity stake in X-Ceptor Therapeutics for $US 3.2 million. The minority
investment provides Ligand with an exclusive right to use targets for
cardiovascular disease and metabolic/neurological disorders. In the words of
Ligand Chairman, President and CEO David E. Robinson: "It allows Ligand
to develop our long-term technology base and share the risk as well as the
potential upside of a leading orphan nuclear receptor venture without the
direct management, financing or full profit and loss responsibility."^'
Anticipation of profits in the event of future buy-out may be another motive.
When Marion Merrell Dow purchased Selectide in 1995, for example, US-
based Sugen was well rewarded for committing funds to an early financing
round of the American combinatorial chemistry firm. Indeed, Sugen
received approximately $3 million in proceeds from the sale.
Manu/äcfuring/Distriöution/MarAefing. Although arrangements related to
manufacturing, distribution and marketing involve sharing a great deal of
technical information, these modes of collaboration remain marginal and
merely rose from 16 (0.6 percent of total) to 35 (0.3 percent) over the first
and second phase of development. This is in line with the observation that
few new entrants have the financial means to develop complementary assets,
with perhaps the exception of scientific instrumentation suppliers, as for
example Argonaut Technologies. Argonaut Technologies and Symyx
Technologies initiated a collaboration wherein the former will
commercialize improve, manufacture, and distribute worldwide certain of
the latter's proprietary instrument for high-throughput synthesis and
screening of chemical materials.
consortium is an arrangement wherein two or more organizations share
resources to create a new legal order to conduct cooperative research and
development activities (Oik and Young 1997). Since combinatorial
chemistry made its debut in the industrial setting, new entrants, large
71. See X-Ceptor's website (www.x-ceptor.com).98
incumbents and scientific organizations have participated in at least 20
consortia. Mindful of the fact that consortia can further the development of
innovations, the European Union helped set up COMBICAT, a consortium
comprising 2 start-ups, 3 large companies, 5 scientific organizations that
aims at developing innovative methods for high-speed catalyst preparation,
testing and selection; ComGenex launched EMIL with 17 Japanese
pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies to design software for
library-building purposes; Accelrys, a subsidiary of Pharmacopeia,
established 7 different consortia dedicated to development of software for
computation, simulation and the management and mining of scientific data
used by biologists, chemists and materials scientists; etc.^ One of the most
representative example is that of Argonaut Technologies, which formed 7
consortia to define product requirements and perform validation and testing
of its state-of-the-art parallel synthesizers. While each participating company
can achieve a nine-month to one-year competitive advantage by receiving
one or more of the advanced process tools before it becomes available to
non-members, Argonaut Technologies receives non-refundable participation
fees and gets to incorporate the member's feedback into the final product.
"We listen to our customers and solicited input from process chemists
throughout the world," said David P. Binkley, Argonaut's president and chief
executive officer. "We then present a concept to consortium members who
review it and are able to either validate or change product features and
specifications by consensus" (PRNewswire 1999). Thus one of the purest
forms of learning by using can be found in consortia, for good reason.
Consortia members can identify unanticipated problems related to a new
synthesizer, software or any other pharmaceutical input and share their ideas
and experience with the group, leading to the better design of future
products.
/oi/rt J?<6D occurs when two firms collaborate on a particular process or
product through research or development and share future profits. The
number of joint R&D contracts increased from 41 (16 percent of total) to
338 (29.5 percent) over the periods 1984-1995 and 1996-2001. Most of
this increase reflects firms' shifting emphasis away from just offering
combinatorial libraries as a service towards developing small molecular
weight drugs. To buy this logic is to accept the idea that while R&D and joint
72. Thierry Jean, CEO of Cerep. sums up the benefits of the MSI's consortium: "As a
member of the Phase I Consortium, we recognize the positive impact that the synergy of
MSI and other members of the consortium brought to our internal computational
chemistry efforts. In the field of molecular modeling, as for the rest of our drug
discovery platform, we want to both keep abreast of the latest innovations and keep
adding the most useful technologies to our portfolio. Staying in the consortium is part of
this strategy" (www.pharmacopeia.com).99
R&D agreements bring together complementary strengths and help achieve
economies of scale and scope, the latter is much better in transferring the
tacit know-how necessary to complete a research program. Thus
combinatorial drug discovery cuts into more disciplines than mere chemical
synthesis, compounding transactional difficulties in the intermediate market
of know-how and requiring face-to face interaction between scientists. It
needs to be emphasized that these arrangements are often cashless, with
chemical-based firms bartering expertise in lead discovery and lead
optimization for know-how in assay development from biological-based
firms. The joint R&D agreement between Nanoscale Combinatorial Synthesis
and Euroscreen is a representative example. Besides giving them the
opportunity to share and accumulate know-what about the general
interaction between types of chemistries and types of drug targets, the joint
R&D project bringing together Nanoscale Combinatorial Synthesis's know-
how in small molecule libraries with Euroscreen's expertise in cloned G-
protein coupled receptors.
/oint Venture involves the creation of a subsidiary by a firm and at least one
more partner to achieve a specific objective. Often, a joint venture not only
involves capital from its partners but also employees (Roberts and Mizouchi
1989). This is a mode of collaboration that has gained some ground in recent
years, from 11 joint ventures in the first phase to 21 in the second phase of
industrial development. A joint venture makes sense when two companies
endowed with different yet complementary knowledge assets seek to
develop a new technology requiring the transfer of tacit knowledge (Kogut
1988). Take the example of ChiroChem Discovery Services, a joint venture
which was established in 1998 by Chirotech Technology, a leader in chiral
technologies, and CombiChem, a leader in computational drug design and
synthesis, to develop and sell specifically designed chemical libraries. Under
the agreement, ChiroTech provides novel, multi-functional chiral templates
to CombiChem scientists as an information base to design and synthesize
information-rich chiral compound libraries. Joint ventures may also speed
up a firm's acquaintance with the human resource management practices and
problems of the host country fisano et al. 1988; Sachwald 1999). One
example will suffice: the joint venture between BioFocus, a UK-based
company, and Australian Cancer Technologies (AustCancer), which has been
formed with the aim to discover new small molecule drugs against breast
cancer and circumvent barriers to entry (i.e. regulatory procedures,
prospective clients, etc.) in the Australian market.™
73. As pointed out by Dr David Stone, Chief Executive at BioFocus: "The
collaboration will continue to build on BioFocus' expanding market presence in the Asia-
Pacific Rim and will also allow us to capitalize on AustCancer's experienced clinical team
in developing novel therapeutics for breast cancer." (See Biofocus's website:100
4.4 LEARNING THROUGH ACQUISITIONS
The picture on the behavior of new entrants would only be partial if one
did not give place to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Since the late 1980s,
when the technology appeared in industrial settings, 183 new entrants have
been acquired by, or merged with, another organization, as figure 4.5
shows. These findings, combined with the 7 new entrants that have dissolved
their operations, sold their assets or folded for lack of funding, are not trivial
and play to the Tushman-Anderson model. Most of them "exited" the
industry in times of increasing combinatorial output and declining price.
But there are important observations to be made. To begin, the acquiring
organizations were large incumbents in 25 cases, often with no previous
experience in the field (see next chapter). In line with Acs and Audretsch
(1989), one should acknowledge that the entry of one large firm can more
than offset the entry of dozens smaller firms. One should also take into
account the fact that 37 chemical-based entrants have been bought up by
small biotechnology companies with no expertise in combinatorial
chemistry.
# #
I Acquired by large firm • Acquired by smaller fim D Acquired smaller firm 0 Merged with smaller fiim
Figure 4.5
Increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions (1990-2002)
Source: Compiled by author
www.biofocus.com).101
It is telling that genomic firms, which typically sell analytical data,
software and hardware to large pharmaceutical companies, were among the
most aggressive buyers. This is because biological-based firms, akin to
combinatorial chemistry firms, have been trying to avoid the trapping of a
commodity market (Herrera 2001; Thayer 2002). In the words of William
Haseltine, chairman and CEO of Human Genome Sciences: "I think the
challenges we face are not on the research end, not in generating these
wonderful ideas, but in the proper coupling of those to the market, to the
customer and to the most efficient use of those technologies. A lot of these
splendid new tools and ideas are being applied to old ends. The key
research/development challenge is fitting yet another small molecule drug
into our complex body" (Jarv's 2002). Thus genomic firms are buying up
new entrants in combinatorial chemistry in the hope of penetrating the
market of small molecule drugs. Learning through acquisition, therefore,
allows them to break rigidities, to metamorphose into fully-integrated drug
discovery firms/''
Not only does this weaken the relation between M&A activity and
concentration, but this also implies that new chemical-based entrants do not
play second violin as far as learning through acquisitions is concerned: they
initiated 14 mergers and 107 acquisitions of smaller firms with
complementary technologies." Rather than falling into a competency trap,
71 firms reason that this learning-based strategy provides a fast, effective -
albeit expensive- way to enrich their knowledge base cum competences.
Concomitantly, the mushrooming of M&As may have been triggered by the
belief that the combined value of technology platforms are greater than the
sum of their parts, first because the very business of conducting innovative
activities in combinatorial chemistry, genomics, computational chemistry
and scientific instrumentation can synergize to achieve economies of scope
and scale, and second because the newly-integrated drug discovery company
can potentially deliver small-molecule drugs, rather than just libraries, target
receptors, etc.
The example of Pharmacopeia can convey the basic idea. Since its
foundation in March 1993, Pharmacopeia acquired 5 different start-ups,
enabling the New Jersey-based company to move its position of supplier of
74. Examples include the acquisition of Aptein by Cambridge Antibody Technology
for $US 11 million in 1998, the take over of Trega Biosciences by Lion Biosciences for
$US 35 million in 2000. the acquisition of Coelacanth by Lexicon Genetics for $US 32
million in 2001, the purchase of Medichem Life Sciences by deCode for $83.6 million in
2002: etc.
75. Examples include the acquisitions of Structural Proteomics in 2000 and
Xenometrix in 2001 by Discovery Partners International; the take over of Triangle
Pharmaceuticals by Gilead Sciences for $464 million in 2002, the acquisitions of
Molecular Simulations in 1998 and Synopsys Scientific Systems, Oxford Molecular and
GCG in 2000 by Pharmacopeia; etc.J02103
combinatorial libraries towards a position of fully integrated drug discovery
and development firm. Pharmacopeia's mission statement is to "provide
experimental, computational, and informatics products and services to
accelerate and improve the design, discovery and development of new
Pharmaceuticals and chemicals to identify compounds active against
collaborators' targets and improve potency and other partner-defined
criteria of lead compounds."^The acquisitions of Molecular Simulations Inc.
(MSI) in 1998 and Synopsys Scientific Systems, Oxford Molecular, and GCG
in 2000, which were grouped and incorporated into Accelrys in 2001, are
therefore strategically significant. Accelrys provides Pharmacopeia with four
key assets: a broad line of cheminformatics products that complement its
existing chemical database tools, an industry leading position in the large and
growing field of bioinformatics, a group of more than 120 talented
employees, including highly skilled scientific software developers and an
instant access to a network of collaborating firms, etc., as figure 4.6 shows.
Joseph A. Mollica, Pharmacopeia's chairman, president and chief executive
officer explained the company's acquisition strategy: "...the critical mass we
will achieve from [Accelrys] cheminformatics products will benefit our
customers as they seek to leverage the important chemical data emerging
from today's drug discovery efforts. This acquisition should serve to fuel
Pharmacopeia's continued growth."
In addition, Pharmacopeia spent $US 197 million in 2001 to buy Eos
Biotechnology, which built an integrated platform of custom genomics-
based tools to discover and validate targets. In this way, the company hopes
to benefit from technological opportunities stemming from the genomic
revolution by securing its own source of high-quality disease technology,
expertise and resources. In this way, the company hopes to benefit from
technological opportunities stemming from the genomic revolution by
securing its own source of high-quality disease technology, expertise and
resources. Joseph A. Mollica was quoted as saying:
By combining Eos' skills and assets with Pharmacopeia's
leadership in experimentation, computation, and informatics
products, our combined company will have the full spectrum of
drug discovery capabilities from target discovery and validation,
through lead discovery, enhancement and optimization. The
combination will also create many new scientific and business
opportunities not currently available to either company. ...we
will now be able to set our own objectives and, importantly,
move up the value chain' in our drug discovery business. In
short, our combined company will have all the science,
76. See Pharmacopeia's website: www.pcop.com.104
technology, partnerships, and management in place to create a
full-fledged drug discovery company (PR Newswire 2001a).
Consolidating complementary competences and technologies to create
synergies through economies of scale and scope is an explanation, although
logically one cannot rule out that the possibility that an acquisition or
merger is motivated by the hope of raising the profile of the firm. Consider
the example of NeXstar. NeXstar, a liposome company with an expertise in
combichem, came into existence after the merger of NeXagen and Vestar in
1995. NeXagen's stock was about $US 8 per share prior to the merger but
$US 27 a year later (Persidis 1999). Four years later the share price of
NeXstar rose again significantly when it merged with Gilead Sciences, a
combinatorial chemistry firm specializing in anti-viral therapies. It may be
impossible to assess whether the firm would have survived without merger,
but NeXstar, now Gilead Sciences, has enjoyed steady growth (The
Economist 1999b).
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter was intended to show that the discovery of simultaneous parallel
synthesis and simultaneous multiple synthesis signaled watershed structural
changes in the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, the emergence of
combinatorial chemistry has clearly democratized the process of organic
compound synthesis. More specifically, the pioneering work of Furka,
Geysen, Frank, Ellman and colleagues lowered an important barrier to entry
in the market of chemical-based services and products, allowing at least 393
new entrants to venture into a territory that had traditionally been the
province of large pharmaceutical companies. Not only did new entrants
initiate the competence-enhancing discontinuity, but also the number of
entrants remains relatively stable, despite the creeping "commodization" of
combinatorial libraries. The chief reason is that new entrants did not make
the mistake to wait until the price of combinatorial libraries went down
before adapting to the external environment. Using their be/jawor advantage,
most notably their formal networks, these firms reacted quickly to enhance
and/or expand their competences along the second, third and fourth
trajectory through technological learning. Some repackaged their service and
product offerings to help large pharmaceutical firms in their drug discovery
endeavours. Some have diversified into catalysts, pesticides, etc. Less
obvious, but probably more important in the longer term, others became
fully-integrated drug discovery firms. A general theme, however, prevails
throughout. Smaller firms have been increasingly joining forces to learn
about the complementary knowledge of the other. The structural
implications can be far-reaching, as the following chapter will demonstrate: a105
new division of labor on the basis of chemical-based innovations is taking
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4 has described how new entrants created value in different ways
through internal and external learning. However, one is also confronted
with the fact that these firms operate in the context of a competence-
enhancing process discontinuity. Lending credence to the predictions of
Tushman and Anderson (1986), the gap between smaller and larger firms
was never so great as to leave the latter far behind on the learning curve, and
today's large pharmaceutical firms largely surpass new entrants in terms of
combinatorial library output.
In theory, this should cloud the outlook for the long-term development of
the new entrants. The key argument should be that large pharmaceutical
companies, having rapidly learned the skills required to master combinatorial
chemistry, will take advantage of their size to achieve economies of scale and108
drive smaller firms out of business. In practice, large pharmaceutical and
large fcgro)chemical firms, while enjoying a maferia/ advantage over new
entrants, remain far from being self-sufficient: large incumbents need new
entrants as much as the latter need the former. The idea, of course, is not
entirely new. For example, Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman stated more than
three decades ago: "It may well be that there is no optimum size of firm but
merely an optimal pattern for an industry, such a distribution of firms by
size, character and outlook as to guarantee the most effective gathering
together and commercially perfecting the flow of ideas" (1958; 2nd edn,
1969:168). What is new, however, is that the emergence of combinatorial
chemistry may be leading to a restructuring of the relations between smaller
and larger firms on the basis of chemical-based innovations: the technology is
giving rise to a new division of labor in the pharmaceutical industry.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 examines the motives
behind the decision to adopt combinatorial chemistry, describes the
implementation of corporate learning-based strategies and inquires into the
impact of the technological discontinuity on their competitive standing.
Section 5.3 turns to formal interorganizational agreements between new
entrants and large incumbents and explores what light they can shed on the
new division of labor in the drug industry. Section 5.4 draws many of the
threads of this overall assessment together with a case study of
GlaxoSmithKline. The subject matter of section 5.5 is the entry of large
(agro)chemical companies into combinatorial material. Section 5.6
concludes by returning to the question of how new entrants and large
incumbents are playing different, yet complementary functions in the
dynamics of combinatorial innovations.
5.2 THE ENTRY OF LARGE PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS
Established by the German firms Bayer and Hoechst in the 1880s, the first
pharmaceutical R&D laboratories had initially searched for therapeutic drugs
by screening, with little or no preselection, thousand of different
compounds (Liebenau 1985). However, the use of pure random exploration
declined from the mid-fifties-on, giving way to more empirically oriented
research programs. Thus, medicinal chemists would increasingly tap into bits
of know-what, know-how and know-why that had been acquired and
provided by pharmacologists, clinical researchers, marketing personal and
others (Schwartzman 1976). Such semi-empirical search strategy may have
been successful in the early post-war period, but the number of newly
introduced compounds slowly declined during the sixties and seventies. In
the United States, for example, an average of 50 new chemical entities (i.e.
drugs whose ingredient has never been approved by regulatory authorities)
per year had been introduced between 1955 and 1960, but only 17 had109
been launched yearly during the 1965-1976 period (Grabowski and Vemon
1982). Most analysts had associated this decline to the effects of regulation in
general and the Kefauver-Harris amendments of 1962 in particular, ™ but a
few others suspected that the depletion of research opportunities, at least in
a few therapeutic classes, had also played a detrimental role (Wiggins 1981;
Comanor 1986).
In this context, one might have justifiably wondered whether the rise of
rational drug design and biotechnology would solve the innovation deficit of
the human health care industry. While it is true that these radical innovations
gave new ways to understand the mechanisms of disease and thereby placed
frontier scientific research at the center of the drug discovery process, it is
also true that these technologies did little to increase the flow of new
molecular entities containing new active ingredients (NMEs). According to
the National Institute for Health Care Management Research and Educational
Foundation (NIHCM 2002), only one-third (361) of 1,035 drugs approved
in the in the United States by the Food and Drug Agency between 1989 and
2000 were NMEs. Of the 361 NMEs, less than half (153) were given
"priority" status, which is reserved for drugs the agency believes could
provide significant clinical improvement over existing medications. This
implies that a total of 674 drugs, or 65 percent of FDA-approved
medications, contained active ingredients that were already available in
marketed products.
Critics of big pharma often dismiss such drugs as "copycat" or "me-too"
drugs. Yet these drugs, which results from the process of incremental
innovations, can offer advantages in terms of improvement in efficacy, better
patient satisfaction and compliance, and in some cases, potency.™
Nonetheless, launch price for priority NMEs can be two to three times
higher than incrementally modified drugs (Lu and Comanor 1998), and
pharmaceutical innovations, despite the wave of acquisitions and mergers
among large pharmaceutical companies, have become less concentrated over
time (DiMasi 2000).
In spite of this, few large pharmaceutical companies showed interests in
combinatorial chemistry in its early days, with many disregarding its
potentials (Brown 1996; Glaser 1996; Merritt 1998; Lebl 1998). Whether
industry incumbents had fallen prey to structural inertia (Hannan and
77. In a nutshell, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act in the US increased the authority of the Food and Drug Administration by
requiring drug manufacturers to show that their drugs were safe.
78. Take the case of beta-blockers. Contrary to first-generation agents, the second-
generation beta-blockers are selective for beta-1 receptors and hence are less likely to
cause systemic vasoconstriction. They also offer differences in potency, cardioselectivity,
effects on the nervous system, pharmacokinetic properties, additional pharmacological
effects, potential for interaction with other drugs, efficacy in specific racial groups and
complexity of dosage regimen (Wertheimer et al. 2001).no
Freeman 1984), myopic learning (Levinthal and March 1993),
underinvestment and incompetence (Henderson 1993) or the "Not-Invented-
Here syndrome" (Katz and Allen 1982) remains open to question, though it is
apparent that the early days of combinatorial chemistry, as with so many other
important innovations, had been characterized by widespread skepticism. To
observe this, one only has to note that medicinal chemists, who were
accustomed to synthesize one or two pure compounds once a week, were
often loath to employ the new technology. As Andrew Merritt, research
leader at Glaxo Wellcome, puts it: "For most chemists, the automation
synthesis approach was an example of increased mindless handle turning, not
appropriate to the craftsman style of medicinal chemistry" (1998:506). By all
accounts, the initial impression was essentially that combichem methods were
completely ugly, too empirical, disappointing, not reproducible, not
practical, inelegant and unscientific (Service 1998; Lebl 1998).
In retrospect, large pharmaceutical companies had every reason to adopt
a "wait and see" strategy. After all, no one knew for sure if the process
innovation would someday be economically viable and technically feasible:
Will combinatorial chemistry help increase research productivity? Was the
new technology just a hype? Nonetheless, it is clear that the diffusion of
combinatorial chemistry took off once its relative backwardness had been
overcome by hundreds of incremental improvements, setting the stage for
making the competence-enhancing process innovation much less uncertain
and much more attractive to larger competitors. Remember that the first
synthesizers appeared in the market 6 to 8 years after Frank' and Furka's
experiment, that HTS instrumentation and bioassays had to be miniaturized,
that deconvolution and tagging methods only surfaced in the early nineties,
etc. In particular, recall that chemists were constrained in the type of
structures or organic reaction amenable to combinatorial chemistry, since
the combinatorial synthesis methods could only be applied to construct
peptides and oligonucleotides libraries before the synthesis of a
benzodiazepine library by Ellman's group at UBC in 1992. As pointed out by
it Plunkett and Ellman: "Once we and others demonstrated that
combinatorial chemistry could be used to assemble drug-like molecules, the
pharmaceutical industry began pursuing more projects in the area"
(1997:58).
Therefore, the successful synthesis of small molecule libraries might have
been an eye-opener, contributing t> turn the modus operand/ of medicinal
chemists upside-down and forcing them to change, to quote one scientist,
"the thinking about numbers of compounds from hundreds to millions and
billions" (Lebl 1998:5). At the same time, newly founded firms and early
adopters represented a real competitive challenge, providing an additional
factor which influenced their resolution to invest in the new technology
platform. Clearly, large pharmaceutical companies could neither perpetuallyIll
ignore the investment made by new entrants nor the potentials of the new
methods for increasing efficiency. Suffice here to mention that Merck had
synthesized and screened 250,000 compounds between 1934 and 1994^
while new entrants such as ChemRx, Pharmacopeia, Cerep or Evotech OAI
can now synthesize libraries containing thousands of compounds at a fraction
of the price the pharmaceutical giant used to pay.
To counter this threat, and to boost research productivity, all large
pharmaceutical firms without exception strove to develop in-house
competences in the arena. In accordance with Tushman and Anderson
(1986) and Cohen and Levinthal (1990), the simple fact that combinatorial
chemistry rests on a knowledge base large incumbents already owned
suggests that past investments and organizational routines did not inhibit the
process of competence building. In fact, the crucial matching of skills
between the old screening approach to drug discovery and the new
technological discontinuity was not too difficult to achieve. In spite of
lagging behind combinatorial chemistry firms by at least 2 years, large
incumbents have been able to use their absorptive capacity and existing
know-how in chemistry, biology and information technology to build
efficiently and rapidly an expertise in the field. In the words of David J.
Ecker, vice president of Isis Pharmaceuticals:
It's a technology that is much more widely accepted, at least by
the major pharmaceutical companies, than most new
technologies. The reason is that it's not that much different from
mainstream drug discovery in the pharmaceutical industry for
100 years. It's just a technical advance that allows you to do
things much more quickly, but it's not breaking away that much
from a tried-and-true approach. In that regard, it seems to
require much less justification than something like gene therapy,
something that's new and never existed before and people don't
know what all the hurdles are going to be (Thayer 1996:60).
By 1997, Eli Lilly already used combinatorial technologies in over 75
percent of its cardiovascular, cancer, central nervous system, endocrine and
infectious-disease research programs (Service 1997); Abbott had set out to
master combinatorial chemistry in 1994 but could already employ the
methods in 80 percent of its drug discovery programs in 1998 (Karet 1998);
Bayer only started to build a competence in combinatorial chemistry in
1995, yet there were groups to perform the synthesis techniques in all its
laboratories worldwide in 1999 (Gwynne 1999); SmithKline Beecham filed
its first combinatorial patent with University of Pennsylvannia in 1992 but
79. See www. merrk.corn.112
Table 5.1
Summary of lead compounds discovered by combinatorial means by large
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had accumulated a total of 24 such publications in 1998 (Current Patents
1999); Bristol-Myers increased the number of drug candidates from 6 a year
in the early nineties to 14 a year at the end of the decade after spending
heavily in its synthesis and screening capacities (Pollack 2002); etc. Table 5.1
gives other examples of lead compounds discovered through combinatorial
methods by large established companies; thus, 15 different drug makers
discovered at least 30 lead compounds, though the majority of hits are most
likely to be derived from the historical collections of compounds of these
large incumbents. Additional evidence is indicated in greater details in figure
5.1. The figure depicts the research output of large incumbents and new
entrants as measured by published combinatorial libraries between 1992 and113
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
-New entrant —•—Large incumbent
Figure 5.1
Growth of published combinatorial libraries -new entrants versus large
incumbents (1991-2000)
Source: Extracted from Dolle (1998a, 1998b. 2000. 2001) and Dolle and Nelson
(1999).
2000. The data have been extracted from the annual surveys of Dr. Roland
Dole and sorted by firm size.™ Having said this, it is apparent that large
incumbents had been trailing new entrants in terms of research output in the
early days of the technological life cycle. In the first half of the nineties, 72
percent of published libraries came from new entrants, whereas only Eli
Lilly, Chiron, Merck, Bristol Myers Squibb and Parke-Davis (now part of
Pfizer) had published their results in academic journals. Thus, large
incumbents and new entrants had synthesized 18 and 45 libraries,
respectively, in the first phase of industrial development. Yet, by 2000, large
pharmaceutical firms could be accounted for 65.5 percent of all
combinatorial libraries synthesized by industrial players, or for 76.3 percent
80. To be sure, no measure is perfect; not only one must take into account a 1 -2 year
time lag between actual synthesis and publication but also a statistical discrepancy that
may arise from firms wishing to keep their libraries as trade secret. Nonetheless, Dolle,
author or co-author of over 80 scientific publications and 30 patents, is much better
positioned to monitor the latest developments in the field than any social scientist, and
hence, provide one of the most reliable sources of scientific, technological and economic
information.114
if one takes into account those that were subsequently obtained via the
acquisition of new entrants. These figures, however, hide a high
concentration rate. Thus, the top 15 library holders had been responsible for
the synthesis of 351 libraries -436 libraries thanks to their acquisitions of
new entrants (see table 5.2).
Table 5.2





















































































1= Including Coselco Mimotopes; 2= Including Chiron
Source: Extracted from Dolle (1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001) and Dolle and Nelson
(1999).
How did large pharmaceutical achieve this feat of strength? To build in-
house competences in combinatorial chemistry, all large incumbents without
exception have hired key scientists and spend heavily in automated
instrumentation and R&D. Yet, typically for new technologies, recruiting
scientists with know-how in combinatorial chemistry was not an easy job.*'
However, given the costs of highly specialized scientific personnel, their
idiosyncratic routines and the type of discontinuity involved, large firms
preferred to rain their researchers where possible, rather than hire new
employees. "Pharmaceutical companies are not bottomless wells of money,"
says Stephen Kaldor, head of the combinatorial chemistry effort at Eli Lilly.
"We want to retrain and educate scientists internally so they can stay current
81. In the words of Thomas Sowin, project leader for combinatorial chemistry at
Abbott Laboratories: "Combinatorial chemists are rare commodities indeed. So what I
look for is, first, good skills in synthetic organic chemistry. Beyond that, recruits have to
have an interest in doing combinatorial chemistry, and maybe an aptitude for using
automation" (Gwynne 1999:2).115
and leverage the tools we find promising. So at Lilly, we make sure
flexibility in adopting technologies such as combinatorial chemistry is
rewarded" (Brown 1996:2).
Table 5.3





























































































































(1) In million US dollars
Source: Compiled by author
This policy, however, did not prevent Eli Lilly from acquiring Sphinx
Pharmaceuticals for $US 76 million in 1994. Table 5.3 shows other cases of
acquisition by large pharmaceutical companies (e.g. Merck, Marion Merrell
Dow, etc.), large chemical firms (Dupont), large biotechnology companies
(e.g. Amgen, Genzyme) and large-cap genomic players (e.g. Millennium,
Celera Genomics). The total value of these acquisitions amounts to $US 4.8
billion. To some extent this is the result of attempts to transfer tacit know-
82. Celltech Chiroscience, which only had 400 employees, gave Medeva
shareholders 34 new Celltech Chiroscience shares for every 100 Medeva shares. This
values Medeva at around £563m ($US 915m) and produced a new company with a
market capitalization of around £1.3bn ($US 2.1bn), making it Britain's fourth largest
pharmaceutical company.
83. Rosetta Inpharmatics is a genomic firm but acquired Acacia Biosciences in 1999.
Acacia is a company conducting drug discovery utilizing recent advances in genome
science and combinatorial chemistry.116
how in combinatorial chemistry, as in the cases of Coselco Mimotopes,
Affymax, Selectide and Sphinx Pharmaceuticals, but the decision to buy a
small company gets much more driven by the need to expand product
portfolios and pipelines and reinforce strongholds in specific disease category
as the technology is becoming more mature. For example, it is clear that
Warnert-Lambert benefited from Agouron's expertise in structure-based
drug design, though the acquisition of Agouron Pharmaceuticals primarily
aimed at expanding the presence of the pharmaceutical giant in the AIDS,
anti-virals and oncology sub-markets. But this strategy carries an important
risk, since that there can be no assurance that the acquired firm will actually
deliver on its scientific, technological and commercial promise. It is simply
not possible, eranfe, to know the outcome of a firm's drug research efforts.
In addition, the best scientists are inherently mobile and, in spite of
confidentiality agreements, may leave with crucial know-how, trade secrets
or other proprietary information. The impact can be detrimental to the
firm's performance. Hence large pharmaceutical companies must go at great
lengths to preserve the incentive structure necessary to keep the best
scientists on board. Nothing illustrates more clearly these efforts than the
acquisition of Agouron Pharmaceuticals by Warnert-Lambert. The latter
increased almost immediately the R&D budget on Agouron's lead project,
and both the commercial and R&D units were left independent from
Warner-Lambert's groups. In addition, only Agouron's two top managers
reported to the parent company, and Agouron Pharmaceuticals even kept its
name in the hope that its best scientists stay with the firm (Copeland 2001).
That remains to be seen, for the number of key scientists who leaves
targeted firms can be considerable. Although the question is beyond the
scope of this thesis, it is perhaps not without significance that Xiao-Yi Xiao,
director of research chemistry at ChemRx, was a staff scientist at Affymax
from 1993 to 1995; Ronald Barrett, Mark Gallop and Bill Dower, also ex-
employees of Affymax, founded XenoPort in 1999; Michal Lebl, senior
director of automation at Illumina, was formerly of Selectide; Peter Myers,
previously chief scientific officer of CombiChem, is now chief executive
officer at Libraria; Barry A. Bunin, Libraria's founder and chief executive
officer, was formerly a senior scientist at Axys Pharmaceuticals; Tim
Powers, who serves as Libraria's director of discovery chemistry, was a
scientist at Sphinx before its acquisition by Lilly, etc.
5.3 DYNAMIC COMPLEMENTARITIES BETWEEN NEW ENTRANTS AND LARGE
PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS
From the point of view of new entrants, the bad news contained in section
5.2 is that large pharmaceutical firms have been able t) rapidly learn the
combinatorial synthesis methods. Other troublesome aspects can be inferred117
from their material advantage. The frst material advantage concerns scale
economies. Examining the relationships between firm size and productivity
in R&D in the pharmaceutical industry, Comanor (1965) and Grabowski
(1976) found that for smaller firms economies of scale exist while large firms
display diseconomies of scale. On the other hand, Schwartzman (1976),
Vernon and Gusen (1974), Grabowski and Vernon (1994), DiMasi et al.
(1995), Smmons (1995) and Sornette (2000) argue in different ways that
larger firms are more productive in pharmaceutical research than smaller
competitors. While these studies do not address the use of combinatorial
chemistry per se, it should be noted that larger players may be able to spread
the fixed costs of chemoinformatics software and databases, robotic systems,
synthesizers and so on over more R&D projects and a larger customer's base
than smaller companies. Likewise, large companies can benefit from their
large historical collections of compounds and combinatorial libraries, whose
costs are partially fixed and can be screened in a number of current and
future research programs for a less-than-proportionate increase in costs.
Finally, large pharmaceutical companies can support the establishment of one
or even several large R&D laboratories and are better positioned to benefit
from the ability to support more specialized personnel. In particular, a large
firm could take advantage of its deep-seated expertise in chemistry as well as
in x-crystallography, NMR and structural biology, enabling it to venture
deeper into the analysis of protein structures. In terms of appropriation, this
ability is important because large pharmaceutical companies can bypass the
use of government grants and hence are not required to deposit structural
data into public databases, as for example the Protein Data Bank. Thus, large
firms can keep important know-why as trade secret, allowing them to erect
isolating mechanisms around important therapeutic categories.
A second advantage concerns (he ability of large companies to achieve
scope economies. Following Henderson and Cockburn (1996) and
Cockburn and Henderson (2001), large pharmaceutical firms can benefit
from economies of scope in both drug discovery and development.**
Specifically, larger companies, which can afford running simultaneously
more research programs than smaller firms, can benefit from their greater
access to target receptors, given than scope economies may occur in
screening operations when many targets are considered in parallel rather
than in linear target-by-target fashion. More importantly, data, information
and knowledge stemming from combinatorial projects can be stored into
flexible, accessible and expandable chemical data systems, all of which can
84. The fact that a broader knowledge base can speed up the innovative process must
also be underscored. For example, Bierly and Chakrabarti (1996a), in their study of
organizational learning in the pharmaceutical industry, revealed that firms with a broader
knowledge base took less time to use a new technology in a manner that is beneficial to
the firm, after the technology is initially developed.118
guide synthesis in future and/or related projects. Since all major drug
companies have enormous and cumulative databases that relate chemical
structure to receptor activity (Spencer 1998), and since knowledge created
in one research program can be reused in a different, yet related, program,
it may be assumed that these companies have an advantage in reaping the
benefits of scope economies. It might also be conjectured that large
pharmaceutical companies can benefit from internal knowledge spillovers
due to their investments in a larger number of research programs. This is
clearly happening when serendipitous results are exploited in related
therapeutic areas, as the example of the antimigraine compound Y334370
illustrates. Acting on a hunch, scientists working on antidepressant drugs at
Eli Lilly hypothesized that migraines were linked to particular serotonin
receptors protein docking ports on nerve cells that accommodate the brain
chemical serotonin. This hypothesis led them to (1) screen a huge library of
Prozac-era drug candidates, (2) identify a series of drug candidates, (3)
optimize the most promising ones and (4) select Y334370. Y334370 made
the pre-clinical journey in a mere two years, half the usual time, and may
become the first ever drug discovered Wa combinatorial means (Moukheiber
1998).
A third advantage lies in the ability of large companies to spread risk over
a larger portfolio of projects, providing them with a larger margin for error
than new entrants. For instance, Chiron, a biotechnology company with
3,700 employees and a strong presence in combinatorial chemistry, recently
announced that a drug designed to treat the blood infection syndrome sepsis
proved ineffective in a clinical trial, sending its stock down more than 8
percent. Despite this downturn, analysts expect Chiron to post solid
earnings growth in coming years due to its sales of therapeutic drugs,
vaccines, blood tests and other products.
A final advantage deals with complementary assets. With 10 new entrants
having in-house manufacturing capability and 8 firms an adequate sales force,
full-fledged companies made up less than 3 percent of total companies. One
important implication is that most entrants depend on large pharmaceutical
companies for the commercialization of their products. Another one is that
large pharmaceutical companies can create value through learning by using
and learning by doing and prevent knowledge spillovers from leaking to
competitors.
The goods news for new entrants is that large pharmaceutical firms face
considerable challenges preventing them from being truly independent. To
begin, big pharma is losing patent protection on its best-selling products,
exposing it to generic competition. According to 7>ie fironom/tf (2002),
major drug companies will be hit with $US 6 billion in patent expiration in
2003, up from $US 2.8 billion in 2002. Perhaps just as alarming, the costs of
introducing a new drug to market grew from $US 259 million in the 1970-119
1982 period (Di Masi et al. 1991) to $US 480 million in the 1990-1994
period (Grabowski et al. 2002).®^ These problems are compounded by an
innovation deficit. Large pharmaceutical companies had only
commercialized, on average, 0.45 new molecular entities per year during
1990 and 1994, of which only 8 percent became blockbusters perse (i.e.
sales of greater $350 million/year). Yet, for the pace of growth to continue,
these companies have to launch at least 5 blockbusters per year (Andersen
Consulting 1998).
Forma/ i'nferorganizaüona./ agreements öefween iarge incumbents and new entrants
Owing to the culmination of these challenges, and because large
pharmaceutical firms may certainly master many but certainly not all
technological fields and therapeutic classes, the proportion of NCE approvals
that were self-originated, as opposed to licensed-in, has declined from 71.6
percent in the sixties to 60.9 percent in the nineties (DiMasi 2000). Large
firms would also outsource 10 to 40 percent of their research investment
(Andersen Consulting 1998). While the trend towards formal
interorganizational agreements with new entrants seems to be abating since
1999, the contract revenues of these entrants increased from $US 9.5
million in 1996 to about $US 15 million in 2001.
Clearly, the relationship between new entrants and large incumbents has
been in a constant flux. In the first phase of industrial development, which
can be seen as a monitoring phase, large firms had been mainly interested in
testing the early combinatorial synthesis methods and replenishing their
laboratories with combinatorial compounds. This is reflected in the fact that
equity stakes were relatively more important prior to 1996. Thus, equity
participation was used in 19.1 percent (138 times) of all partnership
agreements in the period 1984-1995, as compared to 9.6 percent (142
times) between 1996 and 2001 (see table 5.4). Often, enough equity is
purchased to get a seat on the board of directors, which provides the
investing firm with a window on technologies at relatively low costs (Kenney
1986). Explaining why large pharmaceutical companies take equity positions
in new entrants, Barry Ross, CEO and scientific director of Affymax says:
"It's not necessarily to get a financial return. It's also a mean of getting a
technology return. And it's technology return that drives the pharma
corporate strategy. If there is a financial return through an equity holding,
that's all very well. But I don't think that has ever driven the relationships"
(Arthur D. Little 2001: 7).
85. The rising costs of R&D in this industry have been associated with the increasing
difficulty in recruiting patients into clinical trials and the increased focus on developing
drugs to treat chronic and degenerative diseases, rather than acute diseases.120
At the same time, R&D contracts accounted for 23.2 percent (168 times)
of all agreements in the period 1984-1995, as compared to 20.5 percent
(302 times) between 1996 and 2001. This relative decline is a perhaps a
demonstration that large pharmaceutical companies initially perceived the
early methods to be a risky investment. As few drug companies wanted to
make irreversible investments in combinatorial chemistry in its early,
uncertain days, outsourcing a combinatorial library provided a safe and
inexpensive way to assess the new technology.
Table 5.4
Formal network
Increase in number of alliances between large incumbents and new entrants























































Source: Compiled by author
In the second phase of industrial development, large drug makers
generally became much more concerned about outsourcing services along
the drug discovery value chain. First on the list come targeted and focused
libraries, as illustrated by the 2001 joint R&D agreement signed between
Merck and ChemBridge to design and produce pharmacophore-based
libraries. Second on the list comes the creation of new leads against specific
targets. One agreement signed in 2001 between Array BioPharma and
Takeda Chemical Industries exemplifies this: the new entrant will create a
series of small molecule drug lead compound against a proprietary Takeda
target. Third on the list comes the optimization of already identified leads for
particular targets. For example, ArQule entered into a five-year
collaboration and license agreement in 2000 to identify, optimize and
deliver drug candidates for SmithKline Beecham's drug discovery programs.
ArQule will optimize a lead compound provided by SmithKline Beecham
and another one identified from its own combinatorial library. As shown in121
table 5.4, these joint R&D agreements grew from 110 (15.2 percent of
total) to 376 (25.5 percent) over the 1984-1995 and 1996-2001 periods.
As many combinatorial chemistry companies transform themselves into
fully-integrated drug discovery companies, it is also clear that
complementary assets became increasingly important in the second phase of
industrial development, prompting an increase in the number of licensing
agreements. Licensing deals occurred 255 times in 35 percent of all
cooperative agreements prior to 1996, but they occur 565 times in 38
percent of total agreement in 1996 henceforward. The importance of
licensing agreements may be seen as a sign of a high barrier to vertical
integration. On the one hand, large incumbents need to find the ding
candidate that will make them profitable, but have all the complementary
assets necessary to bring them to market. On the other hand, smaller firms
are getting richer in chemical-based innovations but often lack the cash flow
and complementary assets necessary to commercialize their products.
Therefore, there can be little doubt that those that do not own these assets
are willing to broker knowledge and a share in future profits in exchange for
their access. For example, Centocor, a wholly owned subsidiary of Johnson
& Johnson, acquired worldwide rights to the orally active direct thrombin
inhibitor program of 3-Dimensional Pharmaceuticals. While fully integrated
Johnson & Johnson needs new therapeutic products, 3-Dimensional
Pharmaceuticals, a structured-based company, is highly innovative but needs
financing and possesses no manufacturing and marketing expertise.
Joint venture is another mode of collaboration that gained some grounds
over the years, from 16 joint ventures in the period 1984-1995 to 29
between 1996 and 2001. That 23 joint ventures had been formed between
companies of different countries is not surprising. International
collaborations are often stimulated by the fact that domestic-based firms are
confronted with Hgher barriers to entry (i.e. the regulatory procedures,
prospective customers, etc.) in foreign markets than foreign-based firms
(Pisano et al. 1988). One example will suffice: Texas-based BioNumerik
Pharmaceuticals formed KI Pharmaceutical, a joint venture with Japan-based
Grelan Pharmaceutical. The joint venture focuses on developing new anti-
cancer compounds for the Japanese marketplace. KI Pharmaceutical marries
Grelan's Japanese development and marketing expertise with BioNumerik's
mechanism-based approach to drug discovery.
Forma/ infero/ga/iizationa./ agreements oefwee/? ferge j'ncumienB and scientific
organizations
It is should finally be noted, however, that large incumbents do not solely
learn from new entrants. Industry-university collaboration has a long history
in the pharmaceutical industry (Swann 1988) and remains an important122
strategy among the major players. Rhöne-Poulenc Rorer, now part of
Aventis, is a case in point. In 1997, the company signed two mega-deals with
Cambridge University/Imperial College of Science, Technology and
Medicine in Great Britain and Stanford University in the United States. The
first agreement, worth 4 million pounds and spread over three years, allows
corporate scientists at Rhöne-Poulenc Rorer, to interact with academic
specialists from the disciplines of computer assisted drug design and
combinatorial chemistry. The first group of specialists, led by Dr. Dean at
Cambridge University, has to create a series of virtual drugs, which the
second group, led by Professor Barrett at Imperial College, would turn into
actual compounds by combinatorial means.
The second agreement, potentially worth US$ 5 million, is one of
Stanford University's largest sponsored research awards. Rhöne-Poulenc
Rorer's research agreement concentrates on the firm's core therapeutic areas
of cancer, cardiovascular disease and central nervous system disorders and
involves drug discovery programs such as functional genomics,
combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening. Research grants, for
US$ 250,000 each, are being given to Stanford's scientists, and Rhöne-
Poulenc Rorer would receive, at its option, either an exclusive or non-
exclusive license to the technology. Aventis, Amersham Pharmacia Biotech,
AstraZeneca, GlaxoSmithKline, Eli Lilly, Nycomed Amersham, Organon
Laboratories, Pfizer and Roche Discovery are another case in point. These
firms invested more than 2.5 million pounds into a research consortium
developed by Professor Mark Bradley at the University of Southampton.
Professor Bradley provides strong clues as to why these firms signed this
collaborative deal with his organization: "Pharmaceutical companies want to
have large libraries of compounds, but they don't have the time to develop
the new tools necessary to make them. At Southampton we will be
developing the methodology to make the compounds and the industrial
partners will have royalty-free licenses to them" (New Reporter 2000).
5.4 GLAXOSMITHKLINE: A CASE STUDY OF COMPETENCE BUILDING IN
COMBINATORIAL CHEMISTRY
To see in greater detail how large pharmaceutical companies have been able
to use their absorptive capacity to acquire their competence in
combinatorial chemistry and why they still need new entrants to fill their
innovation gap, let us look at the example of GlaxoSmithKline.
GlaxoSmithKline is the international giant resulting from the merger of
GlaxoWellcome and SmithKline Beecham in 2000, and combine sales of
approximately $24.9 billion and an estimated 7.3 percent share of the global
pharmaceutical market. GlaxoSmithKline's commitment in combinatorial
chemistry is often associated with the purchase of the Affymax by123
Glaxo Wellcome. This acquisition remains, without doubt, the cornerstone
of the firms's strategy in the field.
Naturally, the story of Affymax invites comparison with the experience
of Genentech, the first firm dedicated to genetic engineering. Both firms are
the brainchild of a "visionary" entrepreneur in the Schumpeterian tradition:
Dr. Alejandro Zaffaroni set up Affymax in 1988, whereas Robert A.
Swanson established Genentech in 1976.^ Like Genentech whose stock
offering set off a buying frenzy, Affymax made the headlines when it went
public, raising 92 million in December 1991 -the fourth largest in the life
science sector (Ernst & Young 1995). Both firms are located in California.
Both firms also fetched high price when they were acquired by a large
incumbent: Hoffman LaRoche purchased Genentech for $US 2.1 billion in
1990 while GlaxoWellcome paid $US 539 million for Affymax in 1995.
Above all, both frms had served as a useful knowledge intermediary
between the large incumbent and the scientific community. As figure 5.3
demonstrates, Affymax was well positioned to capture external knowledge
and external knowledge spillovers in the network of innovators, having
established a series of formal, non-market linkages with firms, small or large,
and scientific organizations in both the United States and Europe. To quote
Dr Ringold, the chief executive officer and scientific director at Affymax:
"We can serve as GlaxoWellcome's eyes and ears to California's academic
and biotech community and provide the company with a technology magnet
that attracts people with interesting ideas to us" (Annual Report of
GlaxoWellcome 1997). For example, Affymax was able to absorb the
catalytic antibody technology of University of California, Berkeley by
striking a joint R&D agreement with this scientific organization. Another
example is a license granted to the firm by Dyax about a patented phage
display technology (i.e. otherwise known as combinatorial biology).
But there the similarity between Affymax and Genentech ends. Hoffman
LaRoche had grown from the science base of chemistry but had no strong
competence in biology. As a result, the Swiss firm simply could not mobilize
the molecular biologists necessary to learn the skills of Genentech. While the
transfer of knowledge from Affymax to GlaxoWellcome was by no means
free, the British giant was able to rapidly absorb the unique Affymax
approach to drug discovery by sending its chemists to Palo Alto for training
sessions. A scientist from GlaxoWellcome in Verona in Italy spent some time
at Affymax making libraries against anti-bacterial agents while another from a
division in Madrid visited the facilities in order to make compounds for anti-
fungal screening. The training program was repeated on a larger scale with
86. Dr. Zaffaroni is perhaps the most well known entrepreneur in the life sciences
business, having launched in his long career 11 entrepreneurial companies, including as
Syntex, Alza, Affymetrix, Symyx and Maxigen. All but one is still in business (The
Economist 1999a).124
Figure 5.2
Strategic alliance network Glaxo (1992-1995)
Figure 5.3
Strategic alliance network GlaxoWellcome (1995-2000)
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scientists at GlaxoWellcome's research center at Stevenage in Great Britain,
where 90 percent of its 400 chemists could use some form of parallel
synthesis in their R&D endeavors by the end of the nineties. Efforts were also
made to teach these scientists how to make the technology relevant to their
particular needs, since much of the accumulated know-how at Affymax was
specific in the context of its use. The words of the president and scientific
director of Affymax deserve to be cited at great length:
An important aspect of the GlaxoWellcome acquisition is the
transfer of Affymax technology to the rest of the company. In a
formal program technology transfer, five scientists from
GlaxoWellcome in the UK have spent several months at Affymax
to learn the techniques of combinatorial chemistry. The scientists'
agenda included learning how to build and dismantle the
equipment, proving they could use it effectively. By building
their own equipment we're convinced that they'll be able to
trouble-shoot any problems that arise if it breaks down at their
base [...] An additional advantage is that by fully understanding the
equipment they will also be able to adapt it to meet their own
needs (Annual Report of GlaxoWellcome 1997).
Another demarcating point between Affymax and Genentech is the sell
out of the former by GlaxoWellcome. With GlaxoWellcome having
established combinatorial techniques across its laboratories around the
world, Affymax has stopped to be a key asset in the pharma company's
portfolio. As a result, GlaxoSmithKline sold Affymax to a venture syndicate
led by Patricof & Co. for $US 51 million in the summer of 2001, and
planned to invest the resultant savings in the next innovative steps it intends
to take. Meanwhile, Affymax had transformed itself from a combinatorial
chemistry firm to a drug discovery company, and is now set to develop
medicine independently.
In retrospect, it is almost certain that this strategic move paid off.
Between 1995 and 1997, the firm witnessed a ten-fold increase in the
number of compounds available for bioassay and a 100-fold increase in its
screening capacity. GlaxoWellcome had made 350,000 molecular entities
before combinatorial chemistry was brought into the picture; now, it can
easily make that number in a year. In fact, the company had synthesized 81
libraries between 1992 and 2000, and claims it has doubled its drug
discovery success rate from 10 to 20-25 percent. In addition, more than 50
percent of drug leads discovered in 2000 came from combinatorial
endeavors -more than twice as many as in 1999 (Borman 2001). Set apart
the two leads displayed in table 5.1, GlaxoSmithKline has at least 4
combinatorial drugs in the pipeline:126
• GW405212, a molecule useful in the treatment of dysmenorrhoea
and premature labor, was recently discovered by combinatorial
means. A team of researchers needed only two scientist weeks for
identifying the potency of GW405212, which would have taken 1500
scientists weeks to discover the same compound Wa traditional
methods.
• Having tailored its screening assay for detecting molecules with anti-
mycobacterial activity, the company was also able to screen 17
libraries and capable of identifying several active compounds for
further testing. Initial screening of a large combinatorial library
against a TB target led to the selection of a molecule that may have
potential against obesity.
• GW409890, the molecules' appellation, is already been sent for
pharmacokinetics, a process that took 40 chemist and 4 biologist
weeks as compared to 600 chemist weeks, half the previous required
time.
• The stomach bacterium He/icoöarter py/ori has been targeted against
500,000 entities, yielding a ranitidine bismuth citrate, which is about
to be commercialized for use with an antibiotic to eradicate the
bacterium.
It is interesting to note, however, that external learning at Glaxo did not
start with Affymax's acquisition. Indeed, the pharmaceutical company did
not "jump" on the combinatorial bandwagon right away. Instead, Glaxo
signed a series of partnership deals with new entrants as a way to assess the
potentials of both combinatorial chemistry and the firms that had been using
it (see figure 5.2). The first one, a joint research and development
partnership deal involving patented peptide screening technology, was
signed with Trega Biosciences in 1992. In 1993, GlaxoWellcome also lured
Mario Geysen, the co-inventor of the first parallel synthesis method, away
from Coselco Mimotopes, appointing him drug discovery chief of the
Diversity Science Department at their North Carolina facility in the United
States.
Nor did Glaxo's experience with combinatorial chemistry and relations
with new entrants end with Affymax's purchase. As David Langley,
compound acquisition manager at Glaxo Wellcome R&D in Great Britain,
puts it: The simple fact is that none of us have all the answers on our
shelves. We've got to go outside looking for compounds. These companies
won't all survive -there must be a finite limit to how many deals are out
there. But I don't see any immediate rationalizing. For the next five years at
least, there is scope for most of the compound suppliers and library
companies" (Boswell 2000). In fact, the firm had synthesized in-house 80
percent of its compounds, but its chemical diversity remains limited. A127
significant portion of its collection, judged inappropriate for screening, was
even eliminated. Hence GlaxoSmithKline elected to tap the newly accessible
universities and research organizations of Hungary and Russia. By one count,
6,000 chemists in the former Soviet Union are active in the business of
synthesizing drug-like compounds for screening, which are sold for just $US
10 to $US 50 for 10 to 20 milligrams. These hand-made compounds, which
are produced by conventional means, offer much greater chemical diversity
than those synthesized by GlaxoSmithKline through combinatorial chemistry,
which offer greater potential for lead development (Boswell 2000). Glaxo
Wellcome R&D would also continue to outsource part of the "R" side of
R&D, as figure 5.3 demonstrates. For example, the company and Repligen
have been collaborating on evaluating the potential of blocking the action of
certain proteins by interfering with their binding to carbohydrates on the
cell surface.
5.5 THE ENTRY OF LARGE (AGRO)CHEMICAL FIRMS
Large agrochemical and chemical companies are also entering a new
technological era that holds great promise. However, these firms have
mirrored large pharmaceutical companies in being cautious with their efforts
to develop in-house competences in combinatorial chemistry. As in the case
of pharmaceuticals, doubts about the economic viability and technological
feasibility of combinatorial innovations in new materials and other markets
persisted. As remarked by Klaus Kulien, director/operative research for
Aventis: "When we started out this collaboration [with Symyx] I was
skeptical. Now I'm convinced that combinatorial chemistry will have quite an
important impact on the improvement of catalysts as well as on the discovery
of new catalysts" (Fairley 1999). Scientists were also reluctant to switch to
the new technology. "They can't understand the need for change", says Daniel
Bellus, chairman of Ciba's research board (Wood 2000).
The potentials for productivity growth, being too important too ignored,
became nonetheless a powerful incentive to invest in combinatorial
materials. Technological and commercial opportunities in the field are far
from being trivial. Thanks to combinatorial chemistry, large chemical
companies expect to screen 700 compounds a week in 2003, as compared
to 10 or 12 in the mid-nineties. In fact, combinatorial chemistry already
yields substantial time and cost savings in the search for new or improved
polymers, catalysts, etc. Using this process, Dow's Combinatorial Chemistry
Lab has increased its research capabilities from just 8-16 experiments per day
to 192 (PR newswire 2001b), and Shell said its investment in the field led to
an increase in the development of new catalysts from 3 in 1994 to 10 in
1999 (Wood 2000). The need to pre-empt rivals and the fear of being left
behind the technological race therefore may have something to do with the128
current spending frenzy in the field. According to a recent study from
Business Communication Co. (2001), the chemical industry spent $US 230
million on combinatorial chemistry in 2000. Rising at at an annual rate of
10.2 percent, these expenditures are expected to reach $US 374 million in
2005.
Bayer reportedly spent close to $US 30 million into combichem, with
particular emphasis on catalysts. Ciba (now Novartis) spent about $US 5 to
$7 million in 2000, and intended to increase this amount more than 20
percent percent/year in the future (Wood 2000). As argued by Clyde Payn,
CEO of the Catalyst group: "As long as two competing companies have
combinatorial chemistry they will bounce each other off. But if only one
parry of a given technology domain invests and the other doesn't then it is
likely [the former] will end up capturing market share" (Chemical Week
2000b: 52).
The use of combinatorial chemistry in new materials does not come
cheap, however. By and large, investments in the order of $US 10-20
million are required in order to achieve interesting results (ft/d 2000b). In
addition, assembling the necessary manpower is more complex than
Pharmaceuticals, involving expertise in robotics, data management,
engineering and analytical chemistry.®' In spite of this, Hoechsts, BASF, Dow,
Dupont, General Electric, Ciba Geiby, Rhodia, UOP, British Petroleum,
W.R. Grace, DSM, Rohm and Haas, Shell and others have all been busy
building competences in the field. But how? Dupont choose to buy
Combichem for $US 95 million in 1999. Others preferred to go with
universities for reasons of appropriability. For example, UOP, headquartered
in Illinois, judged the new field too important for collaboration with new
entrants and chose instead to develop its own technology with the help of
scientific organizations. Thus, the company announced a joint R&D
agreement with the research foundation Sintef in Norway to use
combinatorial chemistry in the development of zeolites (Fairley 1999). In
2002, UOP also formed a wholly owned subsidiary, named Tonal, which
develops and provides combinatorial chemistry tools and services for the
materials-oriented industries (Chemical Market Reporter 2002).
Given the generic nature of chemical compounds, it should hardly be
surprising that agrochemicals hitherto ranks second only to Pharmaceuticals
among combinatorial applications (see table 5.5). Indeed, large agrochemical
companies like Monsanto, Dow Chemical, DuPont and Novartis have been
routinely outsourcing combinatorial libraries ever since Monsanto signed an
87. The same common language is necessary to communicate in the field. As pointed
out by James M. Meyer, vice-president of Dupont Central Research and Development:
"We look for people who have fundamental skills, but we don't expect that they're
going to spend their whole career in the discipline they got their degree in or did their
research in graduate schools (Henry 2000:74).129
R&D contract with Cubist Pharmaceuticals in 1995. The 1999 collaborative
agreement between Novartis CropProtection and Pharmacopeia better
exemplifies this trend. Under the terms of this collaboration. Pharmacopeia
uses its patented ECLIPS technology to provide collections of small molecule
compounds for screening by Novartis CropProtection, the world's leading
supplier of crop protection products. Pharmacopeia receives payments for
each library provided and is entitled to milestone and royalty payments as
compounds progress through development and commercialization.
Table 5.5
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The first large chemical company to test the water in combinatorial
catalysts was Germany's Hoechsts, which backed Symyx with a $43 million
joint R&D contract in 1997. According to Arthur D. Little, demands for
better catalysts in the polymer, specialty chemical and environmental
markets are driving growth by 5 percent/year in the $US 10 billion/year
global catalyst market (Caruana 2000). Accordingly, the largest market to be
tapped apart from Pharmaceuticals is expected to be in this area, and large
chemical companies are increasingly striving to leam the technological
know-how of new entrants for a head start in the combinatorial race. The
collaborative agreement between DSM and Cambridge Combinatorial,
which combines DSM's expertise in catalysis, materials and process
development with Cambridge Combinatorial's extensive know-how in the
area of automation, combinatorial chemistry and software development, is a130
case in point (Chemical Reporter 1998).
The majority, however, turned to "pure" combinatorial material start-up
companies (e.g. Symyx, HTE, Avantium) and multiple platform companies
(e.g. Discovery Partners, Pharmacopeia) for technological know-how and
scientific instrumentation. As pointed out by Klaus Kuhlien from Aventis: "At
the moment I don't see that we have the capabilities, personnel, or money to
do it all our own" (Fairley 1998). In total, 85 alliances have been formed with
these start-ups, with agrochemicals accounting for 25 alliances, catalysts (13),
polymers (11), instruments (9) and phosphors (4). In addition, 8 equity stakes
have been taken by large chemical companies, chiefly as a means to monitor
developments in this fast-changing technology. For example, BASF took
equity stakes into Chemspeed, a global leader in the field of parallel reactors,
which play an important part in combinatorial materials research. BASF is
also entitled to nominate a member of Chempeed's Board of Directors.
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
All things considered, and contrary to the predictions of the Tushman-
Anderson model (1986), it is possible that the most favorable population for
industrial innovations has been achieved: new entrants with a tehavi'orai
advantage living side by side with a few pharmaceutical giants with a materia/
advantage. Indeed, most of the evidence presented in this chapter suggests
that both types of organization enjoy a number of complementary
relationships in their innovative activities. Compound-poor large companies
provide money and/or complementary assets, whereas cash-poor new
entrants full of imaginative ideas provide chemical-based services and
products, most notably small molecule drugs. This crucially provides large
pharmaceutical firms with a means to fill their innovation gaps, and new
chemical-based entrants with a means to generate the necessary cash flow to
carry out further research activities, to survive in an environment
characterized by fast technological change, changing demand and stiff
competition. In fact, given that only 7 new entrants went out of business and
only 25 were bought up by large incumbents, the majority of new entrants
continue to exist independently. In summary, the introduction of
combinatorial chemistry has been fostering a new type of relationship
between new entrants and large incumbents, altering the structures of the
pharmaceutical industry in the process. One may therefore have a situation
where big pharma and new entrants collaborate in a complementary
relationship, instead of incumbents displacing entrants.CHAPTER 6
Combinatorial Chemistry
and Scientific Organizations
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
The dual objective of this chapter is to underscore the contribution of public
research to industrial innovation and to solve the following puzzle. The first
combinatorial synthesis methods appeared in a Hungarian University and a
Dutch public research institute. The combinatorial research output of
scientific organizations from the European Union (EU-15) compares well
with that of US-based ones. The foundation of EU-15 entrants, on average,
only lagged behind their US counterparts by a few months, as opposed to
five years in the biotech sector (Saviotti et al. 1998).
Yet, despite these observations, the American entrepreneurial sector
appears to be much healthier than elsewhere. US-based entrants remain
preeminent in the field by all measures: (1) firm formation; (2)
combinatorial library output; (3) compounds under pre-clinical stage; and132
(4) compounds under clinical stage. As previously mentioned, there are 285
US-based, 82 EU-15 and 55 non-US, non-EU-15 new entrants. Whereas
US-based entrants held 218 combinatorial libraries and uncovered 659
compounds, of which 256 begun clinical testing, EU-15 firms and the rest of
the world place a distant second and third with, respectively, 11 libraries
and 191 compounds (i.e. 63 under clinical testing) and 4 libraries and 128
compounds (i.e. 22 under clinical testing).
The predominance and strengths of the US entrepreneurial sector
probably owe to several different interrelated factors, including the
existence of a sophisticated venture capital system, larger companies, etc.
This chapter sets forth a narrower view focused on the relationships between
scientific organizations and new entrants. It is divided into three sections.
Section 6.2 describes the role of "public" research in combinatorial drug
discovery and compares the position of American scientific organizations
with the position of similar organizations in EU-15 and the rest of world in
terms of library share. In section 6.3 the main question being asked is
whether technology transfer from public organizations to the private sector
plays an active role in enhancing the competitive standing of new entrants
and competitive advantage of nations. Four technology transfer mechanisms
are examined: formal networking (section 6.3.1); informal networking
(6.3.2); university-based training (6.6.3); and the creation of
entrepreneurial spin-offs (6.3.4). Section 6.4 concludes with a summary of
the main findings.
6.2 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS TO COMBINATORIAL
DRUG DISCOVERY
A number of authors have testified in different ways to the positive influence
of public and private, non-profit research endeavors on the creation of
industrial innovations in the therapeutic drug market. Based on data
obtained from top R&D executives, Mansfield (1991) estimated that 27
percent of pharmaceutical firm's products and 29 percent of their new
processes could not have been developed or would have been developed
much later in the absence of recent academic research. Much in the same
spirit, Maxwell and Eckardt (1990), in a study of 32 different drugs,
suggested that 19 of them would not have been discovered or would have
marketed with substantial delay without the contributions of scientific
organizations. Also, as Gambardella (1992) has demonstrated by correlating
company patents with scientific publications, pharmaceutical companies with
better in-house scientific capabilities have been able to avail themselves more
effectively of external science. Using data from the FDA, the NIH and the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association, Toole (2000)
calculated that a 1 percent increase in public basic research resulted in a 2.0133
percent to 2.4 percent increase in the number of commercially available
drugs. Finally, McMillan et al. (2000) showed that 72 percent of scientific
papers cited by the 2,334 patents of 220 US biotech companies originated
solely at scientific organizations.
Table 6.1
Summary of lead compounds discovered by combinatorial means by
scientific organizations (Dec. 1999-Jan. 2001)
Scientific Organization
Scripps Research Institute
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" libraries using
Certainly, most would agree that scientific organizations are an important
source of technological opportunities for new entrants, if only because the
history of combinatorial chemistry is strewn with inventions made by
scientists from universities, public and private non-profit organizations.
Eötvös Lorand University, the Central Veterinary Institute, the Arizona
Cancer Center, the Scripps Research Institute, the German National
Research Center for Biotechnology and University of California, Berkeley
provided the pharmaceutical industry's first combinatorial synthesis
methods, thereby taking an important part in the growth of new entrants and
large incumbents alike. Scientific organizations are also the source of many
instruments (e.g. Carlsberg Laboratory), identification techniques (e.g.
Scripps Research Institute) and computational methods (e.g. Pomona
College), and their contributions to combinatorial material (e.g. Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory) only begin to surface in the scientific
literature. Above all, these scientific organizations remain the main locus of
knowledge production in physiology, pharmacology, enzymology, cell
biology and molecular biology -the absence of which would thwart the
success of chemical experiments (Cockburn et al. 1999). Researchers at the134
US National Cancer Institute, for instance, have been isolating receptor
targets since 1975, which may now be used to test lead compounds against
60 different human cancer cell lines -all major malignancies (Nature
Biotechnology 2000). All these contributions enlarged the existing pool of
knowledge about many diseases, providing insightful clues to firms as to what
to search next and how to achieve their objectives.
The scientific literature also reported that scientific organizations were
behind the isolation and identification of at least 14 leads compounds (table
6.1). More often than not, however, these leads have been identified by
academic and private, non-profit research organizations that were generously
sponsored by nonacademic organizations, primarily from industry and
federal agencies. The financial support granted by the German
pharmaceutical giant Bayer to the Max Planck Institute and the University of
Mainz is a case in point. The grants and contracts given to the Scripps
Research Institute by the National Institutes of Health, the American Cancer
Society, the American Heart Association, the American Lung Association,
the Juvenile Diabetes Association and Novartis Pharmaceuticals and many
others is another one. Yet, if industrial sponsorship is removed from the
equation, few scientific organizations have the ability to initiate a large,
expensive and instrument-intensive pre-clinical research endeavor, given the
full cost of lead discovery and lead optimization. Consequently, most of the
leads and eventually drugs derived from combinatorial-based research will
spring from industry. In the words of scientist-entrepreneur Richard
Houghten:
To make 100,000 individual compounds and screen them in a
high throughput array format is typically prohibitive for most
academic organizations. If you need to look at 100,000 individual
data points in triplicate, that will almost short-circuit academic
organizations. They just can't get it (Borman 1998:7).
One relevant contribution is clear, however. While it is right in
presupposing that universities and public research organizations do not
possess the financial strength needed to steer a new pharmaceutical product
through the entire drug discovery, development and clinical process, their
expertise in solid phase and solution organic synthesis has become a resource
upon which hundreds combinatorial libraries have been developed as well as
sold or licensed to pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies.®® With
65 percent of all published libraries coming from academia, government
laboratories, private and non-for profit research institutes in 2000, these
88. Personal communication, Prof. Arno Spatola, Louisville University (US) (October
2000).135
organizations now outpaced industry in combinatorial research output
(Dolle 2001). Interestingly, the locus of knowledge creation is highly
diversified: universities account for approximately three-quarters of total
published combinatorial libraries, the rest being shared among government
laboratories and private, non-for-profit research organizations.
The creation of these libraries is not undertaken without any particular
use in mind. Given the gradual shift from discovery libraries towards
targeted and focused libraries, it has become increasingly apparent that
chemists at scientific organizations prepare carefully the type of
combinatorial combinations they want to synthesize. It is fair to assume that
interesting new leads compounds and thereby therapeutic drugs will be
discovered in these collections of molecules, though commercialization will
require considerable optimization work on the part of companies. What all
this adds up is the presumption that technology platform companies face
intense competition from unexpected quarters. Indeed, an increasing
number of scientific organizations are now playing a role that was previously
the province of new entrants: suppliers of compound libraries to large
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Figure 6.1
Increasing volume of public research in combinatorial chemistry as measured
by published libraries -by geographical location (1992-2000)
Source: Extracted from Dolle (1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001) and Dolle and Nelson
(1999).
Of additional interest, the drive to spend public monies on combinatorial
chemistry did not spread simultaneously and equally across countries.136
Through the period 1992-1997, 89 libraries had been synthesized by
American organizations, far more than any other country (see figure 6.1).
Early contributions mainly originated at UBC, Torrey Pines Institute for
Molecular Studies, University of California, Davis, and the Scripps Research
Institute. During the same period, only 39 collections of compounds had
their source in scientific organizations from the European Union. These
include Tubingen University (DE), Dortmund University (DE), Catholic
University at Leuven (BEL), Carlsberg Laboratories (DK), Commissariat ä
l'Energie Atomique (FR), Cambridge University (GB) and Stockholm
University (SE). However, as figure 6.1 demonstrates, the American margin
of leadership had been eroded in 1999, with EU-15 rapidly catching up and
challengers appearing in countries as diverse as Canada, Singapore, Taiwan
and India.
Table 6.2
Top 20 scientific organizations for published libraries (1989-2001)
Scientific Organization Country No. of Libraries
Scripps Research Institute
University of California - Berkeley
Torrey Pines Institute for Molecular
Studies
CNRS
National University of Singapore
University of California - Davis




National Dong Hwa University
University of Gottingen
Technical University of Denmark
University of Tokyo














































P: Extracted from Dolle (1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001) and DoUe and Nelson
(1999).
The United States regained their leadership in 2000, its research output
expanding at a higher pace than other locations, but the growth of137
combinatorial libraries from the European Union does not seem to be
slowing down either. To date, American scientific organizations had
synthesized 257 combinatorial libraries and EU-15 ones 209, with Germany
(38) being the most prolific country, followed by Great Britain (35), France
(28), Italy (11) and the Netherlands (8). The relatively strong publication
performance of EU-15 is not surprising, given that European academia has
had a long history of excellence in the discipline of chemistry. This is borne
out by publication statistics produced by the National Science Foundation
(2000), which showed that EU-15 and the United States generated,
respectively, 32.8 percent and 20.9 percent of the world's articles published
in chemistry over 1995-1997.
Table 6.2 shows the most productive scientific organizations in terms of
published libraries, which account for about 48 percent of all published
libraries in the world. The top organization in the United States is the
Scripps Research Institute, followed by University of California, Berkeley,
Torrey Pines Institute for Molecular Studies, University of California, Davis,
and University of California, Los Angeles -all located in California.
Interestingly, Torrey Pines Institute for Molecular Studies spun out of
another scientific organization. Indeed, its founder, Richard A. Houghten,
was a former scientist at the Scripps Research Institute before establishing the
organization in 1988. What is also noticeable in table 6.2 is that the response
of Asian countries to the technological discontinuity is significant. National
University of Singapore (with 16 libraries), National Dong Hwa University
(7) and University of Tokyo (6) are now among the most important
producers of combinatorial libraries.
6.3 TAPPING INTO PUBLIC RESEARCH
It is evident from the previous section that scientific organizations in the
United States only slightly outperformed EU-based universities, public
research organization and private, non-profit research organizations. Yet one
should mention that the population of the former is 40 percent lower that
that of the latter. Even more alarming for EU-15 is that EU-based firms have
been lagging behind their American counterparts in terms of technology
transfer from scientific organizations. Of the numerous technology transfer
mechanisms available to the firm, this section will consider: (1) formal
interorganizational agreements, (2) informal interorganizational agreements,
(3) the provision of vocational skills and (4) entrepreneurial spin-offs.
6J.i forma/ ;nfero/ganizat/ona/ agreements between new entrants and scientific
orgam'zaf/ons
The success of scientific organization in generating new knowledge has138
not been lost on new entrants. Research in scientific organizations is
supported by nearly two thirds of these firms, which signed 795 alliances
with universities and public research organizations from 1988 to 2001, as
table 6.4 illustrates. However, the table also provides the first indication that
scientific organizations help finance both R&D and the foundation of new
entrants. This is, first, because these companies often receive outside
funding from government agencies and laboratories, most notably the
National Institute on Health (NIH) and its agencies. These government
agencies had given 10 grants to new entrants in the period 1984-1995,
which increased to 67 in the period 1995-2001. For instance Phylos, was
able to evaluate protein scaffolds for the design of novel anti-cancer agents
thanks to a $US 550,000 grant by the National Cancer Institute (NCI). Also,
it is worth remarking that Scripps Research Institute had organized 9 research
contracts and licensing agreements with Cytel, Trega Biosciences, Ixsys, CN
Biosciences and Tripos. Second, equity investments occurred 57 times,
probably reflecting a concern by universities to not only ensure that the
results of their research are exploited but also bring reward to their
researchers and themselves. This is exemplified by the equity position taken
by Oxford University into Oxford Asymmetry, which was meant to market
chiral chemical synthesis technology developed by Professor Stephen Davies
and his research group at the Dyson Perrins Laboratory. The equity stakes
taken by John Hopkins University into Lion Pharmaceuticals and by
Cambridge and Oxford University into Cambridge Combinatorial are other
examples.
Likewise, the data reveal a few cases of new entrants whose existence
owe to combinatorial technology licensed from universities and government
research organizations. Auda Pharmaceuticals started with a combinatorial
synthesis methodology developed at the Technical University of Denmark;
Jerini Bio Tools was launched to exploit the SPOT technology discovered at
German National Research Center for Biotechnology; Synsorb Biotech uses
technologies based on discoveries done by the chemistry department at the
University of Alberta, which ware subsequently transferred to the Alberta
Research Council and then licensed to Synsorb; Pharmacopeia started out
with an exclusive license agreement with Columbia University and Cold
Spring Harbor covering technology related to tagged combinatorial chemical
libraries and methods of preparing and utilizing such libraries; etc. Of
course, there are also license agreements that transfer technologies other
than combinatorial synthesis processes. Scientific instrumentation for
medical and new material research can also be targeted, as when Symyx
acquired an exclusive license to a portfolio of patents focusing on infrared
thermal imaging. The technology was developed at the University of
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However, there is little doubt that the strongest reason to obtain a license
from a scientific organization is to get access to advanced genomics products
and technologies. This is probably what top management at Senomyx had in
mind when the firm entered into three different license agreements with
Rockefeller University, John Hopkins University and University of
California, San Diego. In 1999, Senomyx signed an exclusive license with the
Rockefeller University regarding the discovery of molecules involved in the
human biology of olfaction and the Johns Hopkins University regarding assay
technologies and receptor genes related to taste and olfaction. In 2000, the
company entered into a license agreement with the University of California,
San Diego, under which it obtained exclusive rights to technologies involved
in the biology of taste, including two taste receptor gene families, TlRs and
T2Rs. The licensing of such targets is particularly frequent and important
because these products and technologies can provide the means to develop
screens for specific combinatorial programs. Despite this, the interest in
both licensing and R&D outsourcing has been declining, respectively, from
54.8 percent to 45.2 percent and from 27.3 percent to 12.6 percent over
the periods 1984-1995 and 1996-2001.
By comparison, the share of joint R&D agreements rose from 6.4 percent
to 26.7 percent over the same interval. New entrants have been
collaborating with scientific organization for a variety of overlapping reasons.
As part of their strategy of being integrated drug discovery companies, most
new entrants are seeking to branch into a wider spectrum of new140
Table 6.4
Formal network





































































































Sou/re: Compiled by author
knowledge, though the transfer of know-how and know-why in genomic
sciences is again to be the main motivation behind collaborative R&D. Thus,
joint R&D can represent a cost-effective vehicle not only for experimenting
with uncertain technologies but also for developing or reinforcing
competences in genomics and related technologies. Whereas licensing and
R&D contracts do not allow for learning by doing and open-ended learning,
joint R&D arrangements permit interactions among scientists, thereby
enabling new entrants to learn the tacit elements of technologies. Thus when
Pharmacopeia wanted to learn about leading-edge research in chemical
genetics,^ the New Jersey-based firm signed a joint collaborative agreement
with Harvard University and its Institute of Chemistry and Cell Biology
(ICCB). In view of the fact that technological change is blurring all
distinction between basic and applied research, collaborations with scientific
organizations can also increase the likelihood that a firm will be the first to
use the new knowledge for commercial purposes. Thus, a joint R&D
89. Chemical genetics is the process of using chemistry to understand biological
systems and unlock the function of the vast numbers of new proteins being discovered
through genomic research.
90. In the words of Joseph A. Mollica, Pharmacopeia's Chairman, President and
CEO: "By having our scientists conduct research at the ICCB, Pharmacopeia will be able
to participate in research at the forefront of chemical genetics and potentially apply new
advances to our internal efforts, thus complementing Pharmacopeia's own drug
discovery efforts". (Press release of Pharmacopeia, see www.pharmacopeia.com).141
agreement enables new entrants to pre-empt rivals in generating innovation
within specific therapeutic fields and can establish the basis for forging a
privileged relationship with a specific organization (Gambardella 1995).
More generally, the faster new entrants move to develop or access novel
screens and/or new classes of compounds, the faster they can identify and
erect isolating mechanisms around the therapeutic category.
Unsurprisingly, as table 6.4 shows, it is the National Institute of Health,
with 79 grants, licensing and research agreements, which carries the palm
with respect to the number of awards and alliances. This should not come as
a major surprise. The NIH is the single most important source of funding for
basic research in the United States.^' The table also has something to say
about the origins of the partners involved, suggesting that scientific
organizations are much more likely to sign on new entrants from their home
country, though the data cannot provide a comprehensive picture of
international and national trends. Better insights can be gained by examining
table 6.5. As expected, scientific organization-new entrant relationships are
mainly an American phenomenon. New entrants in the US entered into 678
agreements (85.3 percent of total), whereas new entrants in EU-15 only
engaged in 80 alliances (10 percent). This is a manifestation that EU-based
entrants are less numerous, and their scientists and scientific organizations
perhaps less commercially oriented, than their US-based counterparts. With
82 new entrants (21 percent of total), EU-15 trailed the American
entrepreneurial sector (72.5 percent of total).
It is also telling that American new entrants collaborated 598 times with
scientific organizations from their home country, 47 times with EU-based
ones and 33 times with other ones. By comparison, firms from the European
Union established 58 alliances with EU-15 scientific organizations, 18 with
American ones and 6 with non-US, non-EU-15 ones. As US-based firms
seem to benefit almost as much as EU-based firms from European public
science, it would be tempting to assert that EU-15 underestimates the value
of its own public research. This does not, however, completely explain why
22.5 percent of EU-15 firm alliances are with American scientific
organizations while only 6.8 percent of US firm alliances are with EU-15
scientific organizations. One possible reason is that chemical-based
companies in EU-15 turn to the American network for innovations in
biotechnology in general and genomic technologies in particular. For EU-15
lags behind the US in these technological and scientific areas (Orsenigo 1989;
Senker 1998), EU-based entrants are compelled to license technologies or
partner with American scientific organizations for biological targets.
91. Take only the case of the National Cancer Institute (NCI). In 2001, the NCI had a
budget of $US 3.754 million, enough money to support 4,695 external research projects
and 400 researchers performing intramural research.142
Table 6.5
Formal network
Alliances between new entrants and scientific organizations
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/fl/brma/ inferorganizafjo/ia./ agreemenfs taween new entrante and sriendfic
organizaf/om
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 present a different, albeit complementary, picture
from formal network: informal network. While the phenomenon of informal
interorganizational agreements is more difficult to observe, gauge and
analyze, Liebeskind and colleagues (1996) took on the challenge by looking
at scholarly publications on which scientists of different organizations were
named as authors. Multi-addressed papers are an interesting proxy for
measuring knowledge transfer because co-authorship provides an
opportunity for extensive discussion, debate, exchange of ideas, and joint
problem solving (Cockbum and Henderson 1998). Accordingly, the results
of Liebeskind et al. (1996) suggest that informal networks increase the
learning and flexibility of new biotechnology firms in ways that could not
have been possible v/a formal networks.
The data used here have been extracted from a publication database
comprising 2,570 papers focusing on combinatorial chemistry, of which 755
papers had been written by one or several scientists from at least two
different organizations.^ Several trends can be observed from the resulting
92. The database was built using the CD-roms of the Institute for Scientific
Information (1SI). Such an enterprise was fraught with difficulties. The most important
one is that the term "combinatorial" spread only very slowly. For example, the first
article referring to combinatorial chemistry in CAemicai & fng/neering News, the official
newsmagazine of the American Chemical Society (ACS), only appeared in 1993, when
Jonathan A. Ellman and coworkers at the University of California, Berkeley, described
their small molecule benzodiazepines library. To circumvent this problem, a series of
keywords such as "parallel synthesis", "library", etc. had to be used. However, a netsite
entirely dedicated to combinatorial chemistry (www.5z.rom) proved to be helpful as it
lists combinatorial papers since the technology appeared in 1982.143
statistics (see table 6.6). First, as one may have expected from scientometric
analysis, scientific organizations, rather than firms, constitute the core of the
informal network. The informal network encompasses 516 different
scientific organizations, considerably less than new entrants (85).
Universities, public and pivate, non-profit research organizations therefore
seem to be more interested in exchanging knowledge with other scientific
organizations than with industry. Only 356 papers (47 percent of total) had
been written between scientific organizations and new entrants.
Table 6.6
Informal network
Co-authorship of scientific papers between new entrants and scientific
organizations -by geographical location (1986-1996) (percentage of the total)
US firm EU firm Others TOTAL
US scientific organization 189 (86.3) 6 (2.7) 27 (12.3) 2l9
EU scientific organization
Others
TOTAL 230(64) 52(14.6) 78(21.9) 356
(100) (100) (100) (100)
(100)
Source: Compiled by author
Second, it is clear that informal interorganizational agreements are akin to
formal linkages in that new entrants from the US (64 percent of all cases) are
much more effective in linkink with scientific organizations than EU-15
companies (15 percent) and firms from the rest of the world (22 percent).
American firms had written 189 papers with US scientific organizations, 26
with European ones and 15 with scientific organizations from other
countries. By contrast, new entrants from EU-15 had co-authored papers
with 6 American scientific organizations, 44 with EU-15-based ones and 2
with non-US, non-EU-15 ones. Third, some scientific organizations,
especially in the US, are more likely to collaborate with new entrants than
are others (see table 6.7). For example, Medical Research Council,
Edinburgh University and University of Nottingham produced 8, 6 and 4
scientific papers, respectively, with other firms, but their combined
contribution appear to be no match for the Scripps Research Institute (33
papers) and Arizona University, which alone wrote 32 papers with the
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Source: Compiled by author
A final remark must be made about informal interorganizational
agreements with pioneer scientists. As the early combinatorial synthesis
methods have important roots in a Hungarian University, a Dutch
government laboratory and a new chemical-based entrant from Australia,
this absence of informal linkages between EU-15-based entrants and these
organizations suggests that new American entrants have been able to access
directly the know-how of the inventors of the parallel synthesis and multiple
synthesis methods. Thus US-based firms and scientific organizations did not
hesitate to establish contacts with some of the original inventors. For
instance, Advanced Chemtech and Arpäd Furka, the inventor of the first
simultaneous multiple synthesis, at Eötvös University in Budapest
collaborated in 6 different papers between 1994 and 1996, a collaboration
that may have reinforced the firm's position in multiple synthesis method and
instrumentation. Most important is the series of papers written by Mario
Geysen, a co-inventor of an important parallel synthesis technique. Geysen,
then at Common Serum Laboratories (CSL)/Coselco Mimotopes in
Australia, co-authored articles with the Scripps Research Institute as early as145
1987 and University of California, Los Angeles, in the early nineties. This
informal collaboration may have been a turning point in the dissemination of
"combinatorial" knowledge in the United States. As reported in table 6.2,
Scripps Research Institute, America's largest not-for-profit biomedical
research center,^ and University of California, Los Angeles, subsequently
became leading contributors of combinatorial libraries in the country.
6.3.3 The provj'jj'on o/vocaf/ona/ JM/S
There is a general consensus that the recruitment of skilled graduates by
companies is one if not the most important technology transfer mechanism
from university to industry (Salter and Martin 2001). It is therefore
instructive to note that combinatorial chemistry is now part of the academic
curriculum. In 1996, University of Louisville was the first to teach the ABCs
of combinatorial chemistry in Academia in the United States, followed by
University of Pittsburgh, Harvard University, University at Buffalo,
University of Utah, Ohio State University and Cold Spring Harbor
University. Northeastern University, for example, offers a lecture course,
Chemistry 4388, as an introduction to the subject. The course covers: (1)
peptide chemistry and its application to the discovery of ligands for
biological receptors; (2) combinatorial chemistry in drug discovery,
materials science and catalysis; (3) methods of solid-phase synthesis; (4)
automation in synthesis, analysis, and purification; (5) data handling; (6)
design of diverse screening libraries; and (7) drug design (Borchardt 2001).
In EU-15, Leeds University, University of Manchester, Cambridge
University and Newcastle University in Great Britain, Lund University (SE),
the Technical University of Denmark (DK), Barcelona University (SP),
Trinity College University (IR), Milan University 0T) and Marburg
University (DE) are also known to give some form of training in the field.
Few universities have courses that focused solely on combinatorial
chemistry, however. Most of them include combinatorial chemistry into a
bioorganic chemistry or drug discovery course.
Nonetheless, combinatorial chemists are not born, but made. Put
alternatively, the idiosyncratic nature of companies' knowledge base implies
that industry would often choose to hire scientists who possess know-how in
synthetic organic chemistry, yet are familiar with the combinatorial synthesis
methods, and then train them with the specific needs of the firm in mind.
This is why universities should make students active participants in the field,
as for example by engaging them in the construction of libraries. This could
foster problem-solving abilities that can prove valuable once they reach the
93. The Institute's staff includes more than 270 professors, 800 postdoctoral fellows,
1500 laboratory technicians, administrative and support personnel, nd 126 Ph.D.
students.146
marketplace.^ Yet, despite the growing body of evidence suggesting that
universities are slowly getting to grips with the emergence of combinatorial
chemistry, there is still an acute shortage of skilled graduates with expertise
in the field in both the US and EU-15 (Kelly 2000). According to the
recruiting pages of the C/iem/cai <& fngi/jerring News, the US industry regularly
suffers a short supply of specialists in this technological area (Brennan 1995,
1997, 2000). Echoing this concern, a survey by the European Federation for
Pharmaceutical Sciences (EUFEPS) indicates a potential lack of qualified
personnel in QSAR and chemical synthesis in EU-15 (Mooney 2001). If it
transpires that the pharmaceutical industry truly suffered shortages of well-
trained researchers in combinatorial chemistry, thereby setting limits to the
development of the industry, government intervention will be necessary.
6.3.4 Die creation o/"spin-o/R
Scientific organizations also create spin-offs when an employee leaves the
parent organization with a core technology to form a company of his/her
own (Lindholm Dahlstrand 1997). Of the numerous possible examples of
technology transfer, the creation of spin-offs appear to be one of the most
effective in terms of job and wealth creation (Rogers et al. 2001). For
example, BankBoston (1997) estimated that 1,065 MIT-related firms
headquarter in Massachusetts employ 125,000 people in the state.
In view of the fact that 393 new entrants have been using the tools of
combinatorial chemistry, the information provided in table 6.8 only covers a
small fraction of the firms using combinatorial chemisty. However, examples
of university scientists playing the role of entrepreneurs, as opposed to ex-
employees of smaller and larger companies, are so numerous that links
between public research and industry cannot he ignored. In fact, it is much
more difficult to unravel corporate spin-offs than academic and institutional
spin-offs. Coselco Mimotopes (spun off from Commonwealth Serum
Laboratories), Chemspeed (Roche), Basilea Pharmaceutica (Roche),
Origenix (Hybridon), Guilford Pharmaceuticals (Scios Nova), Diversomer
Technologies (Parke-Davis), Tularik (Genentech), Sarco (Glaxo), XenoPort
(GlaxoSmithKline), HTE (BASF) and Locus Discovery (Sarnoff Corporation)
are perhaps the only examples of corporate spin-offs in the sample. By
contrast, faculty members and scientists working for government
94. In the words of Jörg Setter, head of the life science department in central research
at Bayer: "We are not really looking for combinatorial chemists. Normally, we prefer to
hire synthetic organic chemists with broad experience in different types of synthesis, and
then educate them here in the company to become combinatorial chemists. Normally,
we don't need to have people who have specialized only in combinatorial chemistry,



































University of Cal. -Berkeley
University of Cal. -Berkeley
University of Cal -San Diego
University of Cal -San Diego
Univ. of Cal -San Francisco








































































































































































































Sou/re: Compiled by authoro
Figure 6.2
Location of rtart-ups and research output of scientific organizations as of 2000149
laboratories or private, non-profit organizations, most of them highly qualified
chemists, helped launched 47 new entrants (see table 6.8). Of these
entrepreneurial spin-offs, 35 spun out of American scientific organizations, 9 had
their roots in EU-15 ones and 3 from non-EU, non-US ones. These results may
suggest that the problem in the Europe Union resides much less in the volume
and quality of its research in combinatorialchemistry than a lack of either
entrepreneurial culture or venture capital. Yet, in spite of this, EU-15 appears to
be improving in terms of firm formation in the second phase of the industrial
development. 39.5 percent (or 101) of US-based entrants and 56.1 percent (46)
of EU-15 based ones had been founded after 1996. This finding is in consonance
with the pattern of growth in the volume of venture capital in recent years across
the member states of EU-15. In relative terms, overall venture capital investment
in EU-15 has increased three times over 1998 and 200 land seed and start-up
investment has increased four times over the same period (COM 2001).
Lastly, it needs to be insisted that spin-offs often neighbor with their parent
organization (Rogers et al. 2001). For example, the Association of University
Technology Managers (AUTM 2002) reported the foundation of 454 new
companies based on an academic discovery in fiscal year 2000, 80 percent of
them in the state where the technology originated. The issue of where spin-offs
are located becomes crucial, given that closeness to science contributes to ease
the transfer of technological know-how. It is, therefore, important to note that
California fares better than any other state and even country in terms of firm
foundation. Of the American spin-offs, 16 (or 46 percent of the sample) spun out
of California-based scientific organizations. As figure 7.1 demonstrates, California
saw the foundation of 102 new entrants, of which 59 in the environs of San-Diego
and 39 in the environs of San-Francisco Bay. At the same time, scientific
organizations from these areas had been responsible to the synthesis of 86 and 58
compound libraries. This contrasts with Massachusetts, which has 42 new entrants
and 18 combinatorial libraries. Thus, an important competitive advantage of
California-based firms may rest on their ability to better benefit from technology
transfer and knowledge spillovers stemming from the most performing scientific
organizations in the United States.
6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In light of the above discussion, a series of observations can be made about the
contribution of scientific organizations to industrial innovations. First of all,
combinatorial drug discovery relies heavily on know-why and inventions created
in scientific organizations: combinatorial synthesis methods, scientific
instruments, identification methods, chemoinformatic tools, combinatorial150
libraries, lead compounds, genomic sciences and so on often have their origins in
academia, government laboratories and private, non-for-profit research
organizations. The second series of observations is that scientific organizations
directly contribute to the dissemination of knowledge supporting drug discovery
into entrepreneurial setting, having hundreds of formal and informal linkages with
new entrants, offering an increasing number of Ph.D. studentships, courses,
workshops aid seminars in the area of combinatorial chemistry, and being the
source of dozens of new spin-offs around the world. Formal and informal
interorganizational agreements are particularly important for the firm because
they may provide a significant impetus for renewing its knowledge base and
competences and can help pre-empt rivals in innovations. Last of this series of
observations is the fact that the United States has dominated the field in any major
respects: firm formation, combinatorial libraries and lead compounds under per-
clinical and clinical stages. Although the strengths of US-based new entrants is,
without doubt, the product of many factors, the number of formal and informal
linkages between scientific organizations and the industry and the creation of
scientific organization spin-offs, most notably in California, may play an important
role in tilting the balance in favor of the United States.PART IV: THE PERFORMANCECHAPTER 7
Determinants of Higher Performance
in a Turbulent Environment
/femember t/iaf in f/ie fieW ofoftservaf/on,
r/ranre on/y favours fne prepared m/nd.
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Among the numerous shortcomings with the I/O theories is that they ignore the
message of chapter 2: firms are heterogeneous with regard to their resources and
competences -the elements that explain performance differences in industry. As
postulated by the resource-based theory of the firm, the source of superior
performance rests "upstream" of product markets, lying on the firm's rare,154
valuable, non-imitable and non-substitutable bundle of resources and
competences. While the tenets of resource-based theory of the firm have been
given weight by empirical evidence, these arguments do not necessarily hold in a
turbulent environment, where demand and technologies are so volatile and
competition so intense that resources and competences can rapidly fall into
obsolescence. Probing at the case of combinatorial chemistry, the preceding
chapters demonstrated that a static emphasis on intangible assets and competences
would have proven fatal to most providers of discovery libraries. If anything can
shed light on the survival of these new entrants in the context of a competence-
enhancing discontinuity, it is their ability to rapidly learn new knowledge from
internal and external sources, which enabled them to enhance, expand and renew
their competences along the second, third and fourth trajectory.
Still, these firms and diversified, or newly formed, new entrants with a
competence in combinatorial chemistry are highly heterogeneous with regard to
their learning strategies, accumulated knowledge stocks and historical
backgrounds and thereby performance. To improve our general understanding of
why some of these companies occupy a high performance position in the markets
of chemical-based services and small molecule drugs, section 7.2 will focus on
developing 12 different knowledge-based hypotheses. The following sections
describe the data (section 7.3) and the results of the correlation and regression
analysis (section 7.4). Section 7.5 concludes the thesis by recapitulating on its
major themes and by articulating some normative prescriptions.
7.2 HYPOTHESES
Creating small molecule drugs and offering chemical-based services are not a one-
off event for new entrants. To survive in a turbulent environment, where
technologies, customers demand and competition change rapidly, new entrants
must constantly bring about new, or improve old, product and process
innovations to maintain or improve their performance. The key input for
successful innovations is knowledge, which in turn becomes an output reinforcing
the firm's competences in organic synthesis, molecular biology, etc. Learning in
R&D therefore helps new entrants adapt to the evolving external environment
and enhances their performance. Thus, the first research proposition is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: New entrants with a higher level of internal learning will perform
better than their rivals.
Few, if any new entrant has the scientific, technological and financial capacity to
go alone. For one thing, the rapidity, complexity and uncertainty of155
technological change suggest that these firms need to get access to the knowledge
and technologies of other smaller companies, most notably genomic firms. For
another thing, the costs associated with combinatorial drug discovery and
development and the absence of complementary assets in entrepreneurial setting
place a premium on collaboration with large incumbents. Yet another thing is
that new entrants seeking to achieve fast penetration in pharmaceutical markets
can explore new possibilities and renew their knowledge base and competences
by linking with scientific organizations. Insofar as membership to the innovation
network is paramount for successful performance, one can hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 2: New entrants with a higher level of external learning will
perform better than their rivals.
Consistent with the arguments of Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990), external
learning is complementary, rather than supplementary, to internal learning. This
is because new entrants must participate in scientific research in order to
monitor, absorb and use external know-why in structural biology, chemistry, etc.
Thus:
Hypothesis 3: New entrants with a higher level of internal learning will also be
those with a higher level of external learning with scientific organizations.
Combinatorial chemistry is a prime example where public research has resulted in
ideas that are of economic value. To see this, one only has to mention that the
first synthesis, identification and computational methods originated in scientific
organizations. Most significantly, genomic research receives considerable
attention in academia, private, non-for profit organizations and government
laboratories, offering tremendous opportunities for chemical innovations. Against
this backdrop, the market for therapeutic products and services is intensely
competitive, rapidly evolving and subject to rapid technological change, and
there is a clear advantage in being the first in identifying the relevancy of new
knowledge and technologies developed in the laboratories of scientific
organizations, where they are at their earliest stages. Therefore, the greater a
firm's access to know-why and know how from scientific organizations, the higher
will be its economic performance. In formal terms:
Hypothesis 4: New entrants with a higher level of external learning with
scientific organizations will perform better than their rivals.156
New entrants cannot sit on their laurels and live isolated without branching out to
the innovation network. In line with Delia Valle and Gambardella (1993), this
strategic move should be accompanied by organizational changes: entrepreneurial
firms ups must create a stimulating research environment resembling that of
Academia. This implies that company scientists, as academic scientists do, be
offered the opportunity to attend conferences, communicate with their peers and
publish their results. But why would new entrants publish? After all, publishing
papers takes time, costs money and could end up "leaking out" valuable know-
why and know-what into industry. Hicks espouses the following argument:
companies "need to participate in the barter-governed exchange of scientific and
technical knowledge and ... need to send signals beyond that reflected in prices.
Publications signal the existence of tacit knowledge and other unpublishable
resources, thus building the credibility needed to find partners in knowledge
exchange" (1995:421:422).Thus:
Hypothesis 5: New entrants promoting research "openness" will also be those
with a higher level of external learning.
New entrants have often acted upon the belief that size matters, that economies of
scale and scope can be achieved if two or more firms from similar, or
complementary, backgrounds combine their technology platforms and/or
research activities. For these firms, mergers and acquisitions remain a popular
vehicle for broadening their knowledge base and competences and thereby
creating synergies between chemistry and biology. Most significantly, a merger or
acquisition may allow them break the rigidity of a platform technology model, to
become fully integrated drug discovery companies. This also often opens the
door to the emerging market of small molecule drugs, as opposed to just offering
chemical-based or biological-based services to large pharmaceutical companies.
Thus:
Hypothesis 6: Learning through acquisitions is an important source of higher
performance.
The location of new entrants and research output of scientific organizations were
shown in figure 6.2. Of the 256 new US-based entrants with an expertise in
combinatorial chemistry, 102 (40 percent) are located either in the San Diego or
the San Francisco Bay area. The propensity to set up shop in California is the
result of many factors, including the presence of venture capital and the
availability of both specialized inputs (e.g. reagents, target receptors, purification
tools) and specialized labour. Geographical proximity to the Scripps Research157
Institute, the Torrey Pine Institute for Molecular Studies and the University of
California, Berkeley, may also explain why clustering mainly occur in California,
as opposed to, say, Utah or Mississippi. Closeness to these scientific organizations
not only facilitates the transfer of tacit know-how and codified know-why but also
increases the likelihood that knowledge spillovers keep flowing into new entrants,
contributing to raise their productivity. To summarize:
Hypothesis 7: New entrants located nearby centres of excellence will perform
better than their rivals.
As noted by Sorensen and Stuart (2000), dder companies should have learned
from experience and accumulated a larger stock of tacit know-how, and hence,
should be more efficient in the way their organizational routines are executed.
Due to time compression diseconomies, their head start is also difficult to erase
because rivals cannot simply double R&D expenditures to catch up with the first
movers (Dierickx and Cool 1989). In addition, early entrants are more likely to
be diversified companies, those with higher sales and/or previous experience in
drug discovery. Counterarguments, however, exist. New entrants are competing
in a turbulent environment, where technology, demand and competition evolve
rapidly. While younger firms begin their operations with a clean slate, often with
new technologies licensed from universities, older firms tend to build on
previous technological achievements and may find it difficult to match their
knowlewdge base and competences with environmental demands (Serensen and
Stuart 2000). In formal terms:
Hypothesis 8: Early entrants perform better than late entrants. Or, inversely,
late entrants perform better than early entrants.
Due to the generic nature of chemical sciences, a foot in the pharmaceutical
industry did not prevent new entrants from diversifying into new market
segments, especially those of new materials, catalysts, phosphors and pesticides.
Granted, these firms had to broaden their knowledge base in order to reach these
new markets. Still, new entrants capable of meeting both technological
opportunities can achieve returns to scope, given that knowledge used in one
pharmaceutical-oriented project can be transferred efficiently to a new-material-
oriented project. Synergies across disciplines could also be accomplished, for
example, the solution to a particular problem in one project could increase
productivity of another through knowledge spillovers. Thus:
Hypothesis 9: Diversified firms perform better than their rivals.158
Smaller companies find it easy to focus on technological change. Yet, despite a
behaviorial, or learning-based, advantage, smallness can be a liability as far as
combinatorial chemistry is concerned. With new threats and opportunities
compelling single technology platform firms to become multiple technology
platform firms, a great many skills and hence a deeper stock of human capital are
needed for moving along the value-added chain of combinatorial research (i.e.
lead discovery, lead optimization, structure-based library design, synthesis of new
materials, catalysts, etc.). As an empirical matter, it has often been observed that
economies of scale are strong in the pharmaceutical industry, thus benefiting
larger new entrants from increased specialization of know-why and know-how
(e.g. Comanor 1965; Grabowski 1976). Paraphrasing Henderson (2000), I may
have to be good in analytical, computational and medicinal chemistry if there are
only three of us; I can specialize in medicinal chemistry if there are 20 of us.
These ideas can thus be summarized:
Hypothesis 10: Larger entrants will perform better than smaller companies.
Combinatorial chemistry is both research and know-why intensive. Such intensity
calls for highly specialized labour, not just technicians and management. Not only
these scientists will perform state-of-the-art research but also will be able to
better monitor, assess and absorb knowledge carried out in the laboratories of
other companies and scientific organizations. This brings us to the eleventh
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 11: New entrants with highest number of PhDs will perform better
than their rivals.
As shown in chapter 4, new entrants may have entered the markets of chemical-
based services and small molecule drugs through diversification, merger or
acquisition. The knowledge base of combinatorial drug discovery suggests that
these firms, be it biopharmaceutical or rational drug design companies, have not
been locked-in with the wrong kind of knowledge and competences. On the
contrary, biopharmaceutical or rational drug design companies can use their
stock of accumulated knowledge and competences h molecular biology, X
crystallography, pharmacology and so on and had often made the transition to
drug discovery, with many exhibiting revenues from the sales of their products.
Underlying this idea is that "history matters": past success in the therapeutic drug
market makes it less, rather than more, difficult to cope with the competence-
enhancing discontinuity because the accumulation of germane knowledge and the
revenues generated by the sales of these drugs enable firms to rapidly and159
efficiently absorb the methods and support research in combinatorial drug
discovery. Thus:
Hypothesis 12: New entrants with past success in drug discovery will perform
better than their rivals.
7.3 M ETHOD: SAMPLE AND MEASURES
The study began over a population of 90 firms, launched between 1979 and
1998. All had a competence in combinatorial chemistry, and all went public at
NASDAQ. However, 20 firms became too large (i.e. more than 1000
employees), went out of business or were acquired by a large incumbent before
2001, and hence, were excluded from the sample. Among the remaining 70 new
entrants, one is from Great Britain, 2 are from Canada and 67 are from the
United States. The sample has the obvious disadvantage that most firms are US-
based, preventing effective comparison across countries. From a strategic point
of view, however, the main results should remain valid whether the firm is of
American, English or German origins.
Variafcies
Evaluating the performance of new entrants is bound to be a controversial
issue, if only because the concept means different things to different people. Is it
profits? Growth? Size? Liquidity? Efficiency? Innovativeness? Market share?
Accordingly, performance measures used in entrepreneurship research vary
widely, ranging from measures such as returns on assets to respondent assessment
(Murphy et al. 1996). As sociologists correctly pointed out, interest groups play
a vital role in the choice of these measures (Kanter and Brinkerhoff 1981). Stock
market returns are more valuable to shareholders than the growth of employees;
the growth of employees is more valuable to policy makers than returns on sale;
etc. Therefore, the relative importance of measurement depends on where you
sit. One may also recognize the fact that performance measures are often not
consistent or stable over time, often leading to contradictions. For instance,
growth measures often require expenditures that are made at the expense of
profitability for a time (Fryxell and Barton 1990). Unsurprisingly, there are poor
inter-correlations between performance measures (Dubofswki and Varadarajan
1987; Murphy et al. 1996).
95. There is even evidence that stakeholders, which range from labor unions to business-
environmental groups, have different interests and hence competing demands. See, for
example. Savage et al. (1991).160
Yet, in the absence of performance indicators, the knowledge-based theory of
superior performance presented in this thesis loses all its relevance. As stated by
Chakravarthy: "without a performance referent managers cannot objectively or
consistently evaluate the quality of their strategic decisions" (1986:437). While
there is no consensus as to how best to measure performance, most scholars agree
that research in entrepreneurial settings should consider different performance
criteria (Chakravarthy 1986; Murphy et al. 1996). Some potential indicators can
be discarded at the outset. Data about market share are simply unavailable for this
business. The growth of employees as a barometer for high performance is also a
problem considering that new entrants often grow as a result of mergers and
acquisitions. Hence, this thesis will use 6 measures commonly used in the
strategic management literature to gauge how new entrants perform in a
turbulent environment: (1) revenues from services and products per employee
(REVEM); (2) returns on equity (ROE); (3) returns on assets (ROA); (4) price-
book ratio (PBR); (5) net profit level (PL); and (6) innovations (PAT).
37ie /ndependenf Far/aWes
The data for the sampled population are summarized in Table 7.1. Six
variables were used to operationalize technological learning, 4 variables for
knowledge assets and one for path dependence. While internal learning could
only be measured by R&D expenditures, 5 different measures were used to assess
different dimensions of external learning: (1) external learning (i.e. number of
total agreements); (2) external learning with scientific organizations (i.e. number
of agreements with universities and non-profit organizations); (3) research
"openness" (i.e. number of published libraries); (4) learning through acquisitions
(i.e. number of merger and acquisition) and (5) localization effects (i.e. dummy
variable set equal to one if the firm is located in California). In this sample, 63
new entrants out of 70 (90 percent) had established linkages with universities, 16
(23 percent) had published libraries and 24 (34 percent) are located in California.
Regarding knowledge assets, four different dimensions were examined using
four different measures: (1) age (i.e. the number of years of experience a new
entrant accumulated since inception), (2) diversification (i.e. dummy variable set
equal to one if the firm is involved in material R&D); (3) knowledge depth (i.e.
number of employees) and (4) size (i.e. number of employees with Ph.Ds). This
sample includes 9 firms involved in material R&D. Finally, the number of
marketed drugs, as a measure of past success in drug discovery, captures in an
Indirect way the fact that firms follow different paths in the course of their life
cycle. This is because firms with no drugs in the market are usually de novo
entrants, whereas firms with marketed drugs are usually entrants through161
diversification, that is, biotechnology or rational drug discovery firms that have
diversified their technology protefolios to include combinatorial chemistry. Thus,
57 firms had no marketed drugs at all, whereas 1 firm had 7 drugs, 2 had 5 drugs,
1 had 4 drugs and 13 had 1 one. Consistent with the theory presented in this
thesis, the table shows that new entrants are highly heterogeneous with regard to
their learning strategies, knowledge stocks, historical paths and, ultimately,
performance. For example, research expenditures vary considerably, from $ US
0 to $ US 231,278,000. (No research spending was attributed to a firm exiting
the industry in 2001). Another example may be found in the fact that a firm held
one EPO patent whereas another had 135 patents.
Table 7.1
Descriptive statistics of new entrants in 2001
Variable
1 Revenue per employee' (REV)
2 Returns on equity (ROE)
3 Returns on assets (ROA)
4 Price book ratio (PBR)
5 Profit/Loss' (PL)
6 Number of patents (PAT)
7 R&D expenditures (RD)
8 Number of alliances' (ALL)
9 Number of alliances with scientific
organizations (SCI)
10 Number of published libraries (PUB)
11 Number of acquisitions (M&A)
12 Localization effects (LOC)
T3~Äge(ÄCE)
14 Competence in material R&D (NM)
15 Number of employees (EMP)
16 Number of PhDs (PHD)









































































1 = in thousands US dollars
Sample: 70 firms
7.4 Results
The Pearson correlation results are presented in table 7.2. From it, and
consistent with the results of Dubofswki and Varadarajan (1987) and Murphy et
al. (1996), one can see that correlation among performance indicators hardly
gives positive results. More importantly, returns on equity, returns on assets,
price-book ratio and net profit level as a measure of performance prove to be162
unhelpful in our efforts to explain success (or failure). In retrospect, judging new
entrants with these indicators is neither fair nor useful. Indeed, paybacks are
drawn out over many years: it takes 10 years to bring a drug to market, and the
average firm sampled in the analysis is only 12 old. One should also have expected
high volatility regarding the financial performance of these new entrants,
reflecting the high uncertainty of this sector.^ Patent as an indicator of
innovativess performs better than financial proxies: they correlate positively with
internal learning (i.e. R&D expenditures), external learning (i.e. number of
alliances), research "openness" (i.e. number of published libraries), employees,
PhDs and drugs. However, one should remain cautious about patent counts as a
proxy for corporate performance, since patents vary hugely in their technological
and economic significance (Pavitt 1988; Griliches 1990). In addition, the results
of a linear regression analysis were not statistically significant.
Superior results were obtained for both the correlation and regression analysis
when revenues derived from sales and research contracts were used as a proxy for
performance. To claim that revenue as an indicator of performance produce
positive results, however, is not the same as claiming that all hypotheses have been
validated. Neither merger & acquisition (hypothesis 6) nor age (hypothesis 9
made a very large difference in whether the firm received high revenues.
Beginning with hypothesis & the empirical test fails to show a strong match
between learning through acquisitions and economic performance. Taken at face
value, the results may suggest that learning through acquisitions have no impact
on revenues. However, the results must be tempered by the fact that this strategic
decision is fairly recent: tie vast majority of M&As occured during the last 2
years. To the extent that the integration of knowledge specialists from different
location, organizational culture and even scientific background cannot be
achieved in such a short time span, the question as to whether M&As are
beneficial to merging or acquiring firms remain open question. Regarding
hypothesis 8, one possible explanation can be put forward for explaining a poor
association between age and revenues: younger companies have an advantage over
older firms in having access to up-to-date, top-level scientific knowledge while
having a disadvantage over older ones regarding the way they execute their
organizational routines.
On the other hand, the correlation test reported in table 7.2 confirms
96. Consider the example of Vertex Pharmaceuticals. Recently, Vertex's compounds for
failure of chemotherapy, VX-710 and VX-853. have completed Phase II and Phase I,
respectively, but aren't currently advancing any further in -house, and have yet to be partnered
out. Vertex also announced it had withdrawn one of its lead drugs, VX-745. from clinical trials
after observing damage at very high doses in animals. Investors almost instantly knocked 28
percent off the stock price on the news (Goldman 2001).163
hypothesises 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 12. Specifically, the correlations seem to
indicate that positive association exists between performance and (1) internal
learning (2) external learning, (3) external learning with scientific organizations,
(4) localization, (3) diversification, (4) size and (5) previous success in drug
discovery. Thus R&D expenditures, the number of total, the number of alliances
with scientific organizations, proximity to the best scientific organizations,
related diversification into combinatorial material, number of employees,
number of PhDs and number of drugs in the market was strongely correlated with
higher performance. Table 7.2 also provides some support for hypothesis 3 and 5,
given that external learning is positively correlated with internal learning and
research "openness".
To further substantiate these results, the explanatory power of each dependent
variable for which there is no colinearity was examined to provide the best fit
model. Several independent variables were indeed so highly correlated that it
becames difficult or impossible to distinguish their individual influences on the
firm's performance. Consequently, only 5 explanatory variables could be
identified, as table 7.3 demonstrates. In this simple model where it is assumed
that new entrants overcome the uncertainty, complexity and velocity
surrounding drug discovery and development, the results demonstrate that
scientific linkages, localization, number of employees, a competence in
combinatorial material and marketed drugs increase their expected revenues. The
basic model of firm performance is as follows:
REV= a +ß,SCI+ B2LOC+ 63 EMP + 64 NM + 65 DRU
By far the most consistent predictors of superior performance were having
competence in new material and having frequent linkages with universities, non-
profit research organizations. Thus these results may suggest that knowledge used
in pharmaceutical can efficiently be used in new material R&D: diversified firms
are best positioned to boost revenues. The results also show that new entrants
tapping into public research can greatly benefit from know-why created in
scientific organizations. The positive effects of external learning with scientific
organizations on revenues have an important implication for new entrants in EU-
15, the consequence being that these firms, being less connected to the most
important source of scientific knowledge, should generate fewer revenues than
new entrants in the United States.
There is also evidence suggesting that size and thereby economies of scale can
help determine differences in performance. Indeed, successful new entrants use
more, not less, employees. As one might have expected, past experience in drug
discovery also bestows an advantage as the increase in revenues is directly§Table 7.2
Intercolleration matrix
VaTübü REV KOK RÜA PBR PI PAT—RD—ALT—SCI—PUB M&A LOC ACE—Rffl—KMP PHD DKU
REV 1
ROE .054 1
ROA .389** .313* 1
PBR .102 -.513**-.158 1
PL .112 .302* .084 -.003 1
PAT .275* .141 .084 .014 -.503** 1
RD .352** -.064 .153 .122 -.750** .632** 1
ALL .400" .024 .126 .042 -.164 .437** .359** 1
SCI .377** -.222 .067 .047 -.072 .167 .213 .362** 1
PUB .156 .121 .032 -.083 -.220 .431** .207 .420** -.084
M&A .219 .203 .106 -.166 .036 .111 .072 .518** .198 .224 1
LOC .281* .166 .142 .155 .018 .149 .175 .086 .031 .156 .049 1
AGE .183 .044 .146 .025 .060 .130 .055 .098 .198 -.108 .070 -.115 1
NM .325** .129 .182 -.104 .145 -.128 -.056 .167 -.087 .188 .210 -.008 -.169 1
EMP .504** .121 .293* .047 -.401** .485** .725** .589** .170 .326** .375** .149 .033 .181 1
PHD .382* .189 .350 -.214 -.118 .317* .459** .630** .144 .518** .563** .017 -.224 .456** .909** 1
DRU .415** .121 .116 .160 -.432** .510** .654** .184 .102 .122 .070 .184 .126 -.097 .514** .175 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
• Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 - tailed165
attributable to the number of marketed drugs. Finally, the results confirmed the
prediction that firms located in California should have higher revenues, though
several cautionary notes are necessary. While one has assumed that localization
effects derived from closeness to the science base, one could also make the case
that California-based new entrants have better access to venture capital,
specialized inputs and specialized labour. The data simply cannot distinguish
between these factors.
Table 7.3


















































This thesis started by asking the following question: what conditions separate the
winning new entrants from the losers in a turbulent environment? Chapter 3
examined the extent to which knowledge and its creation can improve a firm's
competences and thereby its performance position in a turbulent environment.
The resulting theory argued that different learning strategies, knowledge stocks
and historical paths can explain inter-firm differences in performance. The
remainder of the thesis probed at the case of combinatorial chemistry, with
chapter 3 beginning the discussion by opening the "black box" of the synthesis
methods, chapter 3, 4 and 5 assessing the evolving role played in the innovation
network by new entrants, large incumbents and scientific organizations and this
chapter providing the first insights into the sources of superior performance.
Given the complexity of the discussion, it is appropriate for this conclusion to
summarize the main findings and ends with some normative prescriptions.166
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the old screening paradigm is back, if
not with a vengeance, then with increased efficiency. However, combinatorial
chemistry was not a single, isolated event, since tie early methods had been
introduced in a "primitive" form by scientific organizations. This is mainly why
employees of scientific organizations, new entrants and large incumbents, most
commonly scientists from the chemistry profession, had to push the limits of the
radical innovation with incremental improvements: small molecule libraries
largely replaced peptide libraries; compatible organic reactions for solid phase
synthesis were developed; automated instruments took over manual synthesis;
etc. By the late eighties-early nineties, "heroic" entrepreneurs in the
Schumpeterian mould gave birth to the first new chemical-based entrants. More
generally, a new breed of companies, linking the ideas of the pioneering scientists
to the market, began performing R&D contracts and licenang on a non-exclusive
basis large random libraries to large Pharmaceuticals companies.
But while combinatorial chemistry can be taken to be a competence-
destroying discontinuity by the economies of scale it generates, it is really a
competence-enhancing process discontinuity in view of the fact that large
Incumbents had long been familiar with its underlying knowledge base. As a
result, and following the predictions of Tushman and Anderson (1986), the
introduction of combinatorial chemistry had enhanced, rather than destroyed, the
competences of large pharmaceutical companies. By the mid-nineties, every large
drug maker was determined to develop a competence in the new synthesis field
with or without new entrants and scientific organizations. Yet the majority, if not
all large incumbents opted to actively learn through acquisitions and/or inter-
firm cooperation with their smaller cousins. By the late nineties, the transition
from the traditional screening method to combinatorial drug discovery was
essentially complete, making the market for large collections of compounds less
lucrative to new entrants. At the same, large random libraries became less
appealing from a technological point of view while competition in the field
intensified: the market share of drug-like compounds had to be split among more
new entrants, scientific organizations and specialist suppliers, often from Russia
and Eastern Europe.
This does not necessarily mean that combinatorial chemistry firms had been
doomed from the start. Indeed, recent genomic discoveries about the origin and
mechanism of a particular disease open up unprecedented opportunities for
screening operations and hence stimulate more combinatorial study and
experimentation. There may be as many as 10,000 targets and therefore potential
10,000 niche markets worthy of pursuit, and new entrants willing to crack the
market of small molecule drugs know that large pharmaceutical companies will167
not have a stronghold on all of them. Thus, many therapeutic areas are below the
radar screen of these drug companies, providing ample technological and
commercial opportunities for fast-learning new entrants. Hence, new
developments continue at a rapid pace, with scientific organizations, large
incumbents and over 390 new entrants engaged in improving both process and
product innovations. They have been highly successful. The incremental
evolution of the technology, in particular its fruitful fusion with the rational drug
design approach, have led to major reductions in discovery and development
times. The application of combinatorial chemistry also became more widespread,
covering not only Pharmaceuticals but also the areas of new materials, catalysts,
agro-chemistry, etc.^
Very important to recall here is that new entrants willing to leverage synergies
between combinatorial chemistry and genomics (or new materials) could no
longer simply rely on a single technology platform, given the "commodities"
nature of discovery libraries. To the extent that the chemical-based services and
combinatorial drug (new materials) discovery approach transcend the discipline
of chemistry to include molecular biology, engineering, computational specialists
and so on, new entrants have had to create new knowledge and reinforce existing
competences and/or developing new ones. However, the business in which these
firms are involved is characterized by rapid, complex and uncertain technological
change, stiff competition and customer demands change. To cope with such a
turbulent environment, top management has been making attempts to integrate
their company not only vertically but also horizontally through linkages with
other smaller firms. As shown in chapter 4, these alliances provided a means for
learning the knowledge of the other and have been formed with the aim to pre-
empt rivals, to get access to complementary knowledge that would have been too
costly to create internally and to reduce risks. Motivated by long-term profits,
many if not the majority of new entrants became, or were formed to be, multiple
technology platform companies. The logic behind the formation of a multiple
technology platform company is the willingness to carve a niche in the small
molecule market, though it must be added that the move offers the benefit of
introducing a "causal ambiguity" as the reconfiguration of different knowledge
streams makes it difficult for rivals to completely understand.
97. One thing that companies also are just coming to appreciate is that combinatorial
automation in process development is becoming increasingly important as more drug
candidates enter the pipeline (Van Arnum 2000). Additionally, it has also recently been
discovered that the combinatorial synthesis approach can be extended to identify and validate
targets and thereby probe the whole proteome, giving rise to an entirely new field of research
-chemical genomics (Dormän et al. 2001).168
This willingness played a crucial role in stimulating structural changes in the
pharmaceutical industry. More precisely, and contrary to the Tushman-Anderson
model, de novo entry, along with entry by diversification and entry following
mergers and acquisitions, have worked to increase the number of new entrants in
the small molecule drug market and will certainly help fill the demand for
chemical-based services and products. This further affected the market structures
of the pharmaceutical industry, with combinatorial chemistry acting as a catalyst
in a new division of labour between large and small firms. The explanation is
quite straightforward: large pharmaceutical companies need to plug their
innovation gap with small molecule drugs. It follows that a strong
complementarity exists between large incumbents and new entrants. In spite of
their matwm/ advanfage, large pharmaceutical firms continue to fall short of
expectations regarding the commercialization of therapeutic innovations. In spite
of their fte/iaWorai advantage small firms cannot afford to distribute and market
their innovations. This dynamic complementarity is apparent in the evolving
pattern of relationships between new entrants and large established companies,
where an important increase of joint R&D and licensing agreements has been
recorded between 1996 and 2001.
There is, however, a wide variation in revenues per employee across new
entrants. If one returns to the theory forwarded in chapter 3, it can be argued
that these inter-firm differences in performance is the outcome of different
learning strategies, stocks of accumulated knowledge and historical backgrounds.
This clearly suggests that a superior performance position, far from being the
outcome of a random process, depends on a firm's ability to learn from external
and internal sources, the depth and breath of its knowledge stock and the path it
has followed in the course of its history. A turbulent environment, however,
confront firms with difficult choices. Which brings us to the initial question: what
conditions separate the winning new entrants from the losers in a turbulent
environment? This chapter presented results suggesting that performance is
associated with (1) external learning with scientific organizations, (2) localization,
(3) diversification, (4) size and (5) past successful experience in drug discovery.
The support for this claim is that (1) the number of alliances with scientific
organizations, (2) location in California, (3) a competence in combinatorial
material, (4) number of employees and (5) the number of marketed drugs help
determine how much a firm can earn in revenues from sales and contracts per
employee.
There is an obvious limitation to all of this, and that arises from the fact that no
single combinatorial drug has ever reached the marketplace. It is hard, especially
when one is dealing with a product that takes up to ten years to move fromlaboratory to market, to foresee whether a small molecule drug will succeed
clinically and economically. The empirical test presented here is also not exempt
from problems. The lessons that can be drawn from it must be tempered because
the data that are examined only capture financial year 2001, thus amounting to a
snapshot of the sampled industry and limiting the scope of the conclusions. The
results, clearly, should be further refined by a longitudinal analysis. In addition,
performance within firms rests on a blend of factors, which could never be
entirely captured by a correlation and regression analysis. Finally, the study
should be extended to include performance indicators other that revenues per
employee.
Yet few dimensions of a firm's performance are more vital for its survival than
revenues derived from sales and inter-firm collaborative agreements. One reason
is that new entrants with high revenues per employee are well along the way to
generating profits. Another reason is that new entrants concerned about long-
term outcome and securing enough revenues can hope to survive until they can
develop their own small molecule drug pipeline. The analysis can therefore
provide guidance to managers. A first recommendation is that firms seeking to
keep abreast of competition must resist the temptation of focusing on a single
technology platform and integrate different technologies under the same roof.
Grafting knowledge specialists where possible is a convenient way to achieve this
objective. Not only would more chemists, biologists and so on enable a firm to
serve new markets but also would create scale and scope economies that will
ultimately increase revenues. In this respect, it is is important to bear in mind
that scale and scope economies cannot be achieved if a company runs its
businesses as isolated units: contributions from one business should be able to
cross over to the other business (Ghemawat 1986). A second recommendation is
that learning, albeit taking place in different places, is especially fruitful with
scientific organizations. However, it is important to remark that external
collaboration with scientific organizations, while providing a means to renew a
firm's knowledge base, can nevertheless fail to internalize important elements of
know-why and know-how if not combined with higher levels of internal learning.
This leads us to a third and fourth recommendation. On the one hand, and
following Cohen and Levinthal (1990), new entrants must increase R&D
expenditures in order to absorb the new knowledge. On the other hand, and
following Delia Valle and Gambardella (1993), new entrants must encourage
"openness" of their research. In concrete terms this should translate into
employees publishing scientific papers, participating in conferences and
communicating with peers.170171
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
Een centraal thema in industriele organisatie 0/0) is dat externe factoren de
winstmogelijkheden van individuele bedrijven vorm geven. Winsten, of het
gebrek daaraan, worden bepaald door de industrie en worden voornamelijk
gezien als gevolg van marktmacht en sectorstructuur. Deze theorieen hebben
uitgewezen behulpzaam te zijn in het economisch onderzoek, maar hebben ook
nun keerzijde. Ten eerste hebben deze theorieen de economische wetenschap zo
lang gedomineerd dat het verleidelijk is te suggereren dat bedrijven slechts hun
prestaties zouden kunnen verbeteren door zieh te wenden tot een attractieve
sector en/of door zieh te wapenen tegen concurrentie. Ten tweede is het I/O
paradigma niet in staat verschillen in efficiency tussen bedrijven te verklaren in
een zelfde industrie of strategische groep van bedrijven. In deze context zal een
bedrijf dat de concurrentie achter zieh wil laten weinig steun ondervinden van de
voornamelijk statische I/O literatuur.
Teneinde de problemen met de I/O zienswijze het hoofd te bieden,
combineert de op kennis gebaseerde theorie van superieure prestaties, die in
hoofdstuk 2 wordt ontwikkeld, bijdragen uit de resource-öased zienswijze van het
bedrijf en de naar voren tredende op kennis gebaseerde theorie van het bedrijf
met evolutionaire economie, de economie van de innovatie, organisatorisch leren
en de industrie-levenscyclus literatuur. Meer in het bijzonder schrijft de theorie
de resou/re-tesed zienswijze een manier voor die nauw verbunden is met de bron
van comparatief voordeel met betrekking tot de hulpbronnen van het bedrijf.
Maar, zoals aanhangers van het dynamische capaciteitsraamwerk snel hebben
aangetoond, zal het bezit van hulpbronnen en competences onvoldoende zijn om
welvaart te creeren in roerige omstandigheden. Deze dynamische
capaciteitstheorie heeft een belangrijke bijdrage geleverd door erop te wijzen dat
"the competitive advantage of firms lies with its managerial and organizational
processes, shaped by its (specific) asset position, and the paths available to it"
(Teece et al. 1997:518). Dit laatste argument, met betrekking tot de drie
dimensies van het bedrijf als determinant van superieure prestaties geeft een
goede gelegenheid een model te ontwikkelen dat zieh rieht op het in kaart
brengen van de kenmerken van kennis en de creatie en accumulate daarvan. In
het bijzonder stelt de dissertatie dat het lot van het bedrijf: (1) direct verbunden
is aan het technologische leerproces, (2) dat wordt geconditioneerd door de
geaccumuleerde hoeveelheid kennis, en (3) wordt gekenmerkt door
padafhankelijkheid. Verwant aan Dodgson (1991) wordt het concept van
technologisch leren hier gedefinieerd als f/je process t/iaf aMoire firms to en/ianoe.196
expand and/or renew their competences as a response fo changes in fechno/cgy, competition
and demand.
Hoewel de dissertatie zieh in essentie bezighoudt met 66n onderzoeksvraag,
namelijk de conditie die winnaars onderscheidt van verliezers in turbulente
omstandigheden, zijn de langetermijn gevolgen van twee vormen van
technologische discontinuiteit ook van belang: (1) competentievernietigende
discontinuiteit, die het gebruik van "new skills, abilities and knowledge in both
the development and production of the product" met zieh meebrengt, en (2)
competentieverhogende innovaties, die "built on existing know-how within a
product class" (Tushman 1986:441-442). De implicatie die wordt getrokken uit
dit onderscheid is dat het eerste effect de competitieve nadruk verschuift in het
voordeel van nieuwe toetreders, terwijl het laatste effect een competitief
voordeel verschaft aan bedrijven die reeds in de markt hun plaats hebben
verworven.
Om twee redenen levert de combinatorische chemie (of combichem) een
interessante achtergrond op om deze gedachten te toetsen. De eerste reden is dat
bedrijven in de combichem opereren in een turbulente omgeving waarin
technologie, vraag en competenties snel veranderen. Technologisch leren is
uiteraard van cruciaal belang. De tweede reden is dat, hoewel combichem wordt
gezien als een eenvoudig probleemoplossend proces, een technologisch platform,
een genera/-purpose technologie of een technologie ten behoeve van
massaproductie, tevens een competentieverhogende proces van discontinuiteit
herbergt. De combinatorische aanpak om medicijnen te ontdekken rust op een
kennisbasis (i.e., chemie, biologie, geautomatiseerd Instrumentarium en
informatie technologie) die reeds decennia lang ter beschikking is, al gekend is en
wordt gedeeld door wetenschappelijke instellingen en bedrijven, maar die tot
vele malen meer verbindingen toelaat te syntheniseren tegen veel lagere kosten
dan conventionele methoden. Dit punt kan niet voldoende onder de aandacht
worden gebracht, daar de grootste bottleneck in de therapeutische medicijnmarkt
niet langer een biologische is, maar veeleer een chemische. Hoewel iedere
ontdekking van een medicijn zieh traditioneel trachtte te richten op 500
moleculaire doelen (Drews 1997), heeft de explosie van nieuwe doelen die
voortkomen uit het Human Genome Project de last van de innovatie op de
schouders van de organische chemici gelegd. "We're in a very target-rich but
lead-poor post-genomics era for drug discovery", legt Raymond Stevens,
onderzoeker aan het Scripps Research Institute en mede-oprichter van Syrrx, uit
(Henry 2001:69). Het gebrek aan verbindingen zou echter tot op zeker hoogte
teniet moeten worden gedaan door nieuwe toetreders, die 979 moleculen in de
pijplijn hebben.197
Hoofdstuk 3 handelt over technologische verandering en de manier waarop
combichem een technologische discontinuiteit introduceerde en een basis
formeerde voor een groot aantal incrementele innovaties op vier technologische
trajecten. De basismethodologie is historisch gericht, waarbij nadruk wordt
gelegd op het dynamische patroon van kenniscreatie in combinatorische
medicijnontdekking. Sectie 3.2 heeft als doel de grondbeginselen, methodes en
onderliggende principes in combichem te identificeren. Sectie 3.3 bestaat uit
drie gedeeltes, die ieder de dynamiek van technologische ontwikkelingen in het
veld belichten. Sectie 3.3.1 ontleedt de combichemmethode om nieuwe
medicijnen te ontdekken in vijf pre-klinische stappen teneinde in Staat te zijn de
eerste twee technologische trajecten op waarde te schatten: incrementele
innovaties die zieh bezighouden met: (1) de Synthese van compound//oraries en (2)
de ontdekking en optimalisatie van geleiding. Sectie 3.3.2 rieht zieh op een
samenvatting van het onderzoek dat is uitgevoerd onder de paraplu van de zieh op
kennis baserende combichem als middel het derde technologische trajeet
inzichtelijk te maken en de verdere integratie met de rationele wijze van
medicijnontwikkeling te belichten. Sectie 3.3.3 beschrijft het vierde traject, dat
is, de recente veranderingen die combichem, samen met recente ontwikkelingen
in de software en hardware, teweeg heeft gebracht in nieuwe materialen,
katalysatoren, pesticiden, etc.
Hoofdstuk 4 draait om het aanpassen van een bedrijf in de context van een
turbulente omgeving. Ongeveer 393 nieuwe toetreders hebben tot op heden een
bekwaamheid in combichem weten te bewerkstelligen, en slechts 8 bedrijven
hebben hun activiteiten stopgezet, hun aandelen verkocht of zijn gestopt vanwege
een gebrek aan financiele middelen. De sleutel van deze hoge graad van
overleving van nieuwe toetreders ligt in hun oenav/oura/ advantage. Liever dan de
industrie te verlaten, zijn deze bedrijven geneigd om te gaan met veranderende
technologie, concurrentie en vraag door aanpassing. Dat wil zeggen, nieuwe
toetreders zijn in Staat geweest hun kennisbasis en bekwaamheid door
technologisch leren längs het tweede, derde en/of vierde technologische traject
te loodsen, waarbij vele, zo niet de meerderheid, zijn verworden tot volledig
geintegreerde pharmaceutische bedrijven die zieh richten op het ontdekken van
nieuwe medicijnen. Sectie 4.2 is voornamelijk opgenomen om te illustreren hoe
de voorwaarden met betrekking tot het betreden van de pharmaceutische
industrie en de (agrochemische industrie zijn veranderd als gevolg van de
ontwikkelingen op het gebied van combichem. Sectie 4.3 rieht zieh op twee
fundamentele fases in het proces van industriele ontwikkeling: (1) het bedrijf als
verschaffer van compound «cranes; (2) het bedrijf als verschaffer van goederen en
diensten op chemische grondslag, en dan met name kleine moleculaire198
medicamenten. Daarnaast biedt deze sectie een beschouwing van de bijzondere
relatie tussen deze nieuwe, op chemie gebaseerde, toetreders en andere kleine
bedrijven, in het bijzonder bedrijfjes die zieh bezighouden met genomics. Sectie
4.4 laat zien dat de recente ontwikkelingen met betrekking tot het grote aantal
fusies en overnames niet het gevolg lijken te zijn van een op handen zijnde "shake-
out", maar veeleer geinterpreteerd moeten worden als een logische uitkomst van
het besef dat rigiditeiten kunnen worden doorbroken en schaalvoordelen kunnen
worden behaald indien kennisspecialisten met complementaire vaardigheden
worden samengebracht onder hetzelfde dak. Sectie 4.5 besluit dit hoofdstuk en
suggereert dat het overleven van nieuwe toetreders mogelijk blijft in een veld
met op de achtergrond competentie-verhogende discontinuiteit.
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat nauwgezet in op de reactie van grote pharmaceutische en
(agro)chemische bedrijven: (1) in-house ontwikkeling, (2) overname van nieuwe
toetreders, (3) leren door allianties aan fe gaan met nieuwe toetreders en (4)
wetenschappelijke organisaties. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat het gat tussen kleinere
en grotere bedrijven nog nooit zo groot is geweest met betrekking tot de
achterstand van grotere bedrijven op de leercurve, en dat de grotere bedrijven
voornamelijk de kleinere overtreffen met betrekking tot comtonaroria./ l/örary
oufpuf. In theorie zou dit de toekomst van de langetermijn ontwikkeling van
nieuwe toetreders kunnen overschaduwen. Het voornaamste argument is dat
grote pharmaceutische bedrijven, die zieh snel de regeis van het spel hebben
eigengemaakt, het voordeel van hun grootte kunnen uitbuiten door middel van
schaalvoordelen en zo de nieuwe toetreders zullen gaan verdringen. In de
praktijk, en dat wordt in het hoofdstuk aangetoond, blijkt het echter moeilijk
voor grotere bedrijven om zelfstandig te handelen. Hoewel ze een materieel
voordeel hebben ten opzichte van nieuwe toetreders, lijkt het erop dat beide
partijen elkaar even hard nodig hebben.
Het tweeledige doel van hoofdstuk 5 is de bijdrage van publiek gefinancierd
onderzoek voor industriele innovatie te benadrukken en de volgende puzzel op te
lossen: de combinatorische onderzoeksoutput van wetenschappelijke organisaties
in de landen van de Europese Unie (EU-15) is goed vergelijkbaar met die van in
de Verenigde Staten gelokaliseerde wetenschappelijke instellingen, maar de
Amerikaanse private sector lijkt veel gezonder te zijn dan waar ook ter wereld.
Het blijkt inderdaad zo te zijn dat Amerikaanse toetreders het goed doen op alle
gebieden: (1) het vormen van bedrijven, (2) combwatoria./ /iörary oufpuf, (3)
patenten, (4) compounds under pre-din/cai sfage, en (5) compounds under tunicai stage.
Deze dominantie is waarschijnlijk toe te schrijven aan verschallende, gerelateerde
factoren, waaronder het verfijnde systeem van durfkapitaal, grotere bedrijven
etc. Dit hoofdstuk brengt een engere kijk naar voren met betrekking tot de199
relatie tussen wetenschappelijke organisaties en nieuwe toetreders door te
suggereren dat de Verenigde Staten een comparatief voordeel hebben ten
opzichte van andere landen dankzij de grotere verspreiding van "publieke" kennis
in de Amerikaanse economie.
Het laatste gedeelte van de dissertatie en hoofdstuk 7 keren terug naar de
theorie van hoofdstuk 2 en laten een groot aantal van de thema's uit de
hoofdstukken 3, 4, 5 en 6 de revue passeren. Het laatste hoofdstuk is slechts
gericht op een enkele theoretische vraag, namelijk de voorwaarden die de
winnaars van de verliezers onderscheiden in een turbulente markt. Een
correlatie- en regressieanalyse worden geintroduceerd om te testen of betere
prestaties zijn gerelateerd aan de volgende factoren: niveaus van intern leren,
niveaus van leren bij andere organisaties, het leren door overnames, research
"openness", locatie, grootte en diversificatie. De resultaten laten het belang zien
van (1) extern leren bij wetenschappelijke organisaties, (2) lokalisatie in
California, (3) het aantal werknemers, (4) bekwaamheid in combichem en (5)
vroegere ervaring in de ontwikkeling van medicijnen. Het hoofdstuk en daarmee
de dissertatie concluderen met de volgende normatieve voorschriften: bedrijven
kunnen hun opbrengsten verhogen door een meervoudig technologisch platform
te creeren, door middel van het verhogen van het interne niveau van leren, door
het bevorderen van research "openness" en door sterke banden te onderhouden
met wetenschappelijke organisaties.200201
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